MIGREUROP

Mission Malta October 2020-March 2021

2025-01-09T14:22:31Z

Zoé Dutot, was hosted by the association ADITUS, in Malta, from October 2020 to March 2021 as part of session 23 of the Echanges & Partenariats programme on behalf of Migreurop, with the aim of analysing the detention of people in exile in the archipelago, the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and the evolution of national migration policy, the challenges of Malta's geographical position, the management of its SAR zone and its relations with the European Union and its European neighbours (particularly in the context of ad hoc relocations).

During her fieldwork, she drafted a number of thematic fact sheets:

a country fact sheet on Malta (FR) with a map of places of detention
a fact sheet on the impact of Covid and the consequences of the health crisis on migration in Malta (FR/EN)
a fact sheet on relations between Malta and the EU (FR/EN)
a fact sheet on the management of the Maltese SAR zone (FR/EN)
a press review on Malta January 2020/January 2021

Libérez les ElHiblu3 !

2022-09-28T15:37:00Z

Ce 28 septembre 2022, date qui marque les trois ans et demi de l'arrivée du cargo El Hiblu 1 à Malte, Migreurop s'associe à la campagne "Libérez les ElHiblus3" et co-signe la lettre ouverte adressée au Procureur général Victoria Buttigieg pour demander que les autorités maltaises abandonnent toutes les charges contre Abdalla, Amara et Kader.

Madame le Procureur général Dr Victoria Buttigieg,

Le 28 mars 2019, le navire marchand El Hiblu 1 est arrivé à Malte. Trois adolescents ont été arrêtés et accusés d'avoir commis de multiples crimes, notamment des actes de terrorisme, d'avoir menacé un équipage et d'avoir détourné un navire. Amara, Kader et Abdalla - âgés de 15,16 et 19 ans à l'époque - ont été emprisonnés pendant près de huit mois avant d'être libérés sous caution en novembre 2019.

Dans les jours qui ont précédé leur arrivée à Malte, ils avaient contribué à désamorcer une situation explosive en mer. Avec 105 autres personnes, ils ont été secourus par l'équipage d'un pétrolier, le El Hiblu 1, qui a tenté de les ramener en Libye. Lorsque les migrants ont reconnu le rivage libyen, ils ont protesté, certains affirmant qu'ils préféraient se jeter par-dessus bord plutôt que de retourner dans le pays qu'ils avaient fui. Abdalla, Amara et Kader sont intervenus et ont calmé la situation. Ils ont agi en traducteurs et en médiateurs entre des passagers effrayés et un équipage apeuré.

Depuis qu'ils ont été libérés sous caution, Abdalla, Amara et Kader, connus collectivement sous le nom des "ElHiblu3", doivent se présenter chaque jour au poste de police et assister à des audiences mensuelles au tribunal de Malte. Lors de ces audiences, les responsables de la police et de l'armée, ainsi que les membres de l'équipage du navire marchand, ont rapidement eu l'occasion de témoigner. Pourtant, il a fallu deux ans à l'accusation maltaise pour demander aux personnes secourues et présentes lors des faits de témoigner. Ces témoignages essentiels ont récemment confirmé ce que nous savions : Abdalla, Amara et Kader n'ont commis aucun crime !

Alors que les audiences préliminaires du procès El Hiblu 3 touchent à leur fin, le Procureur général doit maintenant décider des charges à retenir contre les trois jeunes hommes. Nous réitérons donc notre demande que toutes les charges soient abandonnées et que le procès soit rejeté immédiatement.

Au lieu d'être poursuivis, les ElHiblu3 devraient être célébrés pour leurs actions visant à empêcher le retour de 108 personnes en Libye.

Les signataires ci-dessous - un large éventail d'organisations et d'individus - sont convaincus que l'emprisonnement et la poursuite des ElHiblu3 constituent une profonde injustice. Nous demandons au Procureur général de mettre fin à l'incertitude des trois jeunes hommes. Il est grand temps d'abandonner les charges.

Résister aux refoulements illégaux vers la Libye n'est pas un crime ! Arrêtez cette injustice ! Annulez le procès à Malte immédiatement ! Libérez les ElHiblu3 !

La liste des signataires est disponible en annexe. Pour plus d'informations : https://elhiblu3.info/

Free the El Hiblu 3 !

2022-09-28T15:37:00Z

On 28 September 2022, the 3.5 year anniversary of the arrival of the El Hiblu 1 in Malta, Migreurop joins the "Free the El Hiblu 3" campaign and co-signs the open letter addressed to Attorney General Victoria Buttigieg to request that the Maltese authorities drop all charges against Abdalla, Amara and Kader.

Dear Attorney General Dr Victoria Buttigieg,

On 28 March 2019, the merchant vessel El Hiblu 1 arrived in Malta. Three teenagers were arrested and accused of having committed multiple crimes, including acts of terrorism, threatening a crew and hijacking a ship. Amara, Kader, and Abdalla – aged 15,16, and 19 at the time – were imprisoned for almost eight months before being released on bail in November 2019.

In the days prior to their arrival in Malta, they had helped to defuse a volatile situation at sea. Together with 105 other people, they were rescued by the crew of an oil tanker, the El Hiblu 1, which attempted to return them to Libya. When the migrants recognised the Libyan shore, they protested, some saying they would rather throw themselves overboard than return to the country they had fled. Abdalla, Amara, and Kader intervened and calmed the situation. They acted as translators and mediators between scared passengers and a scared crew.

Since they were released on bail, Abdalla, Amara, and Kader, known collectively as the El Hiblu 3, have had to register at the police station every day and attend monthly hearings in the Maltese law courts. At these hearings, police and military officials, as well as the crew members of the merchant vessel were promptly given the opportunity to testify. Yet, it took the Maltese prosecution two years to ask any of the rescued witnesses to testify. These critical testimonies have recently confirmed what we knew: Abdalla, Amara, and Kader did not commit any crimes!

As the El Hiblu 3 pre-trial hearings come to a close, the Attorney General must now decide which charges to bring against the three young men. We thus reiterate our demand that all charges be dropped and the trial be dismissed immediately.

Instead of being prosecuted, the El Hiblu 3 should be celebrated for their actions in preventing the return of 108 people to Libya.

The signatories below – a wide spectrum of organisations and individuals – are convinced that the imprisonment and prosecution of the El Hiblu 3 constitute a deep injustice. We call on the Attorney General to end the uncertainty of the three young men. It is high time to drop the charges.

Resisting illegal push-backs to Libya is not a crime! Stop this injustice! Dismiss the trial in Malta immediately! Free the El Hiblu 3!

For the list of signatories please see the joint document. For more information: https://elhiblu3.info/

Détention des migrant⋅e⋅s à Malte : le chantage au débarquement

2021-12-12T23:41:00Z

Du 4 au 11 janvier 2020, une mission organisée par le Groupe d'information et de soutien des immigré⋅e⋅s (Gisti) et le réseau euro-africain Migreurop avec le concours de la clinique du droit de Sciences Po Paris a rencontré des acteurs institutionnels, des associations, des journalistes, des chercheurs et chercheuses et des personnes, mineures ou majeures, qui ont été détenues dans les centres « d'accueil » de Malte. Le rapport « Détention des migrant⋅e⋅s à Malte : le chantage au débarquement », réalisé à partir des entretiens menés au cours de la mission et de recherches complémentaires, décrit le régime carcéral appliqué aux exilé⋅e⋅s qui arrivent à Malte par voie maritime, y compris à celles et ceux qui demandent l'asile.

Il montre comment cette pratique de détention systématique, contraire au droit européen, se perpétue avec la collaboration active de l'Union européenne et de ses États membres, qui ferment les yeux sur le contournement du droit maritime international et se prêtent au chantage – dérisoire, au regard du volume des arrivées à Malte – exercé par les autorités maltaises pour leur faire accepter une procédure de « relocalisation ad hoc » dont les personnes en besoin de protection font les frais.

Pour aller plus loin : voir les travaux de Zoé Dutot en mission à Malte pour le compte de Migreurop & Aditus de octobre 2020 à mars 2021 :
https://migreurop.org/article3071.html

Mission volontariat à Malte Migreurop/Aditus (octobre 2020-mars 2021)

2021-07-07T12:58:00Z

Zoé Dutot, a été accueillie par l'association ADITUS, à Malte, d'octobre 2020 à mars 2021 dans le cadre de la session 23 du programme Echanges & Partenariats pour le compte de Migreurop, dans le but d'analyser la détention des personnes exilé·e·s dans l'archipel, l'impact de la pandémie de Covid-19 et l'évolution de la politique migratoire nationale, les enjeux de la position géographique maltaise, la gestion de sa zone SAR et ses relations avec l'Union européenne et ses voisins européens (dans le cadre notamment des relocalisations ad hoc .

Durant sa mission de terrain, elle a rédigé plusieurs fiches thématiques :

une fiche pays sur Malte (FR) avec une carte des lieux de détention
une fiche sur l'impact du Covid et sur les conséquences de la crise sanitaire en matière migratoire à Malte (FR/EN)
une fiche sur les relations entre Malte et l'UE (FR/EN)
une fiche sur la gestion de la zone SAR maltaise (FR/EN)
une revue de presse Malte janvier 2020/janvier 2021

New kinds of confinement at the borders of the European Union

2020-04-07T15:41:43Z

Since the implementation of the “hotspot approach” by the European Union (EU) in 2015, Migreurop has been decoding its consequences on migrants' rights in publications and throughout various international meetings (Calais 2015, Rabat 2016). Preventing exiles' arrivals and criminalizing migration are the aim of this mechanism – which is not new – and it comes with an increase of violence and violations of migrants' rights within a security policy framework. After five years, what is the situation in Europe and beyond?

As an overview, Migreurop organized a conference in Madrid on 8 June 2019 about new forms of confinement at the EU's gates. It has given an opportunity to update knowledge on detention situations in various countries of the geographical area covered by the network. Thanks to our members and guests, we discussed about the situation in the Greek and Italian hotspots – as real “modern oblivion” – as well as in the “Temporary Accommodation Centres for Immigrants” (CETI) in the Ceuta and Melilla enclaves. These areas are made to sort out migrants and to keep them away from the European borders. Other topics have also been addressed, such as non-access practices in Malta and Spain and externalisation policies- linked to the “hotspot approach” - through the cases of Morocco, Egypt and Libya. Finally, hotspots or affiliated sites confine exiles to unsuited places, and that actually serves another purpose : the management of closed borders.

The serious risk caused by the italian government's position in the Aquarius' issue : spanish intervention does not raise Italy from its responsibilities

2018-06-14T14:25:09Z

ASGI LAUNCHES THE ALARM: POSSIBLE IMMINENT REPEAT OF SAME EPISODES

At the time of writing, the case of the vessel Aquarius has not yet come to an end which will hopefully be a positive one, thanks to the intervention of Spanish authorities and despite the conduct of the Italian Government.

The welcome decision of Spain to choose solidarity and to take in charge, materially and legally, the survivors rescued by the Aquarius shall not obfuscate the serious responsibility of the Italian Government in the overall conduct of the operations.

It should be remembered that the rescue operations started at the instigation of an "SOS" issued by the MRCC ( Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre) of Rome. Therefore, in accordance with international law, Italy has always been and still is the State legally responsible for the coordination of the rescue operations.

This is the only reasonable reading of the relevant and applicable treaties, including:

the Convention on the Safeguard of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention, London, 1974; implemented in Italy by Law n. 313/1980);

the International Convention on Research and Rescue at Sea (SAR Convention, Hamburg, 1979, implemented in Italy by Law n. 147/1989, and ensuing Implementing Regulation, D.P.R. n. 662/1994);

the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 1982, implemented in Italy by Law n. 689/1994).

Until Spain announced its intervention for humanitarian reasons, the IMRCC continued to refrain from indicating any destination for the Aquarius boat, breaching its specific obligations under international and domestic law and exposing people on board to risks for their life.

In light of the situation of distress and danger in which the migrants and the crew found themselves, any limitation or obstacle to access the Italian territory through ports must be considered unacceptable.

In accordance with art. 18§2 of the UNCLOS, the coastal State can not invoke a violation of the right of innocent passage or oblige the foreign ship to resume the sea.

The obligation to bring assistance and the responsibility for allowing the conclusion of the rescue on a place of safety lie primarily on the coastal State, i.e. the State whose territorial sea the ship in distress is navigating or approaching. The ship in such a situation as to cause a threat to the lives of the persons on board, regardless of the status of these passengers, enjoys a "right" to access the port.

Denying access to Italian ports to boats that have carried out the rescue at sea involves the violation of articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is applicable since Italy, by coordinating SAR operations beyond its area of jurisdiction, is nevertheless exercising elements of governmental authority in conformity with international law (v. _mutatis mutandis_, _Al-Skeini and oth. v. the United Kingdom_ and _Jaloud v. the Netherlands_).

Indeed the rescued migrants were in evident need of urgent medical care, as well as basic needs (water, food, medicines), and these needs could not be satisfied on the high seas. The conditions under which they were subjected determine the exposure of men, women, and children to inhuman and degrading conditions (in violation of Article 3 ECHR) and to a serious risk for their life (in violation of article 2 ECHR).

Some of the migrants on board of the Aquarius are asylum seekers and refugees: the Italian government's decision to deny the access to a safe harbor to these people could amount to a breach of the principle of not refoulment, under Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, if a safe harbor is eventually not found for them.

The principle of non-refoulment is a principle of general international law, it has customary nature and it is therefore applicable to all States. It establishes the prohibition of refoulement to any place where a person could be exposed to the risk of persecution and/or inhumane and degrading treatment, as the ones to which people on board have experienced.

Under domestic criminal law, the obligation to provide assistance is a discrete legal requirement, which cannot be disregarded.

The conduct of the MRCC in Rome is liable to be characterized as "failure to provide assistance" under art. 593 of the Italian Criminal Code. Moreover, were death or injury to derive from the delayed entry, other autonomous criminal offenses, such as murder or injuries, would be at stake.

Those conduct would be attributable to the whole chain of command, with a view of the existing legal duty to safeguard life and physical integrity which is incumbent on a State coordinating the rescue operation.

The diplomatic "arm wrestling" conducted by the Italian government with the authorities of Malta and with the EU has endangered the lives of hundreds of people and disrespected of fundamental human rights. It constitutes a very serious precedent in European history.

The Italian government could have exposed its legitimate political positions and legal arguments in in the context of the ongoing reform of the Dublin Regulation. Instead, it has chosen to pursue those positions and arguments through coercive action at the expenses of people in distress.

This demonstrates the unwillingness of the Italian Government to act constructively at the European level thus giving up its potentially prominent role in this context.

It would have been possible for the incumbent Ministry of Internal Affairs to discuss the necessity of a compulsory system for the equitable allocation of asylum seekers and refugees in the EU

While a quick and positive solution of the Aquarius case is desirable, ASGI has the well-founded fear that similar situations will repeat in the next future.

ASGI launches an appeal to all the institutions, including the Parliament, and to all the democratic forces in the country, to ensure that international and domestic law on the rescue at sea is scrupulously complied with, in order to avoid that Italy will again taint itself with undignified conducts such as those that have taken place in recent days.

ASGI : Gravi responsabilità dell'Italia nella vicenda Aquarius

2018-06-14T14:25:04Z

Possiamo rallegrarci che, grazie alla proposta della Spagna di accogliere i passeggeri dell'Aquarius, il dramma che stanno vivendo da quasi una settimana queste 629 persone, salvate da un naufragio ma a cui si impedisce l'approdo, stia volgendo al termine.

Questa soluzione tuttavia non può scagionare l'Italia e Malta dai doveri che impone loro il diritto internazionale marittimo, che obbliga i paesi costieri più vicini a fornire assistenza e a permettere lo sbarco di una nave i cui passeggeri siano in pericolo. Essa non autorizza nemmeno gli altri paesi dell'Unione europea a non assumersi le proprie responsabilità collettive nei confronti di migranti e rifugiati/e.

Nel comunicato che segue, l'ASGI (associazione di studi giuridici sull'immigrazione), membro della rete Migreurop, evidenzia come la strumentalizzazione politica, da parte delle autorità italiane, della situazione dei passeggeri dell'Aquarius, costituisce un pericoloso precedente in materia di violazione del diritto nazionale e internazionale.

Il comportamento del governo italiano nella vicenda Aquarius è gravissimo e l'intervento della Spagna non solleva l'Italia dalle sue responsabilità. ASGI lancia l'allarme sul possibile imminente ripetersi di episodi analoghi.

Mentre scriviamo ancora non è definitivamente conclusa la vicenda della nave Aquarius, che ci auguriamo possa trovare felice esito anche grazie all'intervento delle autorità spagnole e, comunque, oltre la gestione che ha avuto da parte del Governo italiano.

La scelta di solidarietà fatta dal Governo spagnolo di fornire assistenza materiale e giuridica ai naufraghi salvati dalla nave Aquarius, infatti, non deve oscurare la gravi responsabilità del governo italiano nella conduzione complessiva di tutte le operazioni.

Va infatti ricordato che le operazioni di soccorso sono partite su impulso di un SOS diramato dall'MRCC (Comando generale del Corpo della Capitanerie di Porto) di Roma e che pertanto, in base al diritto internazionale – l'Italia è sempre stato il Paese giuridicamente responsabile del coordinamento dei soccorsi.

Solo in questo senso possono essere lette le principali Convenzioni internazionali pertinenti in materia e, tra esse:

– la Convenzione sulla salvaguardia della vita umana in mare (Convenzione SOLAS, firmata a Londra nel 1974 e ratificata dall'Italia con L. 313/1980);
– la Convenzione internazionale sulla ricerca ed il soccorso in mare (Convenzione SAR, firmata ad Amburgo nel 1979 e ratificata dall'Italia con L. 147/1989, da cui il Regolamento di attuazione D.P.R. 662/1994;
– la Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sul diritto del mare (Convenzione CNUDM o UNCLOS, adottata a Montegobay nel 1982 e ratificata dall'Italia con L. 689/1994)

Fino al momento nel quale la Spagna non ha annunciato il suo intervento per ragioni umanitarie il centro di coordinamento dei soccorso italiano, competente e responsabile degli stessi, ha continuato a non indicare alcuna destinazione alla barca Aquarius, rendendosi completamente inadempiente verso precisi obblighi indicati dal diritto internazionale ed interno e ponendo a rischio la vita di centinaia di persone.

La situazione di pericolo e di estrema difficoltà, in cui si trovavano e si trovano tutt'ora i migranti, oltre ai membri dell'equipaggio, integra senza dubbio una situazione di pericolo che non fa ritenere legittima alcuna limitazione all'approdo in un porto italiano. Nel caso di specie doveva, infatti, immediatamente trovare applicazione l'art. 18, par. 2 della Convenzione UNCLOS, la quale prevede che lo Stato costiero non può invocare una violazione del diritto di passaggio inoffensivo né obbligare la nave straniera a riprendere il largo. Conseguentemente, lo Stato costiero, nel cui mare territoriale, o nelle vicinanze del quale, si trovi una nave in una situazione di pericolo è, infatti, il titolare primario dell'obbligo di portare soccorso ed è responsabile della conclusione del salvataggio. La nave che si trova quindi in una situazione di pericolo implicante una minaccia per la vita delle persone a bordo, qualsiasi sia lo status di questi passeggeri, gode di un “diritto” di accesso al porto.

Il diniego di accesso ai porti italiani a imbarcazioni che abbiano effettuato il soccorso in mare comporta la violazione degli articoli 2 e 3 della Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell'Uomo, applicabile poiché l'Italia, nel coordinare l'azione SAR, esercita funzioni esecutive al di fuori del proprio territorio «conformemente al diritto internazionale» (v. mutatis mutandis, Al-Skeini c. Regno Unito e Jaloud c. Paesi Bassi). Le persone soccorse vertevano infatti in evidente necessità di cure mediche urgenti, nonché di generi di prima necessità (acqua, cibo, medicinali), e tali bisogni non potevano esser soddisfatti in alto mare. Le condizioni alle quali gli stessi sono stati sottoposti determinano l'esposizione di uomini, donne e bambini ad un reale trattamento disumano e degradante ( in violazione dell'art. 3 cedu) e ad un serio rischio per la loro vita (in violazione dell' art. 2 cedu).

Sulla nave Aquarius vi erano richiedenti asilo e rifugiati, pertanto la scelta del governo italiano di negare un porto sicuro a queste persone, anche poiché le operazioni di soccorso erano state gestite dalle autorità italiane, avrebbe potuto comportare per lo Stato Italiano la violazione del principio di non refoulment ai sensi dell'art 33 della Convenzione di Ginevra sullo Status dei Rifugiati del 1951 se non si fosse trovato un porto sicuro. Il principio di non refoulment è un principio di diritto internazionale generale, vincolante per tutti gli Stati anche indipendentemente dalla ratifica della Convenzione del 1951; esso stabilisce il divieto di respingimento verso qualsiasi luogo in cui una persona potrebbe trovarsi esposta al rischio di persecuzione e/o di condizione ascrivibile a trattamento disumano e degradante, trattamento nel quale si sono trovati a vivere coloro che erano da giorni in alto mare in assenza di approdo in porto sicuro.
Sotto il profilo del diritto penale, l'obbligo di prestare soccorso configura una precisa prescrizione giuridica, la quale non può essere disattesa. Si ritiene che la condotta tenuta dall'MRCC di Roma sia stata suscettibile da integrare almeno la fattispecie dell'omissione di soccorso ai sensi dell'art. 593 c.p. A ciò si aggiunga che se dal ritardo dell'ingresso fossero derivate (o dovessero derivare) morte o lesioni in capo alle persone a bordo, ciò integrerebbe fattispecie penali autonome, quali omicidio o lesioni, che sarebbero imputabili a tutta la catena di comando italiana in ragione dell'evidente dovere giuridico di salvaguardia della vita che incombe sul paese che coordina i soccorsi

Il “braccio di ferro” diplomatico attuato parte del Governo italiano con le Autorità di Malta e con la UE ha messo a rischio la vita di centinaia di persone ed il rispetto di basilari diritti della persona e ciò costituisce un precedente gravissimo nella storia europea.

Il governo italiano aveva tutti gli strumenti legali e politici per far valere nella fase di discussione e votazione del Regolamento Dublino IV le argomentazioni che ha portato invece sul piano mediatico e dell'uso della forza contro persone in stato di necessità dimostrando l'esplicita volontà di non proporre politiche costruttive rinunciando ad un ruolo centrale nel dibattito europeo. Il governo italiano, invece, ha voluto imporre il solo uso della forza. Sarebbe stato possibile per il Ministro degli Interni in carica recarsi a Bruxelles e discutere della necessità di ripartizione equa dei rifugiati fra gli stati europei facendo valere in modo democratico e legale presso tale sede le priorità individuate dall'esecutivo italiano, senza incorrere nelle violazioni dei diritti umani fondamentali e delle norme cogenti.

ASGI, nell'auspicare che la specifica vicenda abbia esito rapido e positivo, ha tuttavia il fondato timore che situazioni analoghe possano ripetersi già dalle prossime ore fa appello a tutte le istituzioni e al Parlamento, nonché a tutte le forze democratiche del Paese, affinché l'Italia non si renda più responsabile degli indecorosi eventi che si sono consumati negli ultimi giorni e che il diritto internazionale e quello interno in materia di soccorsi in mare venga scrupolosamente rispettato.

Situation de l'Aquarius : l'intervention espagnole ne dédouane pas l'Italie de ses responsabilités

2018-06-14T14:24:56Z

On peut se réjouir du fait que, grâce à la proposition de l'Espagne d'accueillir les passagers de l'Aquarius, le drame que vivent depuis presque une semaine ces 629 personnes sauvées du naufrage mais interdites d'accostage trouve bientôt une issue.

Cette solution ne saurait cependant dédouaner l'Italie et Malte des devoirs qui leur incombent au regard du droit international maritime, qui oblige les pays dont les côtes sont les plus proches à porter assistance et à permettre le débarquement d'un navire dont les passagers sont en péril.

Elle n'autorise pas non plus les autres pays de l'Union européenne à se désengager de leur responsabilité collective à l'égard des exilé.e.s et des réfugié.e.s.

Dans le communiqué qui suit, l'ASGI (association d'études juridiques sur l'immigration), membre du réseau Migreurop, démontre, analyse juridique à l'appui, comment l'instrumentalisation politique, par les autorités italiennes, de la situation des passagers de l'Aquarius, constitue un dangereux précédent en matière de violation du droit national et international.

[ITA] https://www.asgi.it/asilo-e-protezi...

[EN] https://www.asgi.it/english/aquariu...

Malta

2011-07-05T08:50:24Z

MALTA

General

Malta is a small and densely populated archipelago situated in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea. Since 1 May 2004, it forms part of the southern-most borders of the European Union.

In Malta, immigration is a recent phenomenon triggered in part by the arrival of Iraqi refugees fleeing the first Gulf war during the 1990s.
The archipelago is situated in the Mediterranean Sea between Sicily, Libya and Tunisia. It is thus situated on the path of many migrants leaving North Africa for Europe. Taking account of its size and population, Malta, proportionally speaking, receives by far the greatest number of migrants of the EU Member States.

Since 2002, the year of massive boat arrivals from Libya, immigration to Malta is considered as a problem by the government and the people living there. Contrary to other small islands that see a lot of migrant arrivals, such as the Canaries or Lampedusa, Malta is a micro-State which consequently cannot send the migrants on to a different metropolis and which therefore has to manage these new migratory phenomena alone.

Right from the first migrant boat arrivals, the Maltese government put in place an immigration law and policy of systematic detention in building emergency detention centres. All migrants, whether or not they are asylum seekers, are detained behind bars until their repatriation or until such time as a decision concerning their asylum claim is taken. Whereas the number of migrants has increased, the authorities have never attempted to find a long-term solution and thus the 'emergency' detention centres have remained in place now for years.

Asylum

Whereas the number of asylum claims has considerably decreased in other European states, it has strongly increased in Malta as well as in the 10 newest Member States of the European Union [1].
The systematic detention regime in Malta explains in part this phenomenon: since the legal status following an asylum request results in the diminution of one's detention (from 18 to 12 months), almost every migrant makes an asylum claim, even if certain among them would prefer a more “classic” regularisation system.

Detention

All migrants, whether asylum seekers or not, are detained behind bars until (a) the authorities decide as to potential international protection needs, (b) social services identify severe vulnerability or (3) repatriation can be organised.

Duration of detention

The duration of detention is not provided for in any law. It is established in a “policy document” from 2005, and goes up to a maximum of 18 months for irregular migrants, migrants who do not seek asylum and for those whose claims are dismissed. For asylum seekers, a maximum of 12 months is set. This limit is based on the “Reception Directive” [2], which stipulates that asylum seekers should have the possibility to access the employment market after 12 months spent on the territory. As this is not possible if the person is detained, the practice has evolved towards a systematic release of persons having applied for asylum and, after 12 months, still have not received a decision from one of the authorities in charge (Office of the Refugee Commissioner or the Refugee Appeals Board).

Vulnerable persons

Persons said to be vulnerable are not, in principle, subjected to the detention regime. In practice, every irregular immigrant is detained and it is only following their detention that persons presenting vulnerability are then evaluated in order to decide whether or not they should be released. The release of vulnerable persons is not automatic. The evaluations are conducted by the Organization for Integration and Welfare of Asylum Seekers (OIWAS), a governmental agency that is also in charge of the management of so-called “Open Centres”, housing migrants, asylum seekers, refugees and vulnerable persons. Thus, certain release procedures for vulnerable persons in detention are delayed if available places in the Open Centres are lacking. As for the evaluations, there are certain problems: for example, for pregnant women or families with young children who do not present any particular difficulties in terms of evaluating vulnerability, the procedure should be quite fast. But in practice, it seems that such a procedure can take from a few days to a few months. A striking example was the case of two Congolese mothers with their 6 children who had been detained for six months in a mixed centre, housed in one bedroom with two double beds for the two families. Or the Somali family where the woman arrived to Malta pregnant was detained for the term of her pregnancy and then sent back to detention until the baby reached the age of three months. In 2007, after numerous complaints on the part of NGOs, unaccompanied minors were all released after 9 months of detention, as most of them had been awaiting age verification tests (la radiography of the wrist). They great majority of them were then sent to the adult open centre until the conclusion of their evaluation.

The evaluation procedures very according to vulnerability. They start with a recommendation from the Immigration Police who will list for OIWAS the presence of pregnant women, children or minors. If the Police have not made the recommendations, the NGO present can do so, if vulnerability has not been detected beforehand or if one emerges in detention. For more delicate cases, like victims of trauma or psychological cases, the recommendations should be backed-up by evidence or reports such as medical certificates or psychological evaluations. There is no psychologist room in detention. MSF was providing this service until recently (explained below). Without their presence, the NGOs can try to appeal to the services of a private specialist. Often, recommendations of this order are carried out after a stay in a psychiatric hospital, as the situation of these undetected vulnerable persons deteriorates during their detention, given especially as there is now no presence of a specialist service there.

Once the recommendations are done by the different organization, governmental or non-governmental, OIWAS will proceed to a first interview with a social assistance, who will send a report to a team at OIWAS specialised in the evaluations for specific vulnerabilities. If this team observes vulnerability due to which the person should not be in detention, it would make a recommendation to the Principal Immigration Officer in charge of detention, who in turn may accept or refuse the recommendation. If it is accepted, an obligatory preliminary medical visit will be ordered before the release of the vulnerable person. If not, the concerned person will remain in detention. Each step represents a delay of varying and undetermined length. No appeal against this decision is provided for under the law.

The other categories of persons said to be vulnerable are generally submitted to procedures far longer and the cases of victims of torture and trauma or even unaccompanied minors are conclusive examples of the particularly long delays that underline serious dysfunctionality of the evaluation system.

Detention Centres

There are three detention centres (Safi Barracks, Lyster Barracks et Ta'Kandja), having a total capacity of around 2300 persons. They are divided into “compounds”; some are managed by the Police, but the large majority are managed directly by the armed forces (AFM) [3]. There is also a 'transit centre' at the airport, where overnight stays are not permitted. According to the case, a person there may be transferred to a detention centre if expulsion is not possible. The detention centres are mixed, women are detained with men, though since the first quarter of 2009 one can observe a movement towards partitioning women from men, not yet implemented in full. Furthermore, there is no specific centre for families with children, or for unaccompanied minors.

Visits to certain centres are authorised only after a request is made. A fixed telephone line is installed in each centre to receive and give calls; credit allocated to each detained person is 5 euros per 2 months. Mobile phones are forbidden and confiscated upon arrival, as are all goods possessed by the detained – money, documents, etc. NGO workers are searched at each visit and searches are sometimes organised in the centres.

Access to healthcare is organised by a private Maltese enterprise, Medicare, and between September 2008 and March 2009 by Médecins Sans Frontières, which had access to the detention camps until this NGO announced its withdrawal. According to MSF, the present conditions in detention aggravate medical and psychological risks: the lack of a clean room to hold consultation interviews, the mixed use of sanitary facilities, the absence of female personnel to take care of the female detained persons, the lack of beds and the ongoing presence of mattresses on the flood, the lack of allocated time outdoors (2 hours per week in certain centres). It has been furthermore claimed that the medical personnel allowed in the centres is insufficient to cover the needs of the detained persons, the lack of a psychologist room, pharmacy, place for quarantined persons, all render health consultations useless. Punishment cells are presently used to house quarantined persons. The decision to quarantine somebody is taken by detention personnel when the Medicare doctors determine a risk of contagion. These cells do not offer the necessary sanitary guarantees, and the decision to place persons in isolation for medical reasons can only be taken by medical personnel.

NGOs have access to the centres after a request for authorisation sent to the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs. This permit may be delivered after several months' wait. In practice, the Jesuit Refugee Service, a NGO offering legal assistance to detained persons, as well as Médecins sans Frontières for medical assistance, visit the centres regularly (until March 2009 for MSF). However, in February 2009, during the publication of its report, MSF regretted that their activities in detention were not accompanied by any improvement in the sanitary conditions on the part of the authorities. Other NGOs visit the detention centres like the Red Cross, which offers a tracing and family reunification service, or SOS Malta for voluntary returns. UNHCR also has free access to the centres. In theory, lawyers also have access to the detention centres. In practice, the operation of the centres severely limits the access: the detained persons have no contact, their money is confiscated upon arrival, and there is no legal aid for the first instance decision on their asylum claim. For appeal procedures, most of the asylum seekers request legal aid and a list of “legal aid lawyers” have the right to access the centres for this purpose. Is a detained person wishes to appeal to the services of a private barrister, authority to do so must be made beforehand to the authorities
Limitations are put in place for access to isolation punishment cells, as well as for cases of general disorder.

The Open Centres

There are different types of open centres which are managed by a governmental agency called OIWAS. Three houses of small capacity offer particular support for families and minors. Added to this is a reception centre exclusively for women, which opened in 2008.
Couples without children are lodged in prefabricated housing outside an old aircraft hangar that was opened in 2008, inside which 800 beds are supposedly reserved for single men. There is another centre for single men called the “tent village” and is composed of 45 tents for 1300 persons.

Closer into town is the Marsa open centre, which is an old school renovated for the purpose. This is the most popular place to live, as it is easiest to find work in the morning around the city centre. Migrants wait outside on the street early in the morning for employers to pass by in their pickups, hoping that they will be chosen to work for the day. The total capacity of the open centres is 3500 persons.

Situation of minors

Unaccompanied minors are “evaluated” by OIWAS (Organization for Integration and Welfare of Asylum Seekers). The evaluation procedure consists of an interview of the minor carried out by a social assistant. If the interview is conclusive, the minor is released with a custody order (placing the minor under the custody of the Ministry of Social Affairs): if the interview is not conclusive, the minor receives a letter informing him that he is considered an adult. If, after this interview, a doubt persists, OIWAS orders a medical test consisting of a simple bone radiography to estimate the age of the person. According to the results of this test, the person will either be released or not. The procedures may take months before being finalised, during which time the minors are not separated from detained adults.

Externalisation and control of borders

The responsibility of the Maltese authorities to rescue boats in distress is not limited to Maltese territorial waters. The Maltese SAR (Search and Rescue Area) [4] stretches almost from Tunisia to Greece, which means that a boat that finds itself in distress in this region falls to the responsibility of Malta, which is then obliged to tow it to its shores. The economic advantage may justify the reluctance of the Maltese government to reduce its SAR zone since it coincides with the rights of the “Flight Information Region” which represents considerable revenue through taxation of the aerial traffic overhead. If a boat is not in distress, the patrols generally let it continue its course towards Lampedusa (Italy). Moreover, Libya generally refusing to assume any responsibility of boats present in its territorial waters, Frontex maritime patrols then tow boats towards Europe, whether Italy or Malta. In 2009, relations between Italy and Malta were marred by disputes about responsibility for boats in distress around Malta or Lampedusa. Malta referred to the SOLAS conventions, which favours the notion of the closest port, whereas Italy recalled the Maltese responsibility for all the expanse of its SAR zone.

Readmission agreements

The particularity of Malta compared with other member states of the EU is that this state carries out very few returns to country of origin or transit of migrants. While there are some individual cases of return to Africa, they are rare and have essentially concerned countries of North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia).

Bibliography

Reports

● CPT, Report to the Maltese Government on the visit to Malta carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, January 2004 June 2005 - May 2008: [http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/states/mlt.htm]
• “Irregular Immigrants, Refugees and Integration - Policy Document” Ministry for Justice and Home Affairs, ministry for the Family and Social Solidarity. 2005
• “Position Paper on the Report of the Board of inquiry nominated by the Prime Minister on January 17, 2005, in terms of Article 4 of the Inquiries Act, dated December 9, 2005”, JRS, Emigrant Commission, 22 December 2005.
• FIDH “Enfermer les étrangers, dissuader les réfugiés: le contrôle des flux migratoires à Malte », n°403, September 2004.
● LIBE, Report by the LIBE Committee delegation on its visit to the administrative detention centres in Malta, 2006.
● Receptions of Asylum Seekers - JRS - February 2005; http://www.jrsmalta.org/Reception_of_Asylum_Seekers_Feb2005.pdf
● Study by STEP Social Consulting for the European Parliament “Conditions of third country nationals in centres (detention camps, open centres, as well as transit zones) within the 25 Member States of the EU” 2007?
● UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention - visit to Malta January 2009: http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/125F21AAD7DCBD1AC125754A0057F318 ?opendocument

Legislation

● Immigration Act: see articles 10, 25A and 34 - http://docs.justice.gov.mt/lom/legislation/english/leg/vol_5/chapt217.pdf
● Refugee Act: http://docs.justice.gov.mt/lom/legislation/english/leg/vol_13/chapt420.pdf
● Transposition of the “Procedures” Directive: Procedural Standards in Examining Applications for refugee Status Regulations - http://docs.justice.gov.mt/lom/Legislation/English/SubLeg/420/07.pdf
● Transposition of the “Reception” Directive: Reception of asylum Seekers (Minimum standards) - http://docs.justice.gov.mt/lom/Legislation/English/SubLeg/420/06.pdf

Associations

● JRS Malta : www.jrsmalta.org

● Médecins Sans Frontières

● Red Cross

● SOS Malta

Solène Guérinot for Migrants'Solidaruty Movement Céline Warnier de Wailly for Jesuit Refugee Service March 2009

Translated by Alexandra Strang

[1] According to the UNHCR report of 2007 concerning western countries “UNHCR Global Appeal 2007”, the number of asylum claims in Malta had risen by 22% for the year 2006.

[2] See Annexes chapter “Legislation”

[3] For a description of conditions of detention, please refer to the most recent reports of CPT, STEPS, JRS or the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention

[4] http://www.sarmalta.gov.mt/sar_in_Malta.htm