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Press review January 2026

 Libya

In Libya, 21 bodies of migrants were discovered in mid-January in a mass grave in Ajdabiya, in the north-east of the country. According to local authorities, the victims were being held in a farm that had been converted into a detention centre for people on the move. Several survivors, found in critical condition, helped locate the mass grave.

Mass graves are regularly discovered in Libya [1], and violations of the fundamental rights of migrants are constantly being reported [2]. Yet the European Union continues to collaborate with Libya, both in terms of funding [3] granted to ’strengthen border control’ and ’migration management’, and to train and equip the Libyan ’coast guard’ [4]. In this way, the European Union is helping to maintain a deadly system for migrants in Libya and is therefore complicit in massive human rights violations in the country [5].

 Mauritania

During a visit to Dakar on 8 and 9 January, Mauritanian Prime Minister Moctar Ould Diay stated that "all nationals from the African continent and the sub-region [were] welcome in Mauritania". By offering to accept all nationals from the African continent on its soil, Mauritania is offering a solution to European states which, faced with material and legal impossibilities, are unable to enforce all the obligations to leave the territory that they issue.

This declaration comes at a time when Nouakchott is constantly being criticised for violating the fundamental rights of people on the move [6]. Due to its location on the Atlantic coast and its proximity to the Canary Islands, Mauritania has become a major transit country to Europe. In March 2024, it signed a migration partnership with the European Union worth more than €200 million to ’prevent departures’ and in October 2025, the EU financed and built two ’temporary reception centres for foreigners’ there [7].

By delegating the management of its borders, the European Union has contributed to increasing and intensifying the violence committed against migrants [8], for whom Mauritania is not a safe country [9], particularly in view of the refoulements at the Senegalese and Malian borders, the mass arrests in situ, and even the increase in so-called ’voluntary’ returns.

 Rwanda

- Courrier international, “Rwanda sues the United Kingdom after cancellation of their migration agreement”, 28 January 2026

Rwanda has initiated arbitration proceedings before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague against the United Kingdom to claim £50 million after the country suspended payments under the agreement concluded between the two states in 2022 [10], the aim of which was to outsource to Rwanda applications for protection deemed inadmissible by the United Kingdom. In short, the idea was to send people who had arrived on British territory ‘irregularly’ to Rwanda, so that Rwanda could process their applications for protection. After many legal and political twists and turns, and following Labour’s victory in the British general election in July 2024, Keir Starmer effectively renounced the deal, declaring it ‘dead and buried’ [11].

This dispute highlights the commercial logic inherent in outsourcing, which ‘allows non-European authoritarian regimes to bail themselves out economically and be rehabilitated diplomatically’ [12]. It also reveals the limits of this outsourcing, as the agreement was abandoned due to reservations expressed by the British courts [13], which ruled that Rwanda was not a ‘safe third country’ and that there were serious grounds for believing that asylum seekers returned there would be at real risk of being subjected to ill-treatment. Although Rwanda reaffirmed on this occasion its commitment to providing security, dignity and opportunities to migrants, this position continues to contrast with the human rights violations reported in situ [14].

 Tunisia

After 20 months in detention, Sherifa Riahi, former director of Terre d’Asile Tunisia, was finally released on 6 January 2026 following her trial. As a reminder, the former director of Terre d’asileTunisie was prosecuted – along with other executives of the association and local elected officials – for ’facilitating the entry, accommodation and settlement of people in irregular situations’.

Although sentenced to two years in prison, the defendants were released, but their sentences were suspended in view of the duration of their ’provisional’ detention. However, this suspended sentence is a means of pressure used by the Tunisian authorities on local elected officials and human rights defenders to hinder their actions. Furthermore, the government of President Kaïs Saïed continues its repeated attacks on human rights defenders [15].

 Spain

While the European Union is in the process of ratifying the creation of ’return centres’ outside its borders for rejected asylum seekers, Spain is opposed to this. Its Minister of the Interior believes that these centres are a false solution with worrying legal and political implications, particularly in view of the centres in Tirana [16].

Although Spain is an exception, its position is accompanied by rhetoric about the effectiveness of the Spanish model, which consists of outsourcing and delegating border management to non-EU countries in order to prevent departures to Europe [17]. This strategy is based on subcontracting migration control to countries where violations of the rights of people on the move are widely documented [18].

While we can welcome the fact that Spain is distancing itself from ’return hubs’, its migration policy remains fully in line with the European externalisation strategy, which is pushing its borders and asylum management ever further away and sacrificing human rights in the name of deterrence.

- El Diario, ‘Five years of fighting for regularisation: the inside story of the migrant-led movement that succeeded’, 31 January 2025

- Libération, ‘Spain: the regularisation of 500,000 undocumented migrants, a step forward that has the right wing in a panic’, 27 January 2026

On 27 January 2026, the Spanish government approved a decree-law aimed at regularising 500,000 people in an ‘irregular’ administrative situation. The measure concerns foreigners who have been in Spain for at least five months at the end of 2025, have no criminal record, and certain asylum seekers whose applications were filed before 31 December 2025. The examination of applications for residence permits – valid for one year for adults and five years for minors – will begin on 1 April and will be carried out through an accelerated procedure lasting no more than three months.

This extraordinary ‘regularisation’ operation, born of a popular legislative initiative signed by more than 700,000 people, is the result of years of struggle by migrants themselves, with the support of human rights organisations [19]. Spain is thus making a strong political choice, as it has done on several occasions in the past. The country has a programme of continuous regularisation (notably through social or professional roots - arraigo) and extraordinary operations, when a large group is targeted by temporary policies, as was the case in 2005 [20], or during the reform of the Foreigners Act (Extranjeria) in 2025.

This choice goes largely against the grain of the restrictive policies pursued elsewhere in Europe. Nevertheless, this regularisation, justified by the need to support ‘economic growth’, follows a logic of migratory utilitarianism by responding to a need for labour and demographic constraints.

 Belgium

The Belgian Minister for Asylum and Migration announced that Belgium would increase financial aid for the ’reintegration’ of Syrian nationals ’who agree to return home’. Presented as a ’voluntary’ measure, this policy is based on a financial incentive that decreases as the asylum procedure progresses and is accompanied, ’as far as possible’, by a ban on returning to the territory.

This strategy is part of a policy of gradually excluding migrants from the Belgian reception system, whose organised precariousness [21]serves as a lever to compel ’voluntary returns’. Belgium thus joins other European states which, since 2024 with the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, have been increasing the number of measures designed to facilitate and compel the return of Syrian nationals to Syria, despite the continuing violence, political instability and the lack of guarantees of security and rights for those who are ’returned’ [22].

 France

- Les Jours, ‘“Africans are savages”: asylum judges running wild’, 27 January 2026

- Le Monde, ‘Racist, sexist and homophobic comments exposed at the National Court of Asylum’, 29 January 2026

The media outlet Les Jours has published a report by the CGT trade union detailing racist, sexist and homophobic comments made by judges at the National Court of Asylum (CNDA) towards asylum seekers, either during hearings or afterwards, during deliberations. As a reminder, this court is responsible for examining appeals against decisions made by the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA), which is itself responsible for investigating asylum applications.

Anonymous testimonies gathered from court officials raise questions about the Court’s independence and its ability to guarantee a fair examination of applications for international protection, especially since pressure on the institution and its members has already been denounced [23]. These revelations also call into question its functioning, which relies heavily on temporary judges (around 500, compared to only 26 professional and permanent magistrates), often retired from administrative, financial or judicial courts, or from academia and senior civil service, particularly prefectural service. Insufficiently trained in the specific issues surrounding asylum, these judges are criticised for allowing ‘their personal or political convictions’ to show.

By expressing racist, sexist or homophobic views within the court, a judge effectively compromises their neutrality and impartiality, which is all the more worrying given that the decisions handed down directly threaten the safety and fundamental rights of people on the move.

 Greece

The acquittal of Sara Mardini and 23 other volunteers from the NGO ERCI by the Lesbos court ends seven years of arbitrary prosecution and confirms that ’providing humanitarian aid is an obligation, not a crime’. Accused of migrant smuggling, money laundering and membership of a criminal organisation for conducting search and rescue operations in the Aegean Sea between 2016 and 2018, the volunteers faced up to 20 years in prison.

This victory in court is indicative of the criminalisation of humanitarian action by the Greek authorities to deter civilian search and rescue actors at sea from intervening where states have withdrawn. Since 2019, state naval patrols have deserted the Mediterranean Sea in favour of aerial surveillance [24]. By allowing these legal proceedings to continue for years, Greece has contributed to hindering the life-saving work of civilian actors at sea and endangering people on the move.

 Portugal

For 2026, Portugal prefers to pay €8.4 million in financial compensation to the European Union rather than take in 420 asylum seekers under the ’solidarity mechanism’ set out in the Migration and Asylum Pact adopted in 2024, in order to ’relocate asylum seekers fairly across the territory of the European Union’ [25]. While the objective is to relocate asylum seekers, the Pact institutionalisesa right of refusal in exchange for the payment of a financial contribution of €20,000 per person not accepted.

Although it has only just come into force, the (flexible) solidarity mechanism is revealing its true aims: to avoid sharing responsibilities and to finance the fortification of borders and detention. With this pact, the European Union is tackling the problem backwards by claiming to resolve a situation for which it is itself responsible, with sea crossings, for example, being a direct consequence of the closure of European borders. This mechanism is in fact a fallacious device, which organises solidarity between Member States in repression and control, not in the reception of migrants.

 Sweden

Sweden is calling on the European Union to take a new step in its policy on the return of Afghan nationals. Its Minister for Migration, Johan Forssell, is advocating the establishment of a common European system for issuing identity and travel documents to facilitate the expulsion of asylum seekers whose applications have been rejected.

Already, in October 2025, 20 Member States signed a joint letter calling on the European Commission to take ’coordinated measures to enable voluntary and forced returns to Afghanistan’ [26]. By calling on the European Union to open ’technical negotiations’ with the de facto Taliban authorities to allow deportations, the states are locking themselves into a major contradiction, wishing to negotiate with a regime that they do not officially recognise. This is particularly true given that Afghanistan cannot be considered a ’safe country of origin.’ Since the Taliban regained power in 2021, the country has continued to be marked by massive human rights violations [27], making any deportation contrary to the principle of non-refoulement and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

 United Kingdom

The Home Office has announced that migrants, mainly those arriving via the English Channel, can now have their phones seized by the police without prior arrest or judicial review. The authorities are also authorised to carry out searches, particularly on minors, including ’oral searches’ to look for possible SIM cards.

This authorisation to seize mobile phones stems from the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill passed by Parliament in December 2025 [28]. However, by introducing anti-terrorism techniques to ’combat smuggling networks’, this law once again stigmatisespeople on the move, who, simply by crossing the border, are presumed guilty of posing a threat to security.

Beyond that, these new police powers constitute a broader infringement of the right to privacy and family life. Already in 2022, the High Court of Justice ruled that the confiscation and search of mobile phones by the police was contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and data protection laws [29]. A new ruling along these lines risks reigniting Keir Starmer’s obsession with reforming the Convention, as he is already engaged in a political bidding war in response to pressure from the far right [30].

In the United Kingdom, asylum seekers detained pending their return to France under the ’One in, one out’ agreement are denouncing their conditions of detention in the Harmondsworth and Brook House centres. Through reports, testimonies [31], and peaceful demonstrations in the centres, migrants are appealing to UN bodies, human rights organisations, and the media.

In a collective report sent to UN bodies, the detainees denounce numerous violations of their rights: extreme physical, psychological and emotional abuse. They report a lack of legal assistance, including the inability to access a lawyer, inadequate or non-existent medical care, and widespread degrading practices. Under these conditions, many report episodes of depression, anxiety, forced isolation and attempts at self-harm.

These allegations, which come at a time when the British government has strengthened its repressive arsenal in December 2025 [32], highlight the unfairness of the ’One in, One out’ agreement, which deprives asylum seekers of their right to an individual assessment, and testify to the injustice and despair that detention camps generate among those trapped there.

They also reveal the erosion of the right to asylum and the treatment of asylum seekers in the United Kingdom and beyond in Europe.

 Obligations to leave the territory

In the last quarter of 2025, according to figures from the European Commission [33], 115,440 people received an obligation to leave the European Union. France remains the country that issues the most, ahead of Germany and Greece. However, only a minority of these decisions are actually followed by departure. In 2025, 34,000 people left the European Union, some of them through ’voluntary return’ schemes.

A large proportion of these orders are not enforced, not because of a lack of political will, but because they are materially or legally impossible (lack of consular laissez-passer, proven risks in the country of origin). Certain nationalities, such as Algerian nationals, are particularly targeted by these obligations to leave the territory, even though expulsions remain virtually impossible due to Algeria’s refusal to issue consular laissez-passer [34].

Without the possibility of enforcement, these obligations to leave the territory organise the precariousness of people on the move, keeping thousands of people in a legal limbo, without rights or access to regularisation, while preventing them from working. Obligations to leave the territory thus serve as a tool to sideline migrants, while displaying a supposedly ’controlled’ migration policy, which allows states to communicate about their ’performance’ in terms of forced returns in a Europeincreasingly mired in overt hostility towards migrants.

Press review January 2026 - EN