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Press Review October 2026

 Uganda

In a letter addressed to the Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission, Ugandan lawyer Mwanje Gideon urges the organisation to oppose the externalisation of European migration policies. He denounces the agreements by which European states (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands) ask African countries (Rwanda, Uganda, Senegal, Ghana, Mauritania) to detain migrants in exchange for financial aid, at the risk of undermining African sovereignty and exposing people to violations of their rights. Recalling the principle of non-refoulement under international law, he calls on the AU to investigate existing agreements, to publicly condemn those who “trade human dignity for funds”, and to dissuade its members from entering into them. He also advocates easier free movement between African countries - along the lines of the ECOWAS area, where the 1979 protocol guarantees nationals of member states the right to enter without a visa, to reside and to settle - in particular visa-free access to the cities hosting African continental institutions.

After the failure of the regional disembarkation platforms project in countries of the Global South in 2018, the failure of the 2022 UK/Rwanda deal to externalise asylum applications to Rwanda, and the failure of the 2023 Italy/Albania memorandum of understanding intended to externalise migration management, the EU has not said its last word. The project of return “hubs”, or extraterritorial expulsion platforms, made possible by the European “Return” Regulation, which came into application on 16 October 2026, paves the way for externalised camps on the territory of third countries to which people whose asylum applications have been rejected or who have no right to stay on European territory would be expelled, without necessarily having any link with those countries.

Five European states are thus discussing the opening of a first camp planned for 2027, with Uganda and Rwanda as the first partner countries under consideration [1]. In this asymmetrical balance of power, the African states on whose territory the return hubs would be located are set to become subcontractors of European expulsion policy [2]. These return hubs represent a new stage in the externalisation of European migration policies: far from the eyes of European society and beyond the reach of European law, people on the move “transferred” to a third country with which they may have no connection (neither country of origin, of residence nor of transit) will be subjected, in complete opacity, to violations of their rights: risks of arbitrary detention, of a violation of their right to international protection and to an effective remedy, and of the principle of non-refoulement. All this in the absence of European judicial and democratic oversight, either before or after the removal.

 Libya

On 13 October, the European Union committed an additional 25 million euros to extend its migration cooperation with the authorities of eastern Libya, under the control of Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The funds are intended to finance “border management, search and rescue operations and the fight against smuggling networks”. This initiative is part of the strengthening of relations between Brussels and the authorities of eastern Libya, despite the EU’s official recognition of the Tripoli government alone. It notably extends the project to create a regional operational surveillance and rescue centre in Benghazi [3], along the same lines as the one created in Tripoli in December 2017.

With this new funding, the EU is formalising its rapprochement with the forces of Marshal Khalifa Haftar, even though it does not officially recognise them. This extension had been in preparation for several months: the technical agreement concluded in May 2026 under Operation Irini [4] already provided for training, equipment and support for maritime coordination infrastructure in eastern Libya [5]. The new 25-million-euro funding also helps consolidate a partnership with forces involved in serious and systematic violations against people on the move, notably arbitrary detention, torture and collective expulsions [6]. By financing this centre, the EU lends legitimacy to forces whose authority it does not officially recognise [7]. Under the 1979 SAR Convention [8], a rescue coordination centre organises operations at sea and identifies the place of disembarkation for rescued persons. Supporting the Benghazi centre therefore amounts to treating the authorities of eastern Libya, de facto, as legitimate interlocutors in maritime matters. By choosing to extend this cooperation rather than put an end to it, despite documented rights violations [9], the EU prioritises controlling the departures of people on the move over its obligations of reception and protection, and contributes to reinforcing the impunity of the actors to which it delegates the interception of people on the move.

 France

On 8 October 2026, France confirmed the opening of a “technical dialogue” with the Taliban regime to facilitate the expulsion to Afghanistan of Afghan nationals who have no right to stay on French territory and who are presented as a risk to national security. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs specifies that these exchanges do not amount to recognition of the regime, France having maintained no diplomatic relations with the Taliban since August 2021 and its embassy in Kabul remaining closed. France thus joins some twenty EU member states, including Germany, Belgium and Sweden, in favour of negotiations with the Taliban to carry out expulsions to Afghanistan.

These negotiations are part of a European dynamic which, ready to expel at any cost, normalises dialogue with a repressive regime. The German example shows where the argument that only nationals presented as a risk to national security would be concerned leads: in France, no precise criterion has been put forward by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in Germany, a decree of July 2026 lifted the restriction that reserved expulsions for Afghans convicted of a crime [10]. On 28 July, an Afghan national with no criminal record, whose asylum application had been rejected, was thus expelled from Germany to Afghanistan [11]. International organisations and human rights associations (Human Rights Watch [12], Amnesty International [13], UN [14]) have documented massive human rights violations there, making any expulsion to Afghanistan dangerous and contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits inhuman and degrading treatment. Finally, by hiding behind the “technical” nature of the exchanges, Paris - like Brussels, Berlin and Vienna before it - paves the way for negotiations that offer a form of political rehabilitation and legitimacy to a regime ostracised internationally for its serious violations of rights. In the name of “migratory pragmatism”, member states seem ready for every compromise and every renunciation.

 Greece

On 15 October, the Greek authorities announced the arrest of a 13-year-old South Sudanese teenager, accused of having piloted a boat carrying 50 people on the move from Libya to Crete. Three other South Sudanese minors were also arrested for similar acts. These arrests, which are increasing as arrivals on the island intensify, are part of a practice denounced by human rights organisations: people on the move of all ages are prosecuted and heavily sentenced on the basis of summary proceedings, without fair trial guarantees.

Since the 2015 European Agenda on Migration made the fight against smugglers a priority [15], people attempting to reach Europe have been massively prosecuted for facilitating so-called irregular immigration for allegedly piloting a boat - sometimes under coercion or threat [16], or simply to obtain a better price for the crossing - and sentenced to disproportionate penalties of up to several hundred years in prison [17]. In February 2023, 2,154 people were detained in Greece on charges of facilitating so-called irregular immigration (“smuggling”), representing 20% of the prison population, the second largest group [18]. It is accompanied by serious violations of fundamental rights: charges based solely on the testimony of coast guards, impossibility of cross-examining them, insufficient interpretation, summary trials (8 minutes on average) [19] and minors tried as adults [20], in disregard of the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Convention on the Rights of the Child [21] .

On 2 October 2026, Greece asked the European Union to provide for an emergency mechanism allowing member states to temporarily suspend the registration of asylum applications in the event of mass arrivals at the borders. Presented by the Greek Minister of Migration, Thanos Plevris, at the Justice and Home Affairs Council in Luxembourg, the proposal targets in particular situations such as the arrival of more than 72,000 people in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta in July 2026. Supporters of the measure argue that the European Pact on Migration and Asylum, which entered into application in June 2026, does not provide sufficient tools to deal with such situations.

In July 2025, the Greek Parliament had already suspended for three months the registration of asylum applications by people arriving by sea from North Africa, notably in Crete, citing “mass arrivals”. Other European countries (Poland, Finland) had also resorted to this unlawful measure. This proposal coming from Greece is therefore not trivial. Moreover, the proposal goes further than the “crisis and force majeure” regulation [22] of the European Pact on Migration and Asylum, which already allows temporary derogations from certain asylum procedure rules (extension of the deadline for registering asylum applications, extension of the duration of the border examination procedure and of detention). The Greek proposal, for its part, aims to suspend the registration of protection applications, at the risk of collective refoulements, in violation of international and European law (Geneva Convention [23] and EU Charter of Fundamental Rights [24]).

 United Kingdom

The British Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood, is threatening to ban all Eritrean nationals from entering the United Kingdom if Eritrea does not accept more expulsions of people who arrived by small boats and of people with criminal convictions, through the issuing of consular travel documents. Since 15 October, Eritrean diplomats have not been allowed to travel more than 60 km from London without authorisation, and fast-track visas for senior Eritrean officials and diplomats have been suspended. Eritrea denounces a political manoeuvre and accuses London of refusing any serious dialogue. The United Kingdom has already made similar threats of visa restrictions against the DRC, Angola and Namibia, which gave way.

The British threat against Eritrea amounts to migration bargaining turned into a method, aimed at inducing so-called third countries to cooperate on expulsions, through various levers. The United Kingdom thus models its practices on those of the European Union. The first incentive lever is political: the issuing of visas, in greater or lesser numbers, depending on the so-called third country’s degree of cooperation on readmissions. Since 2019, the EU Visa Code has made it possible to sanction states deemed insufficiently cooperative on readmission [25], a mechanism applied to The Gambia as early as October 2021 [26]. In the autumn of the same year, France halved its visas for Morocco and Algeria, and cut them by 30% for Tunisia [27], before restoring regular issuance in 2022 [28]. The second lever is financial: through economic compensation, European countries pay third countries to accept playing the role of border guards on their behalf and to take on their repressive and security-driven migration policies, as with the 105 million euros allocated by the EU to Tunisia to better control its borders and curb departures from its territory [29] or the 240 million pounds sterling paid by the United Kingdom to Rwanda under their migration agreement (UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership) [30]. These two levers, political and financial, each operate through sanction or incentive, in structurally asymmetrical relationships where European states set the terms of the exchange. They thus turn the mobility of third-country nationals into a bargaining chip, even for a country like Eritrea, whose asylum seekers in the United Kingdom are overwhelmingly granted protection at the first decision [31].

 Frontex reform

On 27 October 2026, the European Commission proposed a new reform of the mandate of the European agency Frontex, considerably strengthening its capacities and means of intervention at European borders, but also in third countries and online. The new mandate will notably allow it to support third countries - and no longer only member states - in expulsions, and to monitor social media content in order to anticipate the control of migratory movements and better obstruct them. Granted the status of “trusted flagger”, the agency could report to platforms content it deems risky for the protection of the EU’s external borders, content which would have to be examined as a priority in view of this status. The Commission also proposes the creation of a European Return Coordination Centre (Return Coordination Centre) specific to Frontex, to centralise the data of people on the move and plan expulsions at EU level, from their identification to their expulsion. To carry out its missions, the agency’s resources are considerably increased: the Commission plans for 30,000 officers by 2041, with the creation of a “European border and return reserve” of 17,000 officers at the disposal of member states. Frontex’s budget has constantly multiplied since its creation in 2004; with this reform it will amount to 11.8 billion euros for 2028-2034.

The reform proposed by the European Commission once again [32] prioritises strengthening Frontex’s powers without strengthening fundamental rights safeguards [33]. Even though Frontex has been accused for years of complacency or complicity in rights violations, its impunity has so far been almost total. The reform nevertheless extends its prerogatives outside the EU, adding a further risk of violations of the rights of people on the move far from the eyes of civil society and European law [34]. At the same time, internal safeguards are largely reduced: the Fundamental Rights Officer could only investigate in cases of direct involvement of Frontex staff, complaints concerning national border guards remaining the responsibility of their own authorities. The agency thus obtains ever wider powers and resources, while the mechanisms responsible for overseeing it are weakened, not only at European borders but well beyond.

 Return Regulation and return hubs

On 1 October, the Council of the EU formally adopted the Return Regulation, approved by the European Parliament in June 2026 and in force since 16 October. This text, which repeals the 2008 “Return” Directive and complements the European Pact on Asylum and Migration, governs the detention and expulsion of people without a legal right to remain in the EU. Above all, it completes 20 years of policies focused on coercion, mass confinement and the violation of the fundamental rights of people on the move. They will have to cooperate in their own removal on pain of sanctions, including criminal ones. Administrative detention of people will rise from 18 to 24 months, cumulative, with possible extensions in the event of a “security risk” or an obstacle to removal, and may be carried out in prisons. States will be able to issue expulsion decisions that specify no particular country of destination or that designate several, complicating or paralysing the exercise of legal remedies, and may impose an entry ban on their territory lasting 10 years. The provisions concerning return hubs, or expulsion platforms located outside and beyond the control of the EU, in third countries potentially with no connection to the person expelled, are immediately applicable, while the others will apply in one year.