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Press review September 2025

 Libya

On the night of 25 to 26 September, the civilian vessel Sea-Watch 5 came under fire from the so-called Libyan ’coast guard’ after rescuing 66 people in the Mediterranean. Sea-Watch points out that the patrol boat used by the Libyan forces was supplied to them by the European Union,viaItaly, as part of the memorandum of understanding on migration concluded in 2017 between Italy and Libya, which has since been renewed. The organisation denounces European complicity in this violence, given that Libya has no jurisdiction in international waters.

This latest attack comes just one month after the Ocean Viking, a civilian search and rescue vessel operated by the NGO SOS Méditerranée, was targeted by gunfire from a Libyan patrol boat. These repeated attacks mark an escalation in violence against civilian actors at sea. They are the direct consequence of European externalisation policies, which delegate control of migration flows to the Libyan authorities. By helping to train and equip [1]the so-called Libyan ’coast guard’, without everofficially denouncing their actions and abuses againstpeople on the move, the EU is complicit in serious violations of international law, including the disproportionate use of force against civilian actors. These practices criminalise sea rescue, hinder mobility and expose migrants to increased risks:pushbacks, violence and arbitrary detention. Through this policy, Europe is prioritising the closure of its borders over the protection of human lives and contributing to the impunity of militias operating in the central Mediterranean.

 Senegal

The Senegalese authorities, through the Interministerial Committee for the Fight against Irregular Migration (CILMI), announced that they had intercepted 1,946 migrants between January and March 2025. Nearly half of them were foreign nationals using Senegal as a starting point for their migration journey. The operations led to the arrest of 74 suspected smugglers and the seizure of 32 pirogues. This repressive strategy, accompanied byanofficial rhetoric about preventing the riskson migration routes, is part of a broader context of increased maritime and border control.

Behind the rhetoric of ’protection’, these measures are primarily aimed at preventing departures to Europe, at the cost of mass arrests and the criminalisation of mobility. They are a direct response to international pressure and partnerships, particularly with the European Union and its Member States, which finance the surveillance of Senegal’s coastline and make their aid conditional on increased cooperation against so-called ’irregular’ migration. This policy of closure increases the risk of rights violations and pushes peopleon the moveto take more dangerous routes.

 Lebanon

On 11 September 2025, nearly 300 Syrians were sent back from Lebanon to Homs, Hama and Idlib as part of a so-called ’voluntary’ return operation organised by the UNHCR, the IOM and the Lebanese General Security. Under economic and social pressure, the Lebanese authorities are promoting these returns by offering financial assistance and temporarily waiving fines for irregular administrative stays. This measure is part of a broader programme: since the beginning of the year, nearly 238,000 Syrians have reportedly already beensent backto Syria.

Behind the humanitarian rhetoric and the label of ’voluntary’, these returns are taking place in a context marked by repeated violations of rights and growing pressureon Syrians in Lebanon: stigmatisation, anti-Syrian violence, lack of access to fundamental rights and healthcare [2]. Under these conditions, many have no choice but to leave, even for a country that remains deeply unstable anddangerous. Despite the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, Syria continues to be marked by massive human rights violations, a ruined economy and ongoing war zones [3]. By organising and facilitating these returns, the Lebanese authorities and international agencies are undermining the right to asylum and exposing thousands of people to serious risks of persecution, violence and forced displacement.

 Germany

German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt announced that Germany would renew internal border controls within the Schengen area for the period from 16 September 2025 to 15 March 2026. He stated that Germany would continue to maintain such controls, arguing that "irregular immigration poses a serious threat to public order and security" [4] until the European Union’s external border protection system is fully operational.

This reinstatement was predictable, as it is part of the restrictive shift initiated by Chancellor Merz since he took office in May 2025.Thisis an almost constant and unapologetic practice of certain European Union Member States, including Austria, Poland and France [5]. In principle, the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) limits the reintroduction of internal border controls to a maximum of six months, unless the Member State can justify a serious threat to public order or internal security. In such cases, since the reform of the SBC in May 2024, controls may be reintroduced for a period not exceeding three consecutive years. In practice, the reintroduction of internal border controls is justified by misuse of the SBC. Behind the security rationale for these controls, which are often carried out on the basis of physical appearance, the authorities’ objective is to hinder mobility and massivelypush-back migrants, in particular to prevent them from applying for asylum in Germany.

 Belgium

Eight Frontex officers took up their duties at Brussels-Zaventem airport in early September 2025, a first in Belgium. This deployment is based on the so-called ’Frontex’ law, adopted on 16 May 2024, and on a royal decree of April 2025, which paves the way for a permanent presence of the European agency on Belgian territory, particularly at train stations and airports, to carry out checks, arrests anddeportations. Up to 100 officers will eventually be deployed to participate in deportation procedures. Presented as a simple ’technical’ reinforcement under the authority of the Belgian police, this installation is explicitly aimed at increasing the number of deportations.

This deployment raises issues in terms of access to rights, because it provides no effective guarantee against violence and inhuman or degrading treatment that could result from the presence of the European agency, which is legally untouchable [6]. In a context where Frontex is already being accused of complicity or complacency inpushbacksin the Aegean Sea or at the Balkan borders [7], this establishment in Belgium marks a new stage in the normalisation of repressive practices against peopleon the move, with the active complicity of European and national institutions.

 Spain

On 24 August, a pirogue that had left Senegal with around 300 people on board was rescued off the coast of Gran Canaria after an 11-day crossing. Survivors on board reported extreme violence: dozens of passengers were allegedly beaten and tortured, and more than 50 people were thrown overboard. Spanish police arrested 19 people, who were convicted of homicide and aiding illegal entry and residence.

Behind the emphasis on arrests, this tragedy reveals above all the structural violence of European migration policies. The policy of closing borders hinders the mobility of migrants, who, unable to obtain visas to travel safely, are forced to take the Atlantic route, considered one of the most dangerous in the world [8]. In addition, the increase in EU-funded interceptions on the Atlantic coast is leading to longer routes, while boats are already overloaded and often drift for days, leaving those on board without water or food. By criminalising only those it identifies as ’smugglers’, the Spanish justice system is turning a blind eye and contributing to the stigmatisation ofmigrants, who are often blamed for sailing out of necessity or under threat, when they themselves are victims of the system that forces them to risk their lives at sea.

 France

In early September, during a videoconference organised by France Travail, a former French Frontex liaison officer presented the job of border guard as an opportunity for ’young men’ attracted by ’the hunt’. The agency is looking to recruit 500 new agents by January 2026, lowering the required level of education from a bachelor’s degree to a high school diploma and offering an attractive salary. Officially, Frontex emphasises document verification and the administrative management of migratory movements, butthe comments made reveal a militarised and violent vision of the job, focused on apprehending and tracking migrants.

Thiscommunication illustrates the gap between the polished image that Frontex wants to project and the reality of its practices, namely that of an agency with a colossal budget, which ismass staffingto reinforce a European policy of externalisation and refoulement that violates the fundamental rights of migrants. The use of the word ’hunt’ speaks volumes about Frontex: it reflects a dehumanising view ofmigrantsas targets to be tracked down and contributes to their stigmatisation as ’criminals’. This new revelation comes at a time when the European agency is already mired in accusations of complicity in crimes against humanity [9]for covering up or participating in violent pushbacks in the Aegean Sea or at the borders of the Balkan route. Under the guise of strengthening border security, the European agency is consolidating a repressive apparatus that normalises violence, undermines the right to asylum and fuels the criminalisation of migration:’while France Travail condemned the comments made during this videoconference, the agency itself has not disavowed anything’ [10].


Greece

Greece further tightens its migration policy. The law passed on 3 September 2025 introduces prison sentences and fines for rejected asylum seekers who remain in the country and abolishes the regularisation mechanism for people without valid documents proving seven years of residence in the country. Applicants whose applications are rejected now have a ’voluntary departure’ period of 14 days, compared to 25 previously, to leave the country, failing which they face up to cinqfive years’ imprisonment and a fine of €10,000 for ’illegal entry’into the country. The law also provides that deportees may be required to wear an electronic tag until they leave the country,and the period of administrative detention has been increased from 18 to 24 months, in anticipation of the Return Regulation, which is still under discussion, but above all in violation of the current Return Directive.

By equating irregular residence with a criminal offence, Greece is choosing to criminalisemigrationand is once again contributing to the stigmatisation of migrants, in violation of the case law of the Court of Justice, which has ruled that irregular residence is not a sufficient ground for criminal sanctions. The acceleration of forced returns deprivespeople on the moveof their right to an effective remedy and increases the riskof them being deported to countries where their lives and rights are threatened, in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. The implementation of this law remains largely dependent on obtaining consular passes, which risks generalising the detention of migrants in disregard of their fundamental rights. The removal of regularisation channels condemns thousands of people who have been living in Greece for several years to permanent precariousness and legal insecurity, in disregard of their most fundamental rights.

The deterrent logic of this law will not prevent crossings of the Mediterranean, but it will pushpeople on the movetowards longer and more perilous routes,thereby increasing the number of shipwrecks and, more generally, the risks they face.

 Italy

On 5 September 2025, Italy grounded the observation aircraft ’Colibri 2’ belonging to the NGO Pilotes Volontaires for 20 days and fined the organisation €100,000. The aircraft is used to locate boats carrying refugees in distress in the central Mediterranean, particularly between Italy, Tunisia and Libya. According to the association, the seizure was made possible by the Flussi decree-law, which requires humanitarian air crews to report any boats they spot to the coordination centres and authorities in theadjacent areas, including the Libyan and Tunisian coastguards.

By criminalising civilian search and rescue actors at sea and imposing grossly disproportionate financial penalties on them, Italy is demonstrating its desire to hinder their actions and even, in the long term, to eliminate them, at the risk of causing more shipwrecks, as state naval patrols inthe Mediterranean Seawere withdrawn in 2019 in favour of aerial surveillance. This immobilisation is part of a worrying repressive trend by the Italian authorities [11], despite a ruling by the Italian Constitutional Court [12]that any decision based on punitive and discriminatory standards, circumventing international maritime law, should be considered illegal and illegitimate.

 Netherlands

On 25 September 2025, the Netherlands and Uganda signed a letter of intent on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, aimed at creating a ’return centre’ for rejected asylum seekers. This pilot project plans to sendto Ugandapeople who cannot be returned directly to their country of origin, particularly if it is neighbouring Uganda. Presented as an ’innovative solution’ by the Dutch government, this plan is in line with externalisation policies already tried elsewhere in Europe. It is reminiscent of the British deal to deport asylum seekers to Rwanda, which was ruled illegal in 2023 by the UK Supreme Court [13]. Announced in a political climate marked by the rise of the far right and anti-migrant protests in the Netherlands, the project has been met with fierce criticism, particularly in view of Uganda’s controversial human rights record [14].

This project reflects the Dutch ambition to expelmigrantsnot only from its borders, but from the European continent. By sending asylum seekers whose applications have been rejected to a third country such as Uganda, European states are delegating the management of the reception (and potentially thedeportation) of migrants to countries in the Global South,at the risk of causing serious rights violations and destabilising Southern countries, which already host large numbers ofmigrants.Behind the official rhetoric emphasising ’human rights-compliant centres’, this type of arrangementexposesthose concerned to an increased risk of persecution, violence and violations of their fundamental rights. Furthermore, these informal agreements create a zone of opacity and lawlessness: far from the gaze of European public opinion and supervisory institutions,migrantsare more vulnerable to abuse and inhuman or degrading treatment. This Dutch initiative, which comes after the failure of the British model in Rwanda, also continues a worrying trend: far from learning from the violations that have been observed, some European states persist in institutionalising externalisation, transforming third countries into detention zones and further undermining the reception ofpeople on the move.

 United Kingdom

Since mid-September, the first deportation flights to France have begun under the new reciprocal ’one in, one out’ agreement concluded onJuly the10thof2025. As a reminder, Paris has committed to ’take back’ anyone who has crossed the Channel and has not applied for asylum or whose asylum application has been deemed inadmissible in the United Kingdom, in exchange for the admission of anmigrantto British territory through so-called regular channels.

These deportations deprive asylum seekers of their right to an individual assessment, as the mere fact that they have crossed the Channel is sufficient for their asylum application to be deemed inadmissible in the United Kingdom. Applicants who are arbitrarily admitted to the United Kingdom are initially granted a three-month temporary residence permit without work authorisation, but they have no guaranteethatthey will subsequently be grantedtheright to remain, or even thatthey will be deportedif they do not obtain the right to remain. In France, readmitted persons have little prospect of success: they may apply for asylum provided theyhave notalready done so in anothercountry, at the risk of being placed in the Dublin procedure. Otherwise, they will be placed in a detention centre pending theirdeportationfrom the country.

The British government has suspended the right to family reunification for refugees and beneficiaries of ’humanitarian protection’. This procedure allows beneficiaries of international protection to apply for a residence permit for their spouse and children without having to meet the income and English language requirements that are required under the family visa procedure. The government has stated that this measure is temporary, pending the development of a reform aimed at tightening the conditions of thefamily reunification procedure.

With the suspension of family reunification, families who cannot obtain visas to travel safely are forced to take routes, particularly by sea, where their lives are put at risk. This suspension thereforeleads to the forced separation of families, in violation of the right to family life as protectedbyArticle 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This measure is part of a broader trend towards tougher migration policies in the United Kingdom and beyond in Europe, with Germany having already suspended the reunification procedure for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection [15].

 Frontex

According to an internal note from the Council of the European Union, Member States will soon discuss expanding Frontex’s mandate. The aim would be to enable the European agency not only to strengthen its cooperation with third countries, but also to organisedeportationbetweenthirdcountries,an option already rejected twice (in 2016 and 2019) by the European Parliament, the co-legislator. Some governments are even proposing to give Frontex a role in thedeportationplatforms set up in third countries, as provided for in the return regulation proposed by the European Commission in March 2025. The Commission has also proposed tripling Frontex’s staff by 2027.

This note illustrates the European Union’s desire to further strengthen the European agency Frontex, despite common sense, to push ever further the outsourcing of migration control and to place the burden on southern countries, at the expense of the fundamental rights ofpeople on the move. Furthermore, the establishment of extra-EUdeportationplatforms, combined with the announced tripling of Frontex’s staff, enshrines a logic of militarisation and relocation of European borders. This approach is in line with the European Pact on Migration and Asylum, adopted in 2024, and the agency’s already controversial practices. By giving even more powers to Frontex, the EU is legitimising a structure already marked by abuses and reinforcing a policy that prioritises control anddeportationover reception.