MIGREUROP

Press Review May/June 2026

Camille — 2026-07-10T05:53:09Z

Sommaire

Egypt/EU

EuroNews, “EU pays Egypt billions to manage migration — Cairo says it is not enough”, 21 May 2026*

Faced with the reception crisis currently affecting Egypt, Cairo is pressing the EU to increase its funding for ‘migration management'. The regime considers the €200 million allocation currently available to the country for the period 2024–2027 to be ‘insufficient'.

As a key partner of the EU for almost 30 years in the externalisation of borders – a cornerstone of European migration policy – Egypt wields considerable negotiating leverage. It would therefore come as no surprise if European funding were indeed increased, at a historic juncture when restrictions onmobility have become an absolute priority for the EU. This is despite systematic violations of migrants' rights in the country: migrants in Egypt are arbitrarily detained in inhuman and degrading conditions, and forced returns continue to rise [1] . In March 2026, independent experts appointed by the UN Human Rights Council also warned of an intensification of deportations and violations of fundamental rights targeting migrants on Egyptian territory, in particular Sudanese and Syrian nationals [2] .

Libya

France24, “‘The Angel of Death': former Libyan prison director to appear before the ICC”, 19 May 2026

From 19 to 21 May, Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri, a Libyan member of the Special Deterrence Forces militia and a senior official at Mitiga Prison in Tripoli, where he is alleged to have directly committed, ordered and facilitated multiple crimes between 2014 and 2020 (war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, rape, murder and other acts of persecution). His victims are alleged to have been targeted on the basis of their gender, ethnic origin, sexual orientation and migration status. El Hishri is the first suspect to appear before the ICC for atrocities committed in Libya against migrantd persons, as part of the investigation conducted by the Court since 2011 under a UN mandate [3] .

After decades of impunity, the opening of these hearings represents a significant step forward for the victims of the Libyan detention system, which has been fuelled and supported by Europe through its border externalisation policies. Cooperation between the EU and its Member States (notably Italy) with Libya is based on three pillars: technical support and assistance provided to the ‘Libyan Department for Combating Illegal Immigration' (DCIM) – which manages the camps and prisons where migrants suffer serious human rights violations; training and equipping the Libyan coastguard to intercept people at sea and push them back to Libya; and the conclusion of agreements with local Libyan authorities and armed groups to strengthen border controls in the south of the country [4] . By continuing and strengthening its relations with Libya on migration matters, the EU is making itself complicit in the crimes currently under investigation by the ICC, as well as in the impunity that many of their perpetrators continue to enjoy [5] . The case of Najim Isama Almasri clearly illustrates this long-standing complicity. A former head of the Libyan judicial police and an accomplice of El Hishri in the running of Mitiga, he too is the subject of an international arrest warrant issued by the ICC. When he was on Italian territory in early 2025, Rome sent him back to Libya on a state flight, without handing him over to the Court [6] [7] .

InfoMigrants, “‘I'm scared, I don't leave my house anymore': in Libya, Black people are going into hiding, terrified by the ‘hunt for migrants' raging across the country', 5 June 2026

Since early June, Africans of sub-Saharan origin in Libya have been the target of a crackdown on migrants carried out by hostile individuals, the police and local militias. Many are hiding and no longer dare to leave their homes for fear of being attacked. This wave of violence follows anti-immigration protests outside the offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Tripoli, sparked by false information circulated on social media about the existence of a fictitious refugee resettlement programme in Libya. The demonstrators were demanding that the UNHCR leave Libya and that refugee support services cease their activities. The UNHCR expressed concern over the demonstrators' hate speech and stated that it was working in cooperation with the Libyan authorities to find solutions for those who have fled conflict.

However, as part of this escalation of violence, these same authorities have carried out mass round-ups in neighbourhoods where migrants live. It should also be noted that round-ups and arbitrary arrests of migrants by the Libyan authorities have long been documented in Libya. Those affected are detained in inhumane conditions and subjected to torture. Incidents of physical, psychological and sexual violence, as well as the abandonment of people in the desert, have also been extensively documented [8] . The UNHCR, whose mandate is to protect refugees in Libya, appears in reality to be serving as a ‘humanitarian fig leaf' to enable European states to continue their cooperation with a failed state where rights are systematically flouted [9] .

Morocco

InfoMigrants, “‘They treat you like cattle': migrants arrested in Morocco on their way to Melilla recount their ordeal', 8 May 2026

In late April, seven Mauritanian nationals attempted to cross the only land border between Morocco and the Spanish-controlled enclave of Melilla. They were arrested by the police and subjected to degrading treatment (including beatings and the theft of their personal belongings), before being pushed back to the Moroccan-Algerian border.

This kind of violence is a daily reality for people attempting to reach the European enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, located on the African continent. The border between Moroccan territory and these enclaves is heavily militarised: over the years, high barriers have been erected and a dense network of radar, thermal and infrared cameras has been deployed along the entire border, with the aim of preventing anyone from reaching the European territory. Forced returns are systematic and are often accompanied by physical violence and theft, perpetrated by both Moroccan and Spanish forces, whose collaboration on migration issues dates back to 1992 (agreement on the movement of persons, transit and the readmission of foreigners who have entered illegally). This cooperation has since been consolidated through a series of externalisation agreements (between Spain and Morocco, but also between the EU and Morocco), which have turned this country into a veritable ‘blockade zone' for migration. The systematic human rights violations in Ceuta and Melilla are emblematic of the process of building a closed-off Europe, and continue with complete impunity [10] .

Rwanda/United Kingdom

BBC, ‘UK wins court case over collapsed Rwanda asylum deal', 1 June 2026

The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) has rejected Rwanda's claim for compensation against the United Kingdom, following the annulment of the migration arrangement concluded between the two states in 2022. The aim of this informal agreement was to deport to Rwanda foreign nationals who had arrived on British soil ‘irregularly' and whose applications for protection had been declared inadmissible. The UK Supreme Court had ruled that this arrangement was unlawful on the grounds that Rwanda could not be considered a safe country for refugees. In 2024, under the Starmer government, the agreement was finally cancelled and payments suspended. Rwanda then initiated arbitration proceedings in January 2026, claiming £50 million in compensation from the United Kingdom.

This brings to a close a legal dispute that clearly illustrates the commercial logic inherent in border externalisation, which reduces asylum seekers to a bargaining chip, enabling, on the one hand, European countries to rid themselves of people deemed ‘undesirable', and, on the other, enabling non-European authoritarian regimes to secure financial inflows and achieve diplomatic rehabilitation as legitimate partners of European countries [11] .

Austria

InfoMigrants, ‘Austria limits refugee family reunification under new quota system', 21 May 2026

The Austrian Parliament has passed a new law introducing annual caps on family reunification, the level of which has not yet been set. This law follows a measure suspending family reunification procedures adopted in 2025, justified on the grounds of an alleged ‘overburdening' of social services, and adopted by unjustifiably invoking the ‘emergency clause' provided for in Article 72 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [12] .

With the introduction of this quota system, Austria is flouting its obligations regarding reception and protection: the law will result in the separation of families, in breach of the right to family life protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights, which have established that quotas applied to family reunification are unlawful in the absence of an individual assessment of each situation [13] .

Cyprus

CyprusMail, ‘EU earmarks €800m for Cyprus to tackle immigration', 8 June 2026

Cyprus will receive 800 million euros from the EU for the period 2028–2034, earmarked for ‘migration management', representing a 70 per cent increase on the 480 million allocated for the period 2021–2027.

To date, EU funding has been used to build camps, to facilitate forced returns (Cyprus has recorded an unprecedented number of deportations of migrants in recent years), or to step up operations to identify people without the right to remain. At the end of May, three migrant people jumped from a balcony in Larnaca to escape the intensifying raids across the country. One of them died [14] .

Cyprus has repeatedly been accused of and found guilty of violating the rights of migrants, including refoulement [15] . Yet the southern part of the island will continue to benefit from the EU's support and cooperation in its migration policies that infringe upon the rights and lives of migrants.

Greece

Al Jazeera, ‘Greece reopens Syrian and Afghan asylum cases, hoping for returns', 1 June 2026

Since February, Greece has reopened all asylum cases likely to be rejected. As part of this process, the cases of Syrian and Afghan nationals – particularly men – are being subject to almost systematic re-examination, with rejection rates rising sharply. This review appears to reflect a broader political desire to rid the country of Muslim migrants or those from predominantly Muslim countries by deporting them to regimes where serious human rights violations have been documented. The Minister for Migration and Asylum, Athanasios Plevris, has openly embraced this racist shift during a recent parliamentary hearing, stating that Greece prefers to welcome non-Muslim migrant workers.

Greece's strategy is part of a wider European climate of growing racism and Islamophobia. Several European countries, led by Germany, are now considering the forced return of Afghan and Syrian nationals, despite the extremely dangerous situation in their countries of origin. The European Union itself hosted a Taliban delegation in Brussels on 23 June, to negotiate the deportations of Afghans [16] , and has renewed its cooperation agreement with Syria – ending the partial suspension in place since 2011 – which reflects a desire to speed up the forced returns of Syrian refugees residing throughout Europe [17] .

Italy/Albania

La Repubblica, “Palazzo Chigi tries again: ‘Migrants picked up at sea to be held in centres in Albania' ”, 11 May 2026

The Italian government is reportedly working on a new decree under the Italy–Albania Memorandum of Understanding (2023). The aim is said to be to revert to the original plan to outsource the fast-track processing of asylum applications to the camps in Shëngjin and Gjadër – under Italian jurisdiction. Those affected are migrants intercepted at sea by the Italian authorities, who come from so-called ‘safe' countries and are considered ‘non-vulnerable'. According to the government, this change would be made possible by the European Pact on Migration and Asylum, which came into force on 12 June 2026.

The initial project had so far been held up by several court rulings. The court in Rome has repeatedly refused to authorise detention in the camps in Albania, ruling that the countries of origin of the people concerned, such as Bangladesh and Egypt, could not be considered ‘safe' under European law [18] . To prevent these camps from becoming unused, Italy converted them in 2025 into Italian detention and deportation centres (CPRs) [19]. The entry into force of the Pact could, however, remove these obstacles. The Pact does indeed allow a country to be classified as partially ‘safe' and facilitates the use of accelerated procedures for nationals of countries with a low asylum recognition rate (< 20 per cent). Together with the new common European list of ‘safe countries of origin', these measures provide Italy with a more solid legal basis for reactivating the Albanian centres [20] .

However, doubts remain, particularly regarding Italy's ability to detain asylum seekers undergoing standard procedures on territory outside the EU – an issue referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which is expected to rule in the coming months [21] .

Sweden

InfoMigrants, ‘Sweden: Parliament passes law obliging public authorities to report undocumented migrants' migrants', 16 June 2026

On Monday 15 June, the Swedish Parliament passed two bills aimed at stepping up the deportation of migrants. The first measure, known as the ‘snitch law', obliges six public authorities (employment, pensions, tax, debt, social insurance and the prison service) to report to the police any undocumented migrants with whom their staff come into contact. The second, known as the ‘good conduct' law, provides for the deportation of foreign nationals residing in Sweden who do not lead an ‘honest life'.

These measures establish a state apparatus of control and coercion in Sweden, which will lead to racial profiling, discrimination based on appearance and serious infringements of migrants' rights. The ‘snitch law' risks preventing migrantd people from accessing social rights; they may forgo essential services – including going to hospital or school – for fear of being denounced. By systematically using government departments and public services as tools for surveillance, it foreshadows the ‘return' regulation – adopted on 17 June by the European Parliament – which authorises raids in public places and private homes.

The ‘good conduct' law, does not specify the criteria for defining what would constitute ‘bad conduct'. Its discretionary nature exposes migrants to the risk of having their residence permits refused or revoked on the basis of behaviour that is neither illegal nor punishable for Swedish citizens. This amounts to the deliberate creation of legal uncertainty and the imposition of conditions on rights, which is dissuasive and contrary to the rule of law. These measures will foster fear and self-censorship amongst migrants.

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United Kingdom

France24, ‘Violent anti-immigration protests in Belfast following an attack attributed to a refugee', 9 June 2026

France24, “Mass rally against racism in Belfast following anti-immigrant riots”, 13 June 2026

On 9 June, anti-immigrant demonstrations took place in Belfast (Northern Ireland) in the wake of a knife attack attributed to a Sudanese national, footage of which was shared on social media. Neo-fascist groups set fire to cars and homes, most of which belonged to migrant people. A few days later, a large anti-racist demonstration was organised to condemn this wave of racist violence.

This incident illustrates a well-known pattern in several European countries and beyond: an offence or crime committed by a foreign national is exploited to target entire communities of migrants and to legitimise violent attacks and racially motivated intimidation against them. This dynamic is part of a context of a sharp rise in racism and the far right in the United Kingdom – visible both on social media and in public spaces (murals inciting racial hatred, anti-migrant rallies, etc.) [22] – which threatens the lives and safety of migrant people and non-white people.

InfoMigrants, ‘In the UK, the government wants to expand the sponsored refugee scheme' scheme', 30 June 2026

On 30 June, the UK Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood, announced the introduction of a refugee sponsorship scheme, which will come into force in autumn 2027. In practice, universities, businesses and other organisations will now be able to sponsor a person recognised as a refugee under Article 1 of the1951 Geneva Convention, enabling them to settle legally in the UK. The organisations responsible for this sponsorship will be in charge of providing accommodation, facilitating integration and assisting with the selected individuals' entry into the labour market. The number of potential beneficiaries has not yet been specified, and applications will remain subject to strict government scrutiny.

This announcement comes against a backdrop of a general tightening of UK asylum policy. Sponsorship schemes are, in fact, frequently used by governments to project an image of selective generosity towards ‘genuine refugees' (Mahmood uses the term ‘genuine refugees'), whilst diverting attention from deterrence policies that remain unchanged, or that are strengthened. Sponsorship schemes thus become instruments of a policy of selection, enabling states to set quotas for people entering their territory and to select certain categories of refugees based on their level of qualifications or their religion (church-sponsored schemes spring to mind) [23]. Furthermore, the state shrinks its responsibilities regarding protection and asylum by transferring a legal obligation to the private sector. Beyond the individual benefits that selected people may enjoy, this scheme, which is part of a highly repressive UK policy towards migrants, risks distorting the spirit of the right to asylum, which could then be reduced to ‘a neoliberal, privatised immigration scheme, reserved solely for highly skilled and educated migrants, or for certain ethnic or religious groups' [24] .

United Kingdom/France

Le Monde, “Migration: a first step towards the Europeanisation of the management of Channel crossings ”, 23 June

The ‘One in, one out' agreement (2025) between France and the United Kingdom will not be renewed after October 2026. It will be replaced by a European Commission action plan for the Channel migration route, drawn up in partnership with the United Kingdom and published on June 16.

The ‘One in, one out' agreement currently stipulates that, for every asylum seeker the United Kingdom undertakes to admit through ‘legal channels', France agrees in return to readmit to its territory one person who has arrived in the United Kingdom so-called irregularly [25]. The new action plan sets out a repressive approach centred on three pillars: strengthening diplomatic cooperation with countries of origin and transit to facilitate deportations; the ‘fight against people-smugglers' (which raises fears of increased criminalisation of migrants and solidarity organisations [26] ); and increasing the resources allocated to law enforcement and border control. Unsurprisingly, the text refers to the need to curb ‘illegal' migration in order to deter people from undertaking dangerous journeys. This is a rhetorical ploy that obscures the fact that it is precisely the sealing off of borders that drives many people to continue undertaking these dangerous journeys.

Switzerland

Euractiv, ‘Swiss reject divisive anti-immigration proposal', 14 June 2026

On 14 June, 54 per cent of Swiss voters rejected the anti-immigration initiative ‘No to a Switzerland with 10 million!'. This initiative was put forward by the far-right SVP party and identified asylum seekers as the cause of thepopulation growth that, according to SVP, is jeopardising the country's ‘sustainability'. The text called for the permanent resident population to be kept below the ten-million mark by 2050, through repressive migration measures that contravened the country's obligations regarding reception and protection. Once the population reached 9.5 million, asylum seekers granted temporary leave would no longer have any prospect of remaining in the country. Should the population exceed 10 million, international agreements accused of encouraging population growth would have to be renegotiated or even withdrawn. The application of texts such as the Global Compact for Migration, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the European Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons would be threatened [27] .

The initiative failed thanks to strong opposition from employers' organisations and trade unions, which feared severe repercussions for employment and growth. Although many of the arguments in favour of a ‘no' vote were economic in nature, the rejection of the initiative remains a significant victory and a setback for the far right's vision of society. A vision that would have exposed migrants to a real risk of being turned back at the borders and of asylum procedures being suspended, and which would have led – through the possibility of renouncing international human rights agreements – to a general weakening of these protections for everyone, not just for migrants.

Chisinau Declaration

Euractiv, ‘European countries urge rethink of human rights on migration', 15 May 2026

On 15 May 2026, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a declaration in Chisinau (Moldova) proposing a restrictive interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in order to facilitate the deportation of migrants who have not been granted the right of residence or who have committed serious offences. The declaration proposes a reinterpretation of Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life) to ‘rebalance' the individual rights of migrants against ‘the public interest and public security'. It also proposes narrowing the scope of Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment), so that insufficient access to healthcare or precarious socio-economic conditions in the country of deportation cannot constitute inhuman or degrading treatment that would prevent forced return. It should be noted, however, that Article 3 admits of no exceptions.

The Council of Europe has thus acted on the declaration issued in December 2025 by 27 member states calling for a more restrictive interpretation of the ECHR with regard to forced returns. Whilst the Chisinau Declaration remains non-binding in legal terms, it constitutes a worrying political development which will contribute – alongside recent European legislation (‘safe' countries of origin, ‘safe' third countries, the ‘Return' Regulation) -to entrench in the collective imagination the need to systematise dangerous deportations, in the name of so-called security imperatives. It also constitutes political interference in the interpretation of the ECHR, illustrating a European trend towards challenging the legitimacy of the judiciary [28] , which has been accused by several right-wing and far-right governments of favouring progressive positions on migration.

Entry into force of the Migration and Asylum Pact

Mediapart, ‘Migration and Asylum Pact: a day of shame for the European Union', 12 June 2026

On 12 June, the European Pact on Migration and Asylum came into force. It constitutes a comprehensive reform of European policy in this area, introducing far-reaching changes at the EU's borders. It establishes new screening procedures for anyone arriving at the EU's external borders. Following this screening, some people may be subject to accelerated border asylum procedures, leading to deportation if their application is rejected. Throughout all these stages, people are deprived of their liberty, likely in isolated locations that are difficult for lawyers, doctors, journalists and civil society organisations to access. They are also kept in a legal ‘fiction of non-entry': whilst physically present on European soil, they are legally considered not to have entered. This enables states to deport them more easily, paving the way for lower standards of fundamental rights.

Deprivation of liberty is therefore becoming the norm, and access to asylum – as well as to an effective remedy – is drastically restricted. Indeed, more people will be subject to accelerated procedures, on the assumption that they do notrequire protection: those from countries where the asylum recognition rate in the EU is below 20 per cent, those from so-called ‘safe' countries of origin, and those suspected of posing a ‘threat to public order', a vague and undefined concept. Furthermore, if individuals subject to a deportation order appeal against that decision, their appeal will not have suspensive effect, and the Pact authorises deportation even before a final decision has been taken.

In short, this Pact institutionalises, at a European level, the detention, registration, screening and expulsion of migrants at Europe's borders.

Final adoption of the ‘return' regulation

RFI, ‘Migration: the European Parliament adopts reform providing for “return hubs” hubs”', 17 June 2026

Le Monde, “‘Send them back!' chant far-right MEPs in the European Parliament”, 17 June 2026

On 17 June, the European Parliament gave final approval to the ‘return' regulation, amidst applause and racist chants from right-wing and far-right MEPs in the chamber, who shouted “Send them back!”. The text provides for a massive detention system (lasting up to two years, with the possibility of indefinite extension in the event of a threat to public security), the conversion of third countries into ‘return hubs', to which migrants may be deported even if they have no connection to those countries [29] , as well as ‘investigative' measures authorising raids on homes and in public spaces, the seizure of electronic devices and the obligation to provide biometric data to the authorities.

The proposed measures cross a red line by establishing a regime of widespread surveillance within the EU: migrants without the right to reside will be subjected to a veritable manhunt and deported to countries known to be unsafe (European governments are currently considering deportations to Rwanda, Uganda, Libya, Egypt… [30] ). This regulation institutionalises the violation of fundamental rights and international law: it will lead to breaches of the principle of non-refoulement, flout the right to private and family life, and expose migrantd people to inhuman and degrading treatment [31] .

A Taliban delegation in Brussels

InfoMigrants, ‘Unprecedented meeting between the EU and Taliban officials to discuss the return of Afghans to their country of origin', 24 June 2026

Euractiv, “The Taliban use their visit to Brussels to request consular access in Europe”, 23 June 2026

On 23 June, members of the European Commission met with a Taliban delegation to continue negotiations on the forced return of Afghan nationals without the right to reside in the EU. In exchange for their cooperation with these deportations, the Taliban requested the restoration of consular services for Afghans across Europe.

Once again, the EU's anti-immigration obsession is leading to the normalisation of relations with a repressive regime, with the aim of deporting people at any cost [32] . As the restoration of consular services is a fundamental condition set by the Taliban, the end result of these negotiations risks being a de facto legitimisation of the Afghan regime, which has established gender apartheid [33] and is responsible for the systematic violation of human rights in Afghanistan [34] . By normalising its relations with the Taliban, the European Union is eroding its own standards on fundamental rights, pushing the boundaries of what is considered ‘acceptable' ever further. If these negotiations are successful, the Afghan nationals concerned risk being deported to face torture and death.

Press Review May/June 2026

[1] See the EuroMed Rights factsheet on this subject, ‘Safe on paper, dangerous in reality: Egypt and the EU's return policy', June 2025

[2] See OHCHR, “Egypt: UN experts raise alarm over violations against refugees and migrants”, 6 March 2026

[3] 14 people, including E Hishri, are currently the subject of international arrest warrants in connection with this investigation. Some of them have died, whilst others are on the run.

[4] See, in particular, Amnesty International, “Libya: European governments are complicit in human rights violations against refugees and migrants”, 12 December 2017

[5] For further information, see the press release from Refugees in Libya, “Civil society statement: Detention crimes in Libya finally before the ICC: Judges to decide whether El Hishri case moves to trial”, 11 May 2026

[6] This refusal to cooperate with the Court has led to two complaints being lodged against Italy with the European Court of Human Rights. See, on this subject, InfoMigrants, “Italy facing two complaints with the ECHR for releasing the Libyan migrant torturer Osama Almasri Najim”, 1 June 2026

[7] Almasri was recently sentenced by a court in Tripoli to 7 years and 4 months' imprisonment, whilst still being the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the ICC. Libya, which is not a signatory to the Rome Statute (the founding treaty of the ICC), is not obliged to hand him over to the Court. See in this regard Il Post, “General Almasri has been sentenced in Libya to 7 years and 4 months for acts of violence against migrants”, 21 June 2026.

[8] See, on this subject, the information on Libya on Migreurop, “The Maghreb states and the European Union are guilty of systematic violations of international law and crimes against humanity”, 7 April 2026

[9] See also Refugees in Libya, “Book of Shame. How UNHCR Fails to Protect Refugees in Libya, Tunisia, and Niger”, 2025

[10] See on this subject Migreurop, “CEUTA Factsheet”, Isaline Roverato, 2024

[11] See also Migreurop, “UK–Rwanda Agreement: Outsourcing Asylum to Africa, a Massive Deterrent in Europe”, 20 June 2022

[12] See on this subject InfoMigrants, “Austria: family reunification suspended for a further six months”, 12 December 2025

[13] See in particular Amnesty International Austria, ‘Nationalrat adopts quota system for family reunification: Amnesty warns of human rights violations', 19 May 2026

[14] See in particular Cyprus Mail, “Migrant dies following balcony jump during immigration raid”, 27 May 2026

[15] See on this subject Cyprus Mail, ‘UNHCR expresses concern over alleged pushback of Syrian refugees', 19 March 2025 and InfoMigrants, ‘Cyprus condemned by the ECHR for pushing back two Syrians at sea', 9 October 2024

[16] See below

[17] See, on this subject, The New Arab, ‘Eyeing migrant returns, EU moves to bolster Syria ties', 12 May 2026

[18] See also “Rome court does not uphold the detention of migrants in Albania”, 18 October 2024

[19] See SkyTG24, ‘How migrant centres in Albania work', 9 June 2025

[20] See Fanpage, ‘Why, under the new EU regulation, Meloni can reopen the centres in Albania', 10 December 2025

[21] See also Italian Coalition for Freedom and Civil Rights (CILD), “The Italy-Albania Protocol before the Court of Justice of the EU”, 10 December 2025

[22] See, in particular, the International Federation for Human Rights, ‘Northern Ireland: racist violence and intimidation must stop', 11 June 2026

[23] See on this subject Nikolas Feith Tan, ‘Community Sponsorship of Refugees and Local Governance', in Theorising Local Migration Law and Governance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2022, pp. 252–271

[24] Ibid., p. 258.

[25] See on this subject the short documentary by MSF Frontlines, ‘One in, one out: thousands of lives at risk', 21 May 2026

[26] On this point, see PICUM, ‘Migrant smuggling: why we need a paradigm shift', 18 July 2022

[27] See on this subject Amnesty International, ‘The “No Switzerland at 10 million” initiative: a frontal attack on the protection of human rights', 7 May 2026

[28] See on this subject Joël Andriantsimbazovina, ‘Political pressure on the European Court of Human Rights', Le Club des Juristes, 12 June 2025

[29] A coalition of five Member States has already begun negotiations with third countries with a view to establishing return hubs. See Euractiv, “EU return hubs to be revealed by autumn, says Dutch minister”, 5 June 2026

[30] See Human Rights Watch, ‘Dangerous EU Momentum Towards Offshore Deportation Centres', 26 June 2026

[31] For further reading, see in particular Migreurop, ‘Adoption of the EU “Return” Regulation: the death knell for international law', 26 March 2026

[32] Agreements with Libya or Turkey are further examples.

[33] For further information, see Human Rights Watch, ‘Gender Apartheid as an International Crime: Taliban Oppression in Afghanistan Triggers Campaign', 2 September 2025

[34] See also Amnesty International, ‘Afghanistan: the human rights situation in 2025', 2026

Brochure: Transborder Summer Camp III

Sarah Bachellerie — 2026-05-04T14:58:56Z

The 2025 Transborder Summer Camp (TSC) took place from 5 to 10 August 2025 in the ZAD near Nantes, bringing together hundreds of activists from Africa, Europe and Asia to discuss strategies for the struggle for freedom of movement. The aim of this third edition of the camp was to forge links between the struggles against border violence and those against racist police violence. The brochure brings together texts, workshop reports and reflections shared during this meeting, in which members of Migreurop took part.

For the third time (following the 2019 and 2022 editions), the Transborder Summer Camp 2025 brought together 680 activists at the ZAD in Notre-Dame-des-Landes for a gathering focusing on practices of local and transnational solidarity along migration routes, struggles against border violence and police brutality, and campaigns for freedom of movement.

The brochure produced by members of the TSC organising committee brings together some of the reflections shared during this third international and cross-border summer camp.

Download the brochure in English (available also in French).

The texts are the result of a call for contributions issued to all participants and the organising groups of the various workshops. Through summaries, reports, personal reflections and critical commentary, poems and photographs, the brochure seeks to capture something of the exceptional spirit of this gathering.

Although it inevitably provides only an incomplete account of the diversity of exchanges that fuelled the gathering, the aim of the brochure is to document some of the key discussions and commitments that emerged from the summer camp. It aims to support transnational networking processes and help to re-inspire us in our struggles. It constitutes a valuable archive of struggles against borders on a transnational scale.

The brochure addresses a wide range of rich and diverse topics, including:

The intersecting struggles of the families of those who have died or gone missing along migration routes and the families of victims of racist police violence, highlighting the need to place their voices at the heart of the struggles for freedom of movement
Practical initiatives and solidarity networks along migration routes (helplines, information guides, solidarity cities), and the various forms of practical organisation against deportations
A critique of the visa system and its devastating consequences in Africa
Analyses of the criminalisation of migrants and activists
Intersectional perspectives on migration struggles, drawing on the experiences of women and LGBTQ+ people in migration
Reflections on power dynamics within solidarity movements and ways to challenge these dynamics at transnational events such as the TSC
Texts on the struggles for legalisation and the links between migration and labour struggles, to build bridges between the anti-border movement and the social movement
Strategic reflections on the practical and logistical organisation of transnational meetings and the challenges of funding our struggles.

Finally, the brochure lists numerous grassroots organisations and transnational networks campaigning for freedom of movement in Europe, Africa and Asia, forming a register of organisations committed to solidarity with people in migration across the continents.

You can find and download the full brochure on the Transborder Camp website.

All the pictures are from the brochure.

Brochure du Transborder Summer Camp III

Sarah Bachellerie — 2026-05-04T14:58:47Z

Le camp d'été transfrontalier (Transborder Summer Camp – TSC) 2025 s'est déroulé du 5 au 10 août 2025 dans la ZAD près de Nantes, rassemblant des centaines de militant·es venu·es d'Afrique, d'Europe et d'Asie, pour échanger autour des pratiques de luttes pour la liberté de circulation. Cette 3e édition du camp avait pour objectif de tisser des liens entre les luttes contre la violence des frontières et celles contre les violences policières racistes. La brochure rassemble des textes, des comptes-rendus d'ateliers et réflexions partagées pendant cette rencontre, à laquelle ont pris part des membres de Migreurop.

Pour la troisième fois (après les éditions de 2019 et 2022), le Transborder Summer Camp 2025 a rassemblé à la ZAD de Notre-Dame-des-Landes 680 militant·es pour une rencontre autour des pratiques de solidarité locale et transnationale le long des routes migratoires, des luttes contre les violences des frontières et les violences policières, et des mobilisations pour la liberté de circulation.

La brochure réalisée par des membres de l'organisation du TSC rassemble une partie des réflexions qui ont été partagées durant ce troisième camp d'été international et transfrontalier.

Télécharger la brochure en français (disponible également en anglais).

Les textes sont issus d'un appel à contributions qui a été lancé à toustes les participant·es et aux groupes organisateurs des différents ateliers. A travers des résumés, des comptes-rendus, des impressions subjectives et des commentaires critiques, des poèmes, des photographies, la brochure tente de capturer un peu de l'esprit exceptionnel de ce rassemblement.

Bien que restituant forcément de façon incomplète la diversité des échanges qui ont alimenté le rassemblement, l'objectif de la brochure est de documenter certaines des discussions et engagements clés issus du camp d'été. Elle vise à soutenir les processus transnationaux de mise en réseau et contribuer à nous réinspirer dans nos luttes. Elle constitue une archive précieuse des luttes contre les frontières à l'échelle transnationale.

La brochure aborde un grand nombre de thématiques, à la fois riches et diverses, notamment :

Les combats croisés des familles de mort·es et disparu·es le long des routes migratoires et des familles de victimes des violences policières racistes, soulignant la nécessité de placer leurs voix au coeur des luttes pour la liberté de circulation
Les pratiques concrètes et infrastructures de solidarité le long des routes migratoires (lignes d'assistance, guides d'information, villes solidaires), et les différentes formes d'organisation matérielle contre les expulsions
Une critique du système des visas et de ses conséquences dévastatrice en Afrique
Des analyses sur la criminalisation des personnes migrantes et des militant·es
Des perspectives intersectionnelles sur les luttes migratoires, à partir des expériences de femmes et personnes LGBTQ+ en migration
Des réflexions sur les rapports de domination à l'intérieur des mouvements de solidarité et des pistes pour confronter ces rapports lors d'événements transnationaux comme le TSC
Des textes sur les luttes pour la régularisation et les liens entre migrations et luttes de travail, pour construire des ponts entre le mouvement de lutte contre les frontières et le mouvement social
Des réflexions stratégiques sur l'organisation pratique et logistique des rencontres transnationales et les enjeux de financement de nos luttes.

Enfin, la brochure référence de nombreuses organisations de terrain et réseaux transnationaux qui se mobilisent pour la liberté de circulation en Europe, en Afrique et en Asie, constituant un annuaire des organisations engagées en solidarité avec les personnes en migration à travers les continents.

Vous pouvez retrouver et télécharger la brochure complète sur le site du Transborder Camp.

Toutes les photographies sont issues de la brochure.

6e édition du festival Ajapama Kodo organisé par AEC Niger

Sarah Bachellerie — 2026-03-30T08:51:46Z

Du 27 au 30 mars 2026 a eu lieu à Agadez la 6e édition du festival Ajapama Kodo dédié aux droits des migrant·e·s, organisé par AEC Niger.

Agadez, cité historique à la porte du désert, a accueilli la 6e édition du festival Ajapama Kodo (qui signifie "Bienvenue étranger" en langue fulfuldé), événement culturel dédié aux droits des migrant·e·s.

Le thème central de cette 6e édition était : "Décrypter l'impérialismes des frontières pour contrer la déshumanisation des personnes migrantes dans les pays de transit". Le festival a regroupé des acteurs civiques, des expert·es, décideurs locaux, leaders coutumiers, de nombreuses personnes migrantes de différentes nationalités et citoyen·nes locaux.

Le choix du thème de cette édition trouve sa justification dans le contexte mondial défavorable aux droits fondamentaux, ceux des migrant·e·s en particulier. Aujourd'hui, malgré les engagements pris par les États, la réalité de la migration est telle que les populations du Sud global ne jouissent pas de la liberté d'aller et venir consacrée par l'article 13 de la DUDH. Leur droit à la libre circulation est entravé par des mesures restrictives dictées par les pays occidentaux qui se sont arrogés le pouvoir de déterminer qui peut quitter son pays et sous quelles conditions. L'impérialisme des frontières étend l'européanisation et l'externalisation des politiques migratoires restrictives. Dans un contexte d'expansion du terrorisme et de conflits armés, la surveillance des frontières prend l'allure d'une obsession sécuritaire. Le regard porté sur les personnes migrantes en quête de protection internationale est plein de suspicions.

Au Niger, la décriminalisation de la migration intervenue en novembre 2023 [1] ne s'est pas accompagnée d'un changement de paradigme dans la gouvernance de la mobilité humaine. C'est toujours l'approche sécuritaire qui domine au détriment de la jouissance des droits fondamentaux. Dans le nord du pays, en plus d'une situation humanitaire très critique, les personnes migrantes sont confrontées à des opérations policières et à de l'intolérance de la part de la population d'accueil.

Cette atmosphère a pris une proportion inquiétante avec l'adoption en janvier 2025 d'une ordonnance sur l'entrée et le séjour des étrangers par le gouvernement réuni en Conseil des ministres. En décembre de la même année, les autorités militaires ont durci davantage la situation en adoptant une ordonnance 2025-242 déclarant la mobilisation générale. Ce texte permet de réquisitionner les personnes, les biens et les services pour contribuer à la défense de la patrie. Le ministère de l'Intérieur a pour mandat d'établir une banque de données actualisée relative aux citoyens et aux ressources matérielles devant être mobilisées et réquisitionnées. Cette ordonnance fait obligation à tout citoyen·ne de se soumettre à la réquisition et « d'informer les autorités publiques compétentes sur tout ressortissant de pays hostiles se trouvant sur le territoire national » sous peine d'emprisonnement de 10 à 15 ans et d'une amende de 1 à 10 millions de francs CFA.

C'est dans ce contexte de menaces multiformes que l'association Alternative Espaces Citoyens (AEC) a organisé ce mini-festival Ajapama Kodo. Cette édition poursuit trois objectifs spécifiques :

1) Offrir aux participant·e·s des espaces d'échanges sur les enjeux et défis de la migration ;
2) Analyser les impacts liés à la sécuritisation des frontières ;
3) Proposer des recommandations concrètes aux décideurs et acteurs de la protection.

Initialement prévu en décembre 2025, cet événement n'avait pas eu lieu, en raison de la suspension des activités des ONG/AD par le ministère de l'Intérieur pour non publication des états financiers au Journal Officiel. La levée de cette suspension est intervenue en janvier 2026. C'est pour respecter son engagement de pérenniser ce rendez-vous annuel que AEC a décidé d'organiser un mini-festival dont les activités se sont étalées sur trois jours.

Programme

Jour 1 : Le premier jour a été consacré au lancement officiel, sous forme d'une conférence de presse avec les médias locaux.
Jour 2 : Le deuxième jour a été dédié à des projections de films et à une table ronde de dialogue autour du thème : "Militarisation des frontières et criminalisation de la mobilité humaine", dans laquelle est intervenue Brigitte Espuche pour représenter le réseau Migreurop.
Jour 3 : Le troisième jour a été consacré à une deuxième table ronde autour des enjeux de la nouvelle loi sur l'entrée et le séjour au Niger. Il était prévu également des projections de films documentaires et un dîner de solidarité avec les migrants vulnérables.

Tout au long du festival : des projections de film, des repas partagé, pour favoriser les échanges et repenser la migration et la lutte pour la liberté de circulation.

[1] Voir l'article du Monde : https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/arti...

Press review february 2026

Camille — 2026-03-10T17:11:48Z

Sommaire

Egypt

InfoMigrants, 'In Egypt, arrests of African refugees are increasing as part of a widespread crackdown,' 25 February 2026

Egypt has launched a campaign of arrests and deportations of migrant people in an effort to halt arrivals. Nearly 5,000 migrants have been detained in police stations for reasons related solely to immigration and several human rights organisations have denounced the ill-treatment and violence suffered in these places of deprivation of liberty.

Such violence is not unprecedented in Egypt, which systematically flouts its international responsibilities in terms of reception and protection (it has ratified the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees): arbitrary detention [1] of migrants and refoulement are common practice. Yet, the European Union and its Member States have continued to strengthen their relations with Egypt since the early 2000s. The EU-Egypt partnership concluded in March 2025, which includes 'cooperation on migration and mobility' [2] , and the recent approval of two texts on the concept of 'safe countries' [3], consolidate the attempt to relocate the violation of fundamental rights to a 'third' country. Through this deadly security cooperation, the EU is indirectly responsible for these violations.

Tunisia

France24, 'Tunisia: authorities accused of forcing 'voluntary' returns of migrants', 3 February 2026

Since early 2026, the El Amra and Jebeniana camps in Tunisia have been the target of repeated police operations to dismantle them. The aim of these destruction, confiscations and thefts is to push sub-Saharan migrant people into 'voluntary return' to their countries of origin. Normally managed by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), these returns are also organised and promoted in an opaque and informal manner via WhatsApp groups, probably in conjunction with the Tunisian authorities.

So-called 'voluntary' return is not a free choice in Tunisia, but the only choice possible in the absence of safe alternatives, effectively turning it into a disguised expulsion and thus an instrument of fundamental rights violations [4] .

Police operations, arbitrary detentions, refoulements or expulsions via 'voluntary returns' suffered by migrants, as well as growing racism in Tunisia, make the country a notoriously unsafe place for people on the move [5] . Yet the EU and its Member States continue to entrust Tunisia with the management of migration to Europe through the 2023 Memorandum of Understanding between Tunisia and the EU, which was strongly supported by the Italian government [6], and the 'safe countries' legislation approved by the European Parliament in February 2026.

Germany

Politico, ' Berlin to extend beefed-up border checks ', 16 February 2026
Germany will extend internal border controls, reintroduced in September 2024 and presented as an important part of the country's migration policy strategy, until September 2026.

While free movement is the founding principle of the Schengen area, since 2024 the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) has allowed for the temporary reintroduction of internal controls for a maximum period of six months, except in cases of serious threats to public order or national security, which would justify an extension of up to two years [7] . Since then, ten states have reintroduced border controls: France (which had already reintroduced such controls de facto since 2015), Poland, Sweden, Austria, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany and Slovenia.

With the arrival of Friedrich Merz in government and the adoption of a more repressive migration policy, Germany's borders are becoming increasingly militarised and several cases of returns to countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan have been documented. Despite the rulings of national courts [8] and reports by human rights organisations [9] , the government has not changed its approach, citing the need to 'contain threats to order and security' posed by so-called 'uncontrolled' immigration [10] . Germany thus establishes a causal link between migration and crime, even though no direct correlation between the two has been proven. It is more likely to be a biased perception, which can be explained, for example, by the over-representation of migrants in certain official statistics and the greater media visibility of offences committed by migrants compared to those committed by nationals [11]. Nevertheless, this correlation is regularly exploited in the public debate to justify serious violations of the rights of migrant people, such as refoulement and racial profiling.

InfoMigrants, 'Germany deports 20 Afghan criminals to Kabul,' 27 February 2026

On 26 February, Germany directly deported 20 Afghan nationals who had been convicted by the courts to Afghanistan. In 2024, Olaf Scholz's government had already deported convicted Afghan nationals, but via Qatar, which was responsible for organising their return to Kabul. This is the first time since the Taliban took power in 2021 that an EU member state has carried out a direct deportation to Afghanistan, via an agreement reached in 2025 between the German government and the Taliban.

This informal agreement violates the principle of non-refoulement and sets a dangerous precedent. It is part of a broader attempt by several European states to push the EU to coordinate a strategy of direct deportations to Afghanistan [12] . This attempt may well succeed, as the European Commission began negotiations with the Taliban a few months ago on 'returns' [13] . These practices risk normalising relations with a country that the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has described as a 'graveyard for human rights'.

Cyrprus

InfoMigrants, 'Cyprus intensifies migration enforcement operations', 17 February 2026

Since mid-December, police operations in Cyprus aimed at detecting migrants without the right to stay have intensified. According to the authorities, 160 people have been deported and 480 have made so-called 'voluntary' returns.

Cyprus currently holds the six-month presidency of the Council of the EU and its current priority is to demonstrate its performance in border management. This policy is part of its bid to join the Schengen area, scheduled for later in 2026.

Cyprus has already been accused and found guilty of violating the rights of migrant people on several occasions (notably the refoulement of Syrian asylum seekers [14] ), but these decisions have had no effect: on the contrary, the southern part of the island continues to benefit from EU support for its migration policies that violate rights [15] .

Spain

Telquel Maroc, 'On CNN, Pedro Sánchez praises the effectiveness of migration cooperation with Morocco,' 4 February 2026

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez said in an interview with CNN that cooperation with Morocco has significantly reduced so-called 'irregular' immigration to Spain, describing this bilateral partnership as essential for managing migration.

This statement comes after the announced regularisation of 500,000 migrant people in Spain and Sánchez's explicit opposition to the creation of 'return centres' outside European borders for rejected asylum seekers [16] .

In reality, however, Spain systematically outsources the management of its borders, entrusting it in particular to Morocco and Mauritania [17] . Acting in line with the EU and its Member States, Spain bears responsibility for human rights violations against migrant people in these countries, which have been widely documented in several reports [18] .

Italy

Il Post, ' Il governo ha approvato un disegno di legge che limita l'accoglienza dei migranti ', 11 February 2026

Internazionale, ' Il blocco navale che non è un blocco navale ', 17 February 2026

On 11 February, the Italian government approved a draft immigration bill introducing new restrictive measures in advance of the European Union's Pact on Migration and Asylum. Among other things, the text provides for a 'naval blockade' of up to six months for vaguely defined security reasons, with heavy fines and confiscation of the vessel in the event of non-compliance with the ban on navigation in Italian territorial waters. Furthermore, migrants on board may be transferred to so-called third countries other than their countries of origin, with which Italy has concluded formal or informal agreements. Other measures include facilitated expulsion procedures, stricter criteria for family reunification and subsidiary protection, and a reduction in the guarantees granted to unaccompanied minors.

This bill contravenes international obligations on asylum and rescue at sea, and risks leading to collective refoulement at borders and on the high seas. In the wake of recent European legislation on the concept of 'safe countries', this bill exposes migrant people to serious human rights violations, particularly with regard to the individual examination of their asylum applications. Supported by the European Union, the Italian government continues to shirk its responsibilities in terms of reception and protection, and to systematically criminalise migrants and solidarity organisations [19] .

Sweden

InfoMigrants, 'At 18, they lose the right to stay in the country': strong emotions in Sweden over the deportation of foreign teenagers, 20 February 2026

In Sweden, many young migrant people are deported after reaching the age of majority. A reform adopted in 2016 stipulates that young people who reach the age of 18 before obtaining permanent resident status are no longer considered part of their parents' family unit. They are therefore no longer eligible for family reunification and are deprived of the right to stay.

Cases of deportation of these young people to their 'countries of origin', with which they have little or no actual connection, are on the rise in the current context of Sweden's increasingly harsh migration policies [20] . It is becoming increasingly difficult for minors to obtain permanent resident status: family reunification applications are often processed with delays that result in some young people losing their protection [21] . Guarantees for families are being weakened, and Sweden is flouting its international obligations to respect private and family life and the best interests of the child.

United Kingdom

The Guardian, ' Home Office says nearly 60,000 people deported from UK or left voluntarily since 2024 election ', 5 February 2026

The UK government claims to have deported 60,000 criminals and migrants without the right to remain since Labour came to power (July 2024). According to some, the recent increase in deportations is the result of a desperate attempt to counter the far right (Reform UK is ahead of Labour in recent polls) through populist and criminalising rhetoric. In the wake of this, the United Kingdom has announced on several occasions its intention to introduce measures into its legislation aimed at limiting appeals against deportations by circumventing the application of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In particular, this would be done through laws aimed at restricting the interpretation of Articles 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) - which, however, allows for no exceptions [22] - and 8 (right to respect for private and family life). [23] [24]

The country is among those that signed an open letter in 2025 [25] calling for a more restrictive interpretation of these two articles, which could allow the expulsion of migrant people even in cases of dangerous returns [26] . The United Kingdom thus joins the ranks of states that are challenging international law or seeking to adapt it to subordinate it to the dominant anti-migration ideology.

The concept of "safe countries"

Le Monde, 'European Parliament adopts two key texts to tighten migration policy,' 10 February 2026

On 10 February, the European Parliament adopted two texts on the concept of 'safe countries', thanks to an alliance between the right and the far right. The first establishes a common list of countries of origin considered 'safe', including Tunisia, Morocco, Colombia, Kosovo, Egypt, India and Bangladesh. Member States will have to apply accelerated procedures to examine asylum applications from nationals of these countries, on the assumption that they do not, a priori, need protection. The second text, on 'safe third countries', allows any asylum application from persons who have transited through one of these countries to be declared inadmissible and for them to be deported there.

However, systematic human rights violations have been widely documented in these countries considered 'safe' by the EU [27] . Furthermore, no one can guarantee that a country is safe for all its nationals.

The EU is thus shirking its responsibilities in terms of asylum, putting in place a punitive system of mass deportations and systematising the violation of the principle of non-refoulement and the right to an individual examination of asylum applications.

The "Return Regulation" proposal

The Guardian, 'EU's deportations plan risks ICE-style enforcement, rights groups warn', 16 February 2026

The EU is currently negotiating the 'Return Regulation', which aims to replace the 2008 Return Directive, the framework for detention and deportation within the EU, and which would, among other things, extend and normalise raids and surveillance measures in Member States. Member States would be required to 'detect' persons without the right to stay , thereby transforming everyday spaces and public services into tools of control, similar toBrigitte Espuche2026-03-09T11:23:00BEexplain what it is

ICE in the United States (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) [28] .

More than 80 associations have signed a statement warning that this regulation 'would consolidate a punitive system, fuelled by far-right rhetoric and based on racialised suspicion, denunciation, detention and deportation' [29] .

The draft Return Regulation stems from a proposal by the European Commission in March 2025. It was approved in a more repressive version on 9 March by the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), at the instigation of an alliance between the right and the far right and will be voted on in plenary in the coming days. The proposed measures include expanding coercive measures, facilitating forced expulsions and legalising outsourcing practices. This is yet another attack on the rights of migrant people and the European democratic order.

Press review february 2026

[1] See Amnesty International's press release 'Egypt: Refugees forced into hiding due to arbitrary arrests and illegal deportations amid crackdown', 16 February 2025.

[2] See, in particular, EuroNews, “Brussels to announce €75 million in financial aid to Cairo”, 22 October 2025.

[3] See in particular: Amnesty International, 'European Union: Adoption of safe country rules is a new attack on the right to asylum,' 11 February 2026.

[4] See in this regard the collective action, 'Manifesto. Voluntary humanitarian refusal: a choice you cannot refuse,' 1 April 2025

[5] See in this regard the EuroMed Rights network fact sheet, 'Safe on paper, dangerous in reality: Tunisia and the EU's return policy,' 20 June 2025

[6] See in particular Plein Droit No. 125 by Gisti, 'Tunisia, a land of welcome... for European policies,' June 2020; Lawyers Without Borders 'Italy-Tunisia migration agreements: human costs and security abuses,' report, 11 December 2025

[7] Regulation (EU)2016/399, Schengen Borders Code.

[8] See, in particular, Euractiv, 'Germany: court rules that turning away asylum seekers at the border is illegal', 2 June 2025

[9] See in this regard the 2024 reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch on the human rights situation in Germany

[10] See InfoMigrants, 'Germany to extend border checks by six months ', 17 February 2026

[11] See in particular Centre d'études prospectives et d'informations internationales (CEPII), 'Immigration and crime: realities and perceptions,' April 2023

[12] See, in particular, EuroNews, 'Nineteen EU countries and Norway demand measures to return Afghans either voluntarily or forcibly ', 18 October 2025

[13] See, in particular, InfoMigrants, 'Expulsions of Afghans from the EU: the European Commission announces talks with the Taliban,' 21 October 2025

[14] See Migreurop, 'Press review for March 2025,' 1 April 2025

[15] See in particular the EU's financial support programmes for migration management in Cyprus

[16] See Migreurop, 'Press review for January 2026,' 29 January 2026

[17] See InfoMigrants, 'Canary Islands route: more than 60% drop in migrant arrivals in the Spanish archipelago in 2025,' 5 January 2026

[18] See on this subject: Human Rights Watch, 'Mauritania: Years of Abuse Linked to Migration Controls', 27 August 2025; ASGI 'Morocco: Border policies at the root of forced disappearances and human rights violations', 14 April 2025

[19] See the joint statement against the draft law on the SOS Méditerranée website, 'So-called 'safe' countries and 'naval blockade': the Italian government attacks sea rescue NGOs and the rights of migrants,' 12 February 2026

[20] See the sections on Sweden in Migreurop, 'Press review 2025,' 1 January 2026

[21] See the Human Rights Watch press release on this subject, 'Sweden Deporting Young People', 19 February 2026

[22] Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no.22978/05%7D] , § 107, ECHR 2010

[23] See The Guardian, “What does the UK want to change about human rights law – and will it happen?”, 10 December 2025

[24] However, these laws are not included among the asylum reform measures that came into force at the beginning of March

[25] See, in particular, the joint statement by 27 European countries calling for a more restrictive interpretation of Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR, 'Joint Statement to the Conference of Ministers of Justice of the Council of Europe', 10 December 2025

[26] See in this regard The Guardian, 'UK joins call for Europe's human rights laws to be 'constrained' ,' 10 December 2025

[27] See EuroMed Rights, ‘Stop considering Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco as “safe” countries!', 16 April 2025

[28] ICE: US agency responsible for immigration and customs enforcement, known for its coercive practices and intimidating raids against migrants

[29] See the joint statement on the PICUM website, “No to EU law enabling home raids, policing of public services and racial profiling”, 11 February 2026

Revue de presse février 2026

Camille — 2026-03-10T16:28:28Z

Sommaire

Egypte

InfoMigrants, « En Égypte, les arrestations de réfugiés africains se multiplient dans une vaste campagne de répression », le 25 février 2026

L'Égypte a lancé une campagne d'arrestations et d'expulsions de personnes exilé·e·s, dans le but d'enrayer les arrivées. Près de 5 000 migrant·e·s ont été placés en détention dans les commissariats pour des raisons liée uniquement à l'immigration, et plusieurs organisations de défense des droits humains dénoncent les mauvais traitements et les violences subis dans ces lieux de privation de liberté.

Ces violences ne sont pas inédites en Égypte, qui bafoue systématiquement ses responsabilités internationales en matière d'accueil et de protection (il a ratifié la Convention de Genève relative au statut des réfugiés) : les détentions arbitraires [1] de migrant·e·s et refoulements y sont une pratique courante. Pourtant, l'Union européenne et ses États membres n'ont cessé de renforcer leurs relations avec ce pays depuis le début des années 2000. Le partenariat UE–Égypte conclu en mars 2025, qui inclut une « coopération en matière de migration et mobilité » [2] , et la récente approbation des deux textes sur le concept de « pays sûrs » [3] consolident la tentative de délocaliser la violation des droits fondamentaux vers un pays « tiers ». À travers cette coopération sécuritaire et meurtrière, l'UE se rend indirectement responsable de ces violations.

Tunisie

France24, « Tunisie : les autorités accusées de forcer les retours 'volontaires' des migrants », le 3 février 2026

Depuis début 2026, les campements d'El Amra et Jebeniana, en Tunisie, font l'objet d'opérations policières répétées de démantèlement. L'objectif des destructions, confiscations et vols serait de pousser les exilé·e·s subsaharien·ne·s au « retour volontaire » dans leurs pays d'origine. Normalement gérés par l'Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), ces retours sont également organisés et promus de manière opaque et informelle via des groupes WhatsApp, probablement en lien avec les autorités tunisiennes.

Le retour dit « volontaire » n'est pas un choix libre en Tunisie, mais le seul choix possible en l'absence d'alternatives sûres, se transformant de fait en expulsion déguisée et donc en un instrument de violation des droits fondamentaux [4].

Les opérations policières, les détentions arbitraires, les refoulements ou les expulsions via les « retours volontaires » subis par les migrant·e·s, ainsi que le racisme croissant en Tunisie, font du pays un lieu notoirement non sûr pour les exilé·e·s [5]. Pourtant, l'UE et ses États membres continuent à lui confier la gestion des mouvements migratoires vers l'Europe via le mémorandum d'entente conclu en 2023 entre la Tunisie et l'UE, largement soutenu par le gouvernement italien [6], ou les textes sur les « pays sûrs » approuvés par le Parlement Européen en février 2026.

Allemagne

Politico, « Berlin to extend beefed-up border checks », le 16 février 2026

L'Allemagne prolongera jusqu'en septembre 2026 les contrôles à ses frontières internes, réintroduits en septembre 2024 et présentés comme un élément important de la réorganisation de la politique migratoire du pays.

Si la libre circulation est le principe fondateur de l'espace Schengen, le Code frontières Schengen (CFS) autorise depuis 2024 le rétablissement temporaire des contrôles intérieurs pour une durée maximale de six mois, sauf en cas de menace grave pour l'ordre public ou pour la sécurité nationale, ce qui justifierait une prolongation jusqu'à deux ans [7]. Depuis lors, dix États ont rétabli des contrôles aux frontières : la France (qui avait déjà réintroduit de tels contrôles de facto depuis 2015), la Pologne, la Suède, l'Autriche, la Norvège, le Danemark, les Pays-Bas, l'Italie, l'Allemagne et la Slovénie.

Avec l'arrivée de Friedrich Merz au gouvernement et l'adoption d'une politique migratoire plus répressive, les frontières allemandes sont de plus en plus militarisées et plusieurs cas de renvois vers des pays comme l'Afghanistan ou le Pakistan ont été documentés. Malgré les décisions des tribunaux nationaux [8] et les signalements des organisation de défense de droits humains [9], le gouvernement n'a pas changé d'approche, invoquant la nécessité de « contenir les menaces à l'ordre et à la sécurité » représentées par une immigration dite « incontrôlée » [10]. L'Allemagne établit ainsi un lien de causalité entre migration et criminalité, alors qu'aucune corrélation directe entre les deux n'a pu être prouvée. Il s'agirait plutôt d'une perception biaisée, qui s'expliquerait par exemple par la surreprésentation des migrant·e·s dans certaines statistiques officielles et une plus grande visibilité médiatique des infractions commises par le migrant·e·s par rapport à celles commises par les nationaux [11]. Cette corrélation est néanmoins régulièrement instrumentalisée dans le débat public pour justifier de graves atteintes aux droits des personnes exilées, telles que refoulements et discrimination au faciès.

InfoMigrants, « L'Allemagne expulse 20 criminels afghans vers Kaboul », le 27 février 2026

Le 26 février, l'Allemagne a procédé a une expulsion directe vers l'Afghanistan de 20 ressortissants afghans ayant été condamnés par la justice. En 2024, le gouvernement d'Olaf Scholz avait déjà expulsé des ressortissant·e·s afghan·e·s condamné·e·s, mais via le Qatar, qui se chargeait d'organiser leur renvoi à Kaboul. C'est la première fois, depuis la prise de pouvoir des talibans en 2021, qu'un État membre de l'UE procède à une expulsion directe vers l'Afghanistan, via un arrangement conclu en 2025 entre le gouvernement allemand et les talibans.

Cet accord informel viole le principe de non-refoulement et crée un précédent dangereux. Il s'inscrit dans une tentative plus large de plusieurs États européens de pousser l'UE à coordonner une stratégie d'expulsions directes vers l'Afghanistan [12]. Une tentative qui pourrait bien réussir, la Commission européenne ayant entamé depuis quelques mois des négociations avec les talibans en matière de « retours » [13]. Ces pratiques risquent de normaliser les relations avec un pays que le Haut-Commissariat aux droits de l'homme a qualifié de « cimetière des droits humains ».

Chypre

InfoMigrants, « Cyprus intensifies migration enforcement operations », le 17 février 2026

Depuis mi-décembre, les opérations policières à Chypre visant à détecter les migrant·e·s sans droit au séjour se sont intensifiées. Selon les autorités, 160 personnes ont été expulsées et 480 ont effectué des retours dits « volontaires ».

Chypre assure actuellement la présidence de six mois du Conseil de l'UE et sa priorité actuelle est de démontrer sa performance en matière de gestion des frontières. Cette politique s'inscrit dans le contexte de sa candidature à rejoindre l'espace Schengen, prévue plus tard en 2026.

Chypre a déjà été plusieurs fois accusée et reconnue coupable de violations des droits des exilé·e·s (notamment des refoulements de demandeur·euse·s d'asile syrien·ne·s [14]), mais ces décisions n'ont eu aucun effet : bien au contraire, la partie Sud de l'île continue de bénéficier du soutien de l'UE dans ses politiques migratoires attentatoires aux droits [15].

Espagne

Telquel Maroc, « Sur CNN, Pedro Sánchez salue l'efficacité de la coopération migratoire avec le Maroc », le 4 février 2026

Le Premier ministre espagnol Pedro Sánchez a déclaré lors d'un entretien à la CNN que la coopération avec le Maroc a fortement réduit l'immigration dite « irrégulière » vers l'Espagne, qualifiant ce partenariat bilatéral essentiel pour la gestion des mouvements migratoires.

Cette déclaration intervient après la régularisation annoncée de 500 000 personnes exilées en Espagne et l'opposition explicite de Sánchez à la création de « centres de retour » hors des frontières européennes pour les demandeur·euse·s d'asile débouté·e·s [16].

Dans les faits pourtant, ce pays externalise systématiquement la gestion de ses frontières, en la confiant notamment au Maroc et à la Mauritanie [17]. Agissant dans le sillage de l'UE et de ses États membres, l'Espagne porte une responsabilité dans les violations des droits humains envers les exilé·e·s dans ces pays, largement documentées dans plusieurs rapports [18].

Italie

Il Post, « Il governo ha approvato un disegno di legge che limita l'accoglienza dei migranti », le 11 février 2026

Internazionale, « Il blocco navale che non è un blocco navale », le 17 février 2026

Le 11 février, le gouvernement italien a approuvé un projet de loi sur l'immigration introduisant de nouvelles mesures restrictives en application anticipée du Pacte de l'Union européenne sur la migration et l'asile. Le texte prévoit, entre autres, un “blocus naval” jusqu'à six mois pour de raisons de sécurité définies de manière vague, avec des lourdes amendes et la confiscation du navire en cas de non-respect de l'interdiction de navigation dans les eaux territoriales italiennes. D'ailleurs, les migrant·e·s à bord pourront être transféré·e·s vers des pays dits tiers autres que les pays d'origine, avec lesquels l'Italie aurait conclu des accords formels ou informels. Parmi les autres mesures prévues, figurent des procédures d'expulsion facilités, des critères plus stricts en matière de regroupement familial et de protection subsidiaire, ainsi qu'une réduction des garanties accordées aux mineur·e·s non accompagné·e·s.

Ce projet de loi contrevient aux obligations internationales en matière d'asile et de sauvetage en mer, et risque d'entraîner des refoulements collectifs aux frontières et en haute mer. Dans le sillage des récents textes européens sur le concept de « pays sûrs », ce projet expose les exilé·e·s à de graves violations des droits humains, notamment quant à l'examen individuel de leur demande d'asile. Soutenu par l'Union européenne, le gouvernement italien continue de se défausser de ses responsabilités en matière d'accueil et de protection, et de systématiser la criminalisation des migrant·e·s et des organisations solidaires [19].

Suède

InfoMigrants, « À 18 ans, ils perdent le droit de rester dans le pays' : vive émotion en Suède autour des expulsions d'adolescents étrangers », le 20 février 2026

En Suède, de nombreux·se·s jeunes exilé·e·s sont expulsé·e·s après avoir atteint la majorité. Une réforme adoptée en 2016 prévoit que les jeunes qui atteignent l'âge de 18 ans avant d'obtenir le statut de résident·e permanent·e ne sont plus considéré·e·s comme faisant partie de la cellule familiale de leurs parents. Ils et elles ne peuvent dès lors plus bénéficier du regroupement familial et sont privé·e·s du droit au séjour.

Les cas d'expulsion de ces jeunes vers des pays « d'origine », avec lesquels ils et elles n'ont en réalité que peu, voire aucun, lien effectif, se multiplient dans le contexte actuel du durcissement des politiques migratoire suédoises [20]. Le statut de résident·e permanent·e est de plus en plus difficile à obtenir par les mineur·e·s : les dossiers de regroupement familial sont souvent traités avec des délais qui entraînent la perte de protection pour certains jeunes [21]. Les garanties pour les familles sont affaiblies, et la Suède bafoue ses obligations internationales relatives au respect de la vie privée et familiale et de l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant.

Royaume-Uni

The Guardian, « Home Office says nearly 60,000 people deported from UK or left voluntarily since 2024 election », le 5 février 2026

Le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni affirme avoir expulsé 60 000 criminels et migrant·e·s sans droit au séjour depuis l'arrivée au pouvoir des travaillistes (juillet 2024). La récente augmentation des expulsions résulterait, selon certain·e·s, d'une tentative désespérée de contrer l'extrême droite (Reform UK devançant les travaillistes dans les récents sondages), par le biais d'une rhétorique populiste et criminalisante. Dans ce sillage, le Royaume-Uni a annoncé plusieurs fois de vouloir introduire dans sa législation des mesures visant à limiter les recours contre les expulsions à
travers le contournement de l'application de la Convention européenne des droits de l'Homme (CEDH). Notamment, via de lois visant à restreindre l'interprétation des articles 3 (interdiction des traitements inhumains ou dégradants) - qui ne souffre pourtant aucune exception [22] - et 8 (droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale). [23] [24]

Le pays figure parmi ceux ayant signé en 2025 une lettre ouverte [25] appelant à une interprétation plus restrictive de ces deux articles, ce qui pourrait permettre l'expulsion des exilé·e·s même en cas de renvois dangereux [26]. Le Royaume-Uni rejoint ainsi les États qui remettent en cause le droit international, ou cherchent à l'adapter pour le subordonner à l'idéologie anti-migratoire dominante.

Le concept de « pays sûrs »

Le Monde, « Le Parlement européen adopte définitivement deux textes-clés pour durcir la politique migratoire », le 10 février 2026

Le 10 février, le Parlement européen a adopté deux textes sur le concept de « pays sûrs », grâce à une alliance de la droite et de l'extrême droite. Le premier établit une liste commune de pays d'origine considérés comme « sûrs », incluant la Tunisie, le Maroc, la Colombie, le Kosovo, l'Égypte, l'Inde et le Bangladesh. Les États membres devront appliquer des procédures accélérées pour examiner les demandes d'asile des ressortissant·e·s de ces pays, en partant du principe qu'ils et elles n'ont a priori pas besoin de protection. Le second texte, relatif aux « pays tiers sûrs », permet de déclarer irrecevable toute demande d'asile des personnes ayant transité par l'un de ces pays et de l'y expulser.

Pourtant, dans ces pays considérés comme « sûrs » par l'UE des violations systématiques des droits humains ont été largement documentées [27]. Par ailleurs, nul ne peut garantir qu'un pays soit sûr pour l'ensemble de ses ressortissant·e·s.

L'UE se défausse ainsi de ses responsabilités en matière d'asile, mettant en place un système punitif d'expulsions massives et systématisant la violation du principe de non-refoulement et du droit à un examen individuel des demandes d'asile.

Le Règlement « retour »

The Guardian, « EU's deportations plan risks ICE-style enforcement, rights groups warn », le 16 février 2026

L'UE négocie actuellement le « Règlement retour », qui vise à remplacer la Directive retour de 2008, qui est le cadre de détention et d'expulsion au sein de l'UE, qui viserait entre autres à étendre et normaliser les rafles et les mesures de surveillance dans les États membres. Ceux-ci seraient tenus de « détecter » les personnes sans droit au séjour, transformant ainsi les espaces du quotidien et les services publics en outils de contrôle, à l'image de l'ICE aux États-Unis (l'Immigration and Customs Enforcement) [28],

Plus de 80 associations ont signé une déclaration alertant que ce règlement « consoliderait un système punitif, alimenté par la rhétorique d'extrême droite et fondé sur la suspicion racialisée, la dénonciation, la détention et l'expulsion » [29].

Le projet de Règlement retour découle d'une proposition de la Commission européenne de mars 2025. Il a été approuvé dans une version plus répressive le 9 mars par la Commission des libertés civiles, de la justice et des affaires intérieures (LIBE) du Parlement européen, sous l'impulsion d'une alliance entre la droite et l'extrême droite, et sera voté en plénière dans les prochaines jours. Parmi les mesures proposées figurent l'élargissement des moyens coercitifs, la facilitation des expulsions forcées et la légalisation des pratiques d'externalisation. Une énième atteinte aux droits des personnes exilées et à l'ordre démocratique européen.

Revue de presse février 2026

[1] Voir en ce sens le communiqué de presse de Amnesty International « Égypte. Des personnes réfugiées vivent cachées en raison des arrestations arbitraires et des expulsions illégales menées dans un contexte de répression », 16 février 2025

[2] Voir notamment EuroNews, « Bruxelles va annoncer une aide financière de 75 millions d'euros au Caire », 22 octobre 2025

[3] Voir notamment : Amnesty International, « Union européenne. L'adoption de règles sur les pays sûrs est une nouvelle attaque contre le droit d'asile » , 11 février 2026

[4] Voir en ce sens l'action collective, « Manifesto. Voluntary humanitarian refusal : a choice you cannot refuse », 1 avril 2025

[5] Voir en ce sens la fiche d'information du réseau EuroMed Droits, « Sûr sur le papier, dangereux dans la réalité : La Tunisie et la politique de retour de l'UE », 20 juin 2025

[6] Voir notamment Plein Droit n° 125 du Gisti, « La Tunisie, terre d'accueil… des politiques européennes », juin 2020 ; Avocats Sans Frontières « Accords migratoires Italie-Tunisie : coûts humains et dérives sécuritaires », rapport, 11 décembre 2025

[7] Règlement (UE) 2016/399, code frontières Schengen.

[8] Voir notamment Euractiv, « Allemagne : un tribunal juge illégaux les refoulements de demandeurs d'asile à la frontière », 2 juin 2025

[9] Voir en ce sens les Rapports 2024 de Amnesty International et de Human Rights Watch sur la situation des droits humains en Allemagne

[10] Voir InfoMigrants, « Germany to extend border checks by six months », 17 février 2026

[11] Voir notamment Centre d'études prospectives et d'informations internationales (CEPII), « Immigration et délinquance : réalités et perceptions », avril 2023

[12] Voir notamment EuroNews, « Nineteen EU countries and Norway demand measures to return Afghans either voluntarily or forcibly », 18 octobre 2025

[13] Voir notamment InfoMigrants « Expulsions d'Afghans depuis l'UE : la Commission européenne annonce discuter avec les Taliban », 21 octobre 2025

[14] Voir Migreurop, « Revue de Presse de mars 2025 », 1 avril 2025

[15] Voir notamment les programmes de soutien financier de l'UE pour la gestion des migrations à Chypre

[16] Voir Migreurop, « Revue de Presse de janvier 2026 », 29 janvier 2026

[17] Voir à ce sujet InfoMigrants, « Route des Canaries : chute de plus de 60% des arrivées de migrants dans l'archipel espagnol en 2025 », 5 janvier 2026

[18] Voir à ce sujet : Human Rights Watch, « Mauritanie : Des années d'abus liés aux contrôles des migrations », 27 août 2025 ; ASGI « Morocco : Border policies at the root of forced disappearances and human rights violations », 14 avril 2025

[19] Voir sur le site de SOS Méditerranée la déclaration commune contre le projet de loi « Pays dits “sûrs” et “blocus naval” : le gouvernement italien s'attaque aux ONG de sauvetage en mer et aux droits des personnes migrantes », 12 février 2026

[20] Consulter les sections relatives à la Suède dans Migreurop, « Revue de presse 2025 », 1 janvier 2026

[21] Voir à ce sujet le communiqué de presse de Human Rights Watch, « Sweden Deporting Young People », 19 février 2026

[22] Gäfgen c. Allemagne [GC], no 22978/05%7D], § 107, CEDH 2010

[23] Voir The Guardian, « What does UK want to change about human rights law – and will it happen ? », 10 décembre 2025

[24] Parmi les mesures de la réforme de l'asile entrées en vigueur début mars, ces lois ne figurent pourtant pas

[25] Voir notamment le communiqué conjoint de 27 pays européens pour une interprétation plus restrictive des articles 3 et 8 de la CEDH, « Joint Statement to the Conference of Ministers of Justice of the Council of Europe », 10 décembre 2025

[26] Voir en ce sens The Guardian, « UK joins call for Europe's human rights laws to be ‘constrained' », 10 décembre 2025

[27] Voir à ce sujet EuroMed Droits « Arrêtez de considérer l'Égypte, la Tunisie et le Maroc comme des pays « sûrs » ! », 16 avril 2025

[28] ICE : agence américaine chargée de l'immigration et du contrôle des douanes, connue pour ses pratiques coercitives et ses raids intimidants contre les personnes migrantes

[29] Voir sur le site de PICUM le communiqué conjoint « No to EU law enabling home raids, policing of public services and racial profiling »,11 février 2026

Carta Politica di Migreurop

Camille — 2026-01-08T17:44:03Z

La presente carta politica, approvata durante l'Assemblea Generale 2025 a Rabat, precisa le posizioni politiche fondamentali di Migreurop, così come sono state costruite e consolidate dalla creazione della rete e nel corso dei suoi primi vent'anni di esistenza. Si basa inoltre sui due storici testi di posizione di Migreurop per la chiusura dei campi profughi (2010) e per la libertà di circolazione (2013). Il presente documento vuole essere dinamico e potrà integrare, se necessario, future posizioni politiche della rete.

Le nostre basi

La rete Migreurop, nata al Forum Sociale Europeo di Firenze (Italia) nel 2002 e costituita ufficialmente come associazione nel 2005, è composta da organizzazioni per i diritti umani, attivisti e ricercatori provenienti da 18 paesi d'Europa, Africa subsahariana, Maghreb e Medio Oriente. La rete afferma la volontà di operare collettivamente e di coordinare i propri sforzi per difendere i diritti delle persone in movimento e promuovere la libertà di circolazione e di insediamento. Questi obiettivi implicano:

La fine di: ostacoli alla mobilità, militarizzazione delle frontiere, detenzione amministrativa formale e informale, varie forme di espulsione e esternalizzazione del controllo delle frontiere e dell'asilo.
Il rispetto del diritto alla mobilità e alla libertà di circolazione, considerando che il diritto a migrare è un diritto economico, sociale e politico. Pertanto, rifiutiamo il modello utilitaristico che soggetta le migrazioni ai modi di produzione capitalistici e post-coloniali riducendo le persone alla sola forza lavoro.
Lontano dal concentrarci esclusivamente sulle politiche istituzionali e i loro effetti, attribuiamo un'importanza centrale al modo in cui le persone più direttamente interessate aggirano, affrontano e trasgrediscono quotidianamente le politiche migratorie diseguali, esercitando il loro diritto alla mobilità.

Il nostro approccio

La rete mette in sinergia attori del Nord e del Sud per sviluppare una visione e un'analisi condivisa di questi processi, in particolare riguardo all'esternalizzazione delle politiche di gestione dei flussi migratori, alla detenzione delle persone in movimento e al rafforzamento della sicurezza delle frontiere.
Il nostro lavoro si articola attorno a tre assi:

Documentare: Migreurop raccoglie e sistematizza informazioni sul campo riguardanti le condizioni di vita delle persone migranti, il loro (non) accesso ai diritti e le violenze subite lungo i percorsi dell'esilio. La rete documenta inoltre l'elaborazione, l'evoluzione e l'applicazione delle politiche migratorie in Europa e oltre (in Africa e Medio Oriente).
Interpretare: Migreurop mette in relazione le informazioni raccolte attraverso il lavoro congiunto dei suoi membri individuali e associativi, ricercatori e attivisti. Migreurop produce analisi condivise e multidisciplinari delle conseguenze delle politiche migratorie sulla vita delle persone in movimento e sulle società in cui viviamo, su scala regionale e da una prospettiva storica. La rete organizza poi queste analisi attraverso strumenti di decodifica diversi (note di analisi brevi, documenti di posizione, atlanti e mappe critiche, rapporti di osservazione/missione, podcast e video).
Denunciare: Sulla base di queste analisi documentate, Migreurop denuncia le politiche migratorie europee (incluse quelle esternalizzate) ostili alle persone in movimento, nominando chiaramente la realtà multiforme e mortale degli ostacoli alla mobilità, come la chiusura delle frontiere, l'accampamento delle persone, la guerra ai migranti e l'apartheid delle mobilità. La rete sostiene e accompagna le organizzazioni della società civile euro-africana e le mobilitazioni delle persone in movimento, dei suoi membri e partner: condivisione e diffusione di strumenti, attività di capacity building per i membri e sensibilizzazione del grande pubblico.

Le nostre posizioni fondamentali

Porre fine alla detenzione degli stranieri, alla repressione, al razzismo e alla violenza delle politiche migratorie nel Nord e nel Sud:

Vedi il nostro testo di posizionamento: Per la chiusura dei campi per stranieri in Europa e oltre (2010)

A partire dagli anni '90, in Europa si apre una nuova fase della politica migratoria: diventa sempre più difficile entrare legalmente e in sicurezza nell'area Schengen. L'Unione Europea entra così in una nuova era di controllo delle frontiere, segnata dalla distruzione di alcuni diritti alla libertà di circolazione e alle possibilità di insediamento, con l'introduzione dell'obbligo di visto e delle sanzioni contro le compagnie che trasportano persone prive dei documenti richiesti.

L'inasprimento delle condizioni di accesso al territorio europeo si è concretizzato alle frontiere e altrove tramite la detenzione in luoghi di privazione della libertà amministrativa — con condizioni sempre più carcerarie — e altre forme di esclusione, selezione e accampamento. I dispositivi tecnologici e le pratiche di sorveglianza e controllo migratorio alle frontiere esterne hanno dato origine a un vero e proprio mercato della sicurezza, evidenziando al contempo il paradosso di politiche umanitario-militari sempre più mortali e l'ipocrisia delle cosiddette politiche di “accoglienza”.

Dal 2005, l'Agenzia Europea della Guardia di Frontiera e Costiera (Frontex) ha avuto un ruolo crescente nell'attuazione della politica migratoria ultra-sicurezza dell'UE. Supportata dalle istituzioni europee, che negli ultimi vent'anni hanno rafforzato le sue competenze in materia di controllo ed espulsione, il suo budget e l'equipaggiamento militare, l'agenzia è comunque accusata di violazioni ripetute dei diritti, incluse complicità e/o connivenza nei respingimenti alle frontiere europee.

Dagli anni 2000 sono stati stipulati accordi asimmetrici con paesi terzi di “origine” e di “transito” per facilitare l'espulsione di cittadini stranieri irregolari in Europa, attraverso numerosi quadri negoziali sempre più informali. L'aiuto pubblico allo sviluppo viene così deviato dai suoi obiettivi principali, come la lotta alla povertà e il raggiungimento degli Obiettivi di Sviluppo Sostenibile, diventando una merce di scambio per l'esternalizzazione del controllo migratorio in Africa e altre regioni, mentre i cosiddetti paesi terzi cercano di sfruttare le opportunità offerte da questi negoziati.

Negli ultimi vent'anni, l'aumento dell'esternalizzazione delle frontiere europee ha portato all'adozione diffusa di pratiche diverse: sorveglianza marittima, campagne informative e deterrenti contro l'immigrazione, detenzione, delega delle responsabilità in materia di asilo, securitizzazione delle pratiche umanitarie, formazione delle guardie di frontiera, allineamento delle legislazioni dei paesi non UE a quelle degli Stati membri, ecc. L'esternalizzazione è stata favorita dall'emergere di una governance globale delle migrazioni sotto l'impulso di organizzazioni internazionali come l'Organizzazione Internazionale per le Migrazioni (OIM), il Centro Internazionale per lo Sviluppo delle Politiche Migratorie (ICMPD) e l'Alto Commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i Rifugiati (UNHCR), complici nell'istituzione di un regime di frontiere diseguali legato al modello economico neoliberale e capitalista.
Come conseguenza dell'esternalizzazione delle politiche migratorie repressive europee, della governance migratoria globale e dell'ambivalenza dei paesi di partenza, il razzismo e la xenofobia verso i migranti “razzializzati” legittimano le autorità dei paesi di transito e destinazione a condurre campagne di respingimento ed espulsione di massa con totale impunità, spingendo le persone sempre più lontano e verso rotte più pericolose.

In Europa e in Africa, l'associazione frequente tra migranti e reti criminali transnazionali nei discorsi politici e nei media contribuisce a creare un collegamento tra immigrazione e criminalità. La criminalizzazione dei “trafficanti” e delle pratiche di facilitazione, assistenza o mutuo aiuto nei contesti migratori si intensifica. L'adozione di leggi “contro il traffico di migranti” aumenta in realtà la precarietà dei cittadini stranieri, esponendoli a detenzione e nuove forme di abuso, contribuendo allo stesso tempo alla fioritura di un vero e proprio business delle frontiere. Negli ultimi anni, nel Maghreb e in Africa occidentale, le violazioni dei diritti umani e della solidarietà si sono moltiplicate, con l'arresto di attivisti della società civile con accuse particolarmente gravi, esponendoli a pene detentive e persino alla pena di morte.

Ma la violenza delle politiche migratorie non si limita a causare la morte. Si prolunga dopo il decesso, nella negazione del valore delle vite dei migranti, nella relegazione dei loro corpi e ricordi ai margini. Come vittime dirette del controllo delle frontiere, queste morti stimolano lotte memoriali collettive in assenza di indagini istituzionali, per ricostruire le circostanze dei decessi, recuperare e rimpatriare i corpi e sostenere le famiglie dei deceduti nelle loro battaglie per verità e dignità.

Promuovere la libertà di circolazione come alternativa alle politiche migratorie mortali

Vedi il nostro testo di posizionamento :Appello solenne per la libertà di circolazione (2013)

Nel contesto europeo sopra descritto, l'idea di libera circolazione nello spazio Schengen è più retorica che realtà concreta: esclude i cittadini più vulnerabili e le persone “inattive”, alcuni lavoratori, le comunità stigmatizzate, così come i cittadini di paesi terzi e le loro famiglie, soggetti a controlli alle frontiere basati sul profiling razziale.
Negli ultimi 15 anni circa, il tema della libertà di circolazione e insediamento degli stranieri è diventato progressivamente oggetto di analisi da parte della rete Migreurop, a seguito dei movimenti dei cosiddetti “senza documenti” e in risposta all'impasse delle regolarizzazioni “caso per caso”. Questo tema ha assunto maggiore rilevanza di fronte alla normalizzazione progressiva della violenza alle frontiere, usata come strategia di deterrenza. È emerso inoltre come reazione alla natura illusoria dell'approccio “triple win” al centro del Patto Globale per le Migrazioni (2018), secondo cui la migrazione internazionale potrebbe beneficiare tutte le parti — paesi di origine, paesi di destinazione e migranti stessi. Tuttavia, il Patto — strumento non vincolante legalmente — stabilisce obiettivi contraddittori, promuovendo allo stesso tempo migrazioni lavorative temporanee, circolari e flessibili (spesso privilegiate dagli Stati destinatari), pur cercando di garantire la riunificazione familiare, quando la mobilità stagionale tende strategicamente a escludere le famiglie dai diritti di insediamento. Nel gergo internazionale, “facilitare” la mobilità si riferisce anche a un'altra pratica cui la rete si oppone fermamente: l'espulsione delle persone in situazione amministrativa irregolare, che avviene per molti lavoratori dopo la scadenza del permesso di soggiorno temporaneo.

Dalla crisi dell'accoglienza del 2015 nell'Unione Europea, che non fu altro che una crisi delle sue stesse politiche migratorie e di asilo, le misure adottate fanno parte di una strategia di strumentalizzazione della questione migratoria, attuata dalle autorità europee per rafforzare le capacità operative delle agenzie UE (Frontex, Europol, ma anche l'Agenzia Europea per l'Asilo — EUAA, ex EASO) e continuare a violare i diritti fondamentali delle persone, sia sul territorio sia nelle regioni interessate dalla politica di esternalizzazione delle frontiere. Fin dalla sua creazione, la rete ha definito la politica perseguita dalle autorità europee e dai loro partner come una “guerra ai migranti”, considerando l'ostilità bellicosa e il macabro conteggio delle morti causate da politiche migratorie liberticide. È quindi evidente la necessità di ripensare gli immaginari collettivi.

Difendere la libertà di circolazione ci permette di uscire dal ciclo dell'inasprimento delle politiche migratorie repressive, osservabile in tutti i paesi in cui la rete è attiva. Questa lotta ci offre l'opportunità di spostare il dibattito, rifiutando di allinearci ai termini imposti dai nostri avversari politici. Rifiutiamo ogni logica di selezione delle persone che potremmo “accogliere” e ci rifiutiamo di discutere i criteri che determinerebbero questa selezione.

In tutto il mondo, alcune persone godono del diritto di accogliere, partire, arrivare, insediarsi o ripartire, liberandosi dalle dominazioni statali, economiche, coloniali, razziali o sessuali. Esse sperimentano la libertà di circolazione in atto.

Il nostro impegno a favore della libertà di circolazione e insediamento per tutti si basa su una constatazione fondamentale: questa libertà ha una doppia natura. Rimane un ideale da raggiungere per alcune persone, ma è già una realtà concreta per altre. Questa dualità ci porta a considerare questa libertà non come un'utopia, ma come un mezzo e un obiettivo realizzabile, perché già parzialmente esistente.

Tuttavia, questa libertà ha senso e può essere perseguita solo se si basa su una rigorosa parità di trattamento tra cittadini stranieri e cittadini. Implica quindi una lotta collettiva determinata contro tutte le forme di discriminazione e razzismo. L'universalità del diritto alla libertà di circolazione e insediamento è non negoziabile.

Carta Política de Migreurop

Camille — 2026-01-08T17:37:03Z

La presente carta política, aprobada durante la Asamblea General de 2025 en Rabat, precisa las posiciones políticas fundamentales de Migreurop, tal y como se han construido y consolidado desde la creación de la red y a lo largo de sus primeros veinte años de existencia. También se basa en los dos textos históricos de Migreurop sobre el cierre de los campos de extranjeros (2010) y la libertad de circulación (2013). Este documento pretende ser dinámico y podrá incorporar, si es necesario, futuras posiciones políticas de la red.

Nuestros fundamentos

La red Migreurop, nacida en el Foro Social Europeo de Florencia (Italia) en 2002 y constituida oficialmente como asociación en 2005, está compuesta por organizaciones de defensa de los derechos humanos y por personas militantes e investigadoras procedentes de 18 países de Europa, África subsahariana, el Magreb y Oriente Próximo. La red afirma su voluntad de actuar colectivamente y coordinar sus esfuerzos para defender los derechos de las personas exiliadas y promover la libertad de circulación y de instalación. Estos objetivos implican:

• El fin de los obstáculos a la movilidad, de la militarización de las fronteras, de la detención administrativa formal e informal, de las distintas formas de expulsión, así como de la externalización del control fronterizo y del asilo.
• El respeto del derecho a la movilidad y a la libre circulación, considerando que el derecho a migrar forma parte de los derechos económicos, sociales y políticos. Rechazamos así el modelo utilitarista que subordina las migraciones a modos de producción capitalistas y poscoloniales, reduciendo a las personas a su mera fuerza de trabajo.

Lejos de centrarnos únicamente en las políticas institucionales y en sus efectos, otorgamos una importancia central a la manera en que las propias personas directamente afectadas contornean, afrontan y transgreden cotidianamente las políticas migratorias desiguales y ejercen su derecho a la movilidad.

Nuestro enfoque

La red pone en sinergia el trabajo de actores del Norte y del Sur con el fin de construir una visión y un análisis compartidos de estos procesos, en particular en lo que respecta a las dimensiones de externalización de las políticas de gestión de los movimientos migratorios, el encierro de las personas exiliadas y el refuerzo de la securitización de las fronteras.

Articulamos nuestro trabajo en torno a tres ejes:

Documentar: Migreurop recopila y sistematiza información de terreno sobre las condiciones de vida de las personas en migración, su (no) acceso a derechos y las violencias sufridas a lo largo de los recorridos de exilio. La red también documenta la elaboración, la evolución y la aplicación de las políticas migratorias en Europa y más allá (en África y en Oriente Medio).
Descifrar: Migreurop pone en relación esta información recopilada gracias al trabajo conjunto de sus miembros individuales y asociativos, investigadoras/es y militantes. Migreurop produce análisis compartidos y multidisciplinarios sobre las consecuencias de las políticas migratorias en la vida de las personas exiliadas y en las sociedades en las que vivimos, a escala regional y desde una perspectiva histórica. Posteriormente, la red da forma a estos análisis mediante la elaboración de diversas herramientas de desciframiento (boletines de análisis breves, textos de posicionamiento, atlas y cartografías críticas, informes de observación o de misión, así como pódcasts o vídeos).
Denunciar: A partir de estos análisis documentados, Migreurop denuncia las políticas migratorias europeas (incluidas las que son externalizadas) hostiles a las personas exiliadas, nombrando claramente la realidad multiforme y mortífera de los obstáculos a la movilidad, como el cierre de fronteras, el encampamiento de las personas exiliadas, la guerra contra las personas migrantes o el apartheid de las movilidades. La red alimenta y apoya a las organizaciones de las sociedades civiles euroafricanas y las movilizaciones de las personas exiliadas, de sus miembros y de sus organizaciones aliadas, mediante el intercambio y la difusión de herramientas, actividades de fortalecimiento de capacidades de sus miembros y acciones de sensibilización dirigidas al público en general.

Nuestros posicionamientos fundamentales

Poner fin al encierro de las personas extranjeras, a la represión, al racismo y a las violencias de las políticas migratorias en el Norte y en el Sur:

Véase la declaración de posicionamiento: "Por el cierre de los campos de personas extranjeras, en Europa y más allá" (2010)

A partir de los años noventa, se inaugura una nueva etapa en las políticas migratorias en Europa: la imposibilidad creciente de acceder de forma legal y segura al espacio Schengen. La Unión Europea (UE) entra entonces en una nueva era de control de sus fronteras, marcada por la destrucción, para algunas personas, de los derechos a circular y de las posibilidades de instalación, con la instauración de la obligación de visados y de sanciones contra las compañías que transportan a personas desprovistas de los documentos de viaje exigidos.

El endurecimiento de las condiciones de acceso al territorio europeo se ha materializado en las fronteras y fuera de ellas mediante el encierro en lugares de privación administrativa de libertad —con condiciones cada vez más carcelarias— y otras lógicas de exclusión, selección y encampamiento. Los dispositivos tecnológicos y las prácticas de vigilancia y control migratorio en las fronteras exteriores han hecho emerger un verdadero mercado de la seguridad, al tiempo que han puesto de relieve la paradoja de unas políticas humanitario-militares cada vez más mortíferas, así como la hipocresía de las llamadas políticas de «acogida».

Desde su puesta en funcionamiento en 2005, la Agencia Europea de la Guardia de Fronteras y Costas (Frontex) ha desempeñado un papel cada vez más importante en la aplicación de la política migratoria ultra-securitaria de la Unión Europea. Respaldada por las instituciones europeas, que desde hace veinte años no han dejado de reforzar sus competencias en materia de control y expulsiones, así como su presupuesto y su equipamiento militar, la agencia es sin embargo acusada de violaciones reiteradas de derechos y, en particular, de complicidad y/o complacencia en casos de devoluciones en las fronteras europeas.

Desde los años 2000, se han firmado acuerdos asimétricos con países terceros de «origen» y de «tránsito» para facilitar la expulsión de personas extranjeras ilegalizadas en Europa, a través de múltiples marcos de negociación y de manera cada vez más informal. La ayuda pública al desarrollo se desvía así de sus objetivos iniciales —como la lucha contra la pobreza y el logro de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible— y se convierte en moneda de cambio del control migratorio deslocalizado en África y en otras regiones, mientras los llamados Estados terceros tratan de sacar provecho de las oportunidades que ofrecen estas negociaciones.

Durante los últimos veinte años, la externalización creciente de las fronteras europeas ha generalizado prácticas diversas: vigilancia marítima, campañas de información y disuasión de la inmigración, encierro, delegación de responsabilidades en materia de asilo, securitización de las prácticas humanitarias, formación de guardias fronterizos, alineamiento de las legislaciones de los países externos a la UE con las de los Estados miembros, etc. La externalización se ha visto facilitada por la emergencia de una gobernanza mundial de las migraciones bajo el impulso de organizaciones internacionales como la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM), el Centro Internacional para el Desarrollo de Políticas Migratorias (ICMPD) y el Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados (ACNUR), que participan de manera cómplice en la instauración de un régimen fronterizo desigual vinculado al modelo de economía neoliberal y capitalista.

Como consecuencia de la externalización de las políticas migratorias europeas represivas, de la gobernanza migratoria mundial y de la ambivalencia de los Estados de salida, el racismo y la xenofobia dirigidos contra las personas migrantes racializadas «legitiman» a las autoridades de los países de tránsito y de llegada para llevar a cabo, con total impunidad, campañas de devoluciones y expulsiones masivas, empujando a estas personas cada vez más lejos y hacia rutas más peligrosas.

En Europa y en África, la asociación frecuente entre las personas migrantes y las redes transnacionales del crimen en los discursos políticos y mediáticos contribuye a crear una confusión entre inmigración y criminalidad. La criminalización de los «pasadores», así como de las prácticas de facilitación, asistencia o ayuda mutua en contextos migratorios, se intensifica. La adopción de leyes «contra el tráfico de migrantes» incrementa en realidad las situaciones de precariedad para las personas extranjeras, al exponerlas al encarcelamiento y a nuevas formas de abuso, al tiempo que contribuye a la proliferación de un negocio de las fronteras. En los últimos años, en el Magreb y en África Occidental, las violaciones de los derechos humanos y de la solidaridad se multiplican, con la detención de militantes de la sociedad civil bajo cargos especialmente graves, exponiéndolos a penas de prisión e incluso a la pena de muerte.

Pero la violencia de las políticas migratorias no se limita a causar la muerte. Se prolonga después del fallecimiento, en la negación del valor de las vidas de las personas migrantes, en la relegación a los márgenes de sus cuerpos y de su memoria. Como víctimas directas del control fronterizo, estas personas fallecidas impulsan luchas memoriales colectivas ante la ausencia de investigaciones institucionales, para reconstruir las circunstancias de las muertes, localizar y repatriar los cuerpos, y apoyar a las familias de las personas fallecidas en sus luchas por la verdad y la dignidad.

Promover la libertad de circulación como alternativa a las políticas migratorias mortíferas

Véase la declaración de posicionamiento:"Llamamiento solemne por la libertad de circulación" (2013)

En el contexto europeo descrito anteriormente, la idea de libre circulación dentro del espacio Schengen es más una expresión fácil de usar que una realidad concreta: excluye a los ciudadanos más precarios y a las personas “inactivas”, a ciertxs trabajadores, a las comunidades estigmatizadas, así como a los nacionales de Estados terceros y a sus familias, sujetos a controles fronterizos basados en el perfil racial.

Desde hace aproximadamente 15 años, el tema de la libertad de circulación e instalación de las personas extranjeras se ha convertido progresivamente en un asunto de análisis dentro de la red Migreurop, a raíz de los movimientos de las personas denominadas “sin papeles” y frente al callejón sin salida de las regularizaciones “caso por caso”. Este tema también se ha impuesto frente a la normalización progresiva de la violencia en las fronteras, utilizada como estrategia de disuasión. Asimismo, se ha afirmado como reacción al carácter ilusorio del enfoque del “triple beneficio” en el núcleo del Pacto Mundial para la Migración (2018), según el cual las migraciones internacionales podrían beneficiar a todas las partes —países de origen, receptores y las propias personas migrantes. Sin embargo, el Pacto —instrumento no jurídicamente vinculante— presenta objetivos contradictorios al promover simultáneamente las migraciones laborales temporales, circulares y flexibles (a menudo favorecidas por los Estados receptores), mientras pretende garantizar la reunificación familiar, cuando la movilidad estacional tiende estratégicamente a excluir a las familias de sus derechos de instalación. En el lenguaje internacional, “facilitar” la movilidad también hace referencia a otra práctica contra la cual la red se opone firmemente: la expulsión de personas en situación administrativa irregular, que ocurre para muchxs trabajadores tras la expiración de su permiso de residencia temporal.

Desde la crisis de acogida de 2015 en la Unión Europea —que no fue otra cosa que una crisis de sus propias políticas de inmigración y asilo—, las medidas adoptadas responden a una estrategia de instrumentalización de la cuestión migratoria, desplegada por las autoridades europeas para promover el refuerzo de las capacidades de actuación de las agencias de la UE (Frontex, Europol, pero también la Agencia Europea de Asilo - EUAA, antigua EASO) y continuar vulnerando los derechos fundamentales de las personas, tanto en su territorio como en las regiones afectadas por su política de externalización de fronteras. Desde su creación, la red ha definido la política que llevan a cabo las autoridades europeas y sus socios como una “guerra contra las personas migrantes”, debido a la hostilidad bélica y al registro macabro de muertes causadas por políticas migratorias liberticidas. Por ello, se hace evidente la necesidad de repensar los imaginarios colectivos.

Defender la libertad de circulación nos permite salir del engranaje del endurecimiento de la orientación represiva en la gestión de las cuestiones migratorias, observable en todos los países donde la red está activa. Esta lucha nos brinda la oportunidad de cambiar el debate, rechazando alinearnos con los términos impuestos por nuestros adversarios políticos. Rechazamos toda lógica de selección de personas que podríamos “acoger” y nos negamos a debatir criterios que condicionen esa selección.

En todo el mundo, algunas personas disfrutan del derecho a acoger, partir, llegar, instalarse o volver a salir, liberándose de dominaciones estatales, económicas, coloniales, raciales o sexuales. Ellos y ellas experimentan la libertad de circulación en acción.

Nuestro compromiso con la libertad de circulación e instalación para todas las personas se basa en una constatación fundamental: esta libertad tiene una doble naturaleza. Para algunas personas sigue siendo un ideal por alcanzar, pero para otras ya constituye una realidad concreta. Esta dualidad nos lleva a considerar esta libertad no como una utopía, sino como un medio y un objetivo alcanzable, porque ya existe parcialmente.

Sin embargo, esta libertad solo tiene sentido y es deseable si se basa en una estricta igualdad de trato entre personas extranjeras y nacionales. Implica, por tanto, una lucha colectiva decidida contra todas las formas de discriminación y racismo. La universalidad del derecho a la libre circulación e instalación no es negociable.

Our political charter

Camille — 2026-01-06T12:36:13Z

This Political Charter, adopted during the 2025 General Assembly in Rabat, sets out Migreurop's core political positions, as they have been developed and consolidated since the creation of the network and over its first twenty years of existence. It also draws on Migreurop's two historic position statements: for the closure of migrant detention camps (2010) and in favor of freedom of movement (2013). This document is intended to be dynamic and may, if necessary, incorporate future political positions of the network.

Our foundations

The Migreurop network, which was created at the European Social Forum in Florence (Italy) in 2002 and officially established as an association in 2005, is composed of human rights organisations, activists and researchers from 18 countries in Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghreb and the Middle East. The network affirms its desire to work collectively and coordinate its efforts to defend the rights of people on the move and promote freedom of
movement and settlement. These objectives imply:

The end of : barriers to mobility, militarisation of borders, formal and informal administrative detention, various forms of deportation, and the externalisation of border control and asylum.

Respect for the right to mobility and freedom of movement, considering that the right to migrate is an economic, social and political right. We therefore reject the utilitarian model that subjects migration to capitalist and post-colonial modes of production by reducing people to their labour power alone.

Far from focusing solely on institutional policies and their effects, we place central importance on the way in which those most affected circumvent, confront and transgress unequal immigration policies on a daily basis and exercise their right to mobility.

Our approach

The network brings together actors from the North and South to develop a shared vision and analysis of these processes, particularly with regard to the externalisation of migration management policies, the detention of people on the move, and the strengthening of border security.

Our work is structured around three areas:

Documenting: Migreurop collects and systematises field information on the living conditions of migrants, their (lack of) access to rights, and the violence they suffer throughout their journey into exile. The network also documents the development, evolution and application of migration policies in Europe and beyond (in Africa and the Middle East).

Interpreting: Migreurop brings together the information collected through the joint work of its individual and associative members, researchers and activists. Migreurop produces shared, multidisciplinary analyses of the consequences of migration policies on the lives of people on the move and the societies in which we live, on a regional scale and from a historical perspective. The network then formats these analyses through the development of various decryption tools (short analysis notes, position papers, critical atlases and maps, observation/mission reports, podcasts and videos).

Denounce: Based on these documented analyses, Migreurop denounces European migration policies (including outsourced policies) that are hostile to people on the move, clearly naming the multifaceted and deadly reality of barriers to mobility, such as the closure of borders, the encampment of people, the war on migrants, and mobility apartheid. The network nurtures and supports Euro-African civil society organisations and the mobilisation of people on the move, its members and partners: sharing and disseminating tools, capacity-building activities for its members, and raising awareness among the general public.

Our fundamental positions

· Ending the detention of foreigners, repression, racism and violence in migration policies in the North and South:

See the positioning statement: "For the closure of camps for foreigners in Europe and beyond" (2010)

From the 1990s, a new phase began in European migration policy: it became increasingly difficult to enter the Schengen area legally and safely. The European Union (EU) then entered a new era of border control, marked by the destruction of certain rights to freedom of movement and settlement opportunities, with the introduction of visa requirements and sanctions against companies transporting people without the required travel documents.

The tightening of conditions for access to European territory has materialised at borders and elsewhere in the form of detention in places of administrative deprivation of liberty – with increasingly prison-like conditions – and other forms of exclusion, sorting and encampment. Technological devices and practices of surveillance and migration control at external borders have given rise to a veritable security market, while highlighting the paradox of increasingly deadly humanitarian-military policies and the hypocrisy of so-called ‘welcome' policies.

Since it began operating in 2005, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) has played an increasingly important role in implementing the European Union's ultra-security-focused migration policy. Endorsed by European institutions, which have spent the last twenty years strengthening its powers in terms of control and deportation, as well as its budget and military equipment, the agency is nevertheless accused of repeated rights violations, including complicity and/or complacency in cases of refoulement at European borders.

Since the 2000s, asymmetrical agreements have been concluded with third countries of ‘origin' and ‘transit' to facilitate the deportation of illegal foreign nationals in Europe, through multiple and increasingly informal negotiation frameworks. Official development assistance is thus diverted from its primary objectives, such as poverty reduction and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals; it has become a bargaining chip for the offshoring of migration control to Africa and other regions, while so-called third countries attempt to take advantage of the opportunities offered by these negotiations.

Over the past 20 years, the increasing externalisation of European borders has led to the widespread adoption of a range of practices: maritime surveillance, information and deterrence campaigns against immigration, detention, delegation of asylum responsibilities, securing humanitarian practices, training of border guards, alignment of the legislation of non-EU countries with that of Member States, etc. Externalisation has been facilitated by the emergence of global migration governance under the impetus of international organisations such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which are complicit in the establishment of an unequal border regime linked to the neoliberal and capitalist economic model.

As a result of the externalisation of repressive European migration policies, global migration governance and the ambivalence of countries of departure, racism and xenophobia targeting racialised migrants ‘legitimise' the authorities of transit and destination countries to carry out, with impunity, campaigns of mass refoulement and deportation, pushing these people ever further and towards more dangerous routes.

In Europe and Africa, the frequent association of migrants with transnational criminal networks in political discourse and the media contributes to creating a conflation of immigration and crime. The criminalisation of ‘smugglers' and of practices such as facilitation, assistance or mutual aid in migration situations is intensifying. The adoption of laws ‘against migrant smuggling' actually increases the distress of foreign nationals, exposing them to imprisonment and new forms of abuse, while contributing to the flourishing of a border business. In recent years, in the Maghreb and West Africa, violations of human rights and solidarity have multiplied, with the arrest of civil society activists on particularly serious charges, exposing them to prison sentences or even the death penalty.

But the violence of migration policies does not stop at causing death. It continues after death, in the denial of the value of migrants' lives, in the relegation of their bodies and memories to the margins. As direct victims of border control, these deaths encourage collective memory struggles in the absence of institutional investigations, to retrace the circumstances of the deaths, recover and repatriate the bodies, and support the families of the deceased in their struggles for truth and dignity.

· Promoting freedom of movement as an alternative to deadly migration policies

See the statement :"Solemn appeal for freedom of movement" (2013)

In the European context outlined above, the idea of free movement within the Schengen area is more a matter of rhetoric than concrete reality: it excludes the most vulnerable citizens and ‘inactive' persons, certain workers, stigmatised communities, as well as third-country nationals and their families, who are subject to border controls based on racial profiling.

Over the past 15 years or so, the issue of freedom of movement and settlement for foreigners has gradually become a subject of analysis for the Migreurop network, following the movements of so-called ‘undocumented' people and in response to the impasse of ‘case-by-case' regularisations. This theme has also gained prominence in the face of the gradual normalisation of violence at borders, used as a deterrent strategy. It has also emerged in response to the illusory nature of the ‘triple win' approach at the heart of the Global Compact for Migration (2018), according to which international migration could benefit all parties — sending countries, receiving countries and migrants themselves. However, the Compact—a non-legally binding instrument—sets out contradictory objectives by promoting temporary, circular and flexible labour migration (often favoured by receiving States) while seeking to guarantee family reunification, even though seasonal mobility strategically tends to exclude families from their rights to settle. In international jargon, ‘facilitating' mobility also refers to another practice to which the network is strongly opposed: the deportation of people in an irregular administrative situation, which occurs for many workers after their temporary residence permit has expired.

Since the 2015 reception crisis in the European Union, which was nothing more than a crisis of its own immigration and asylum policies, the measures adopted have been part of a strategy to exploit the migration issue, deployed by the European authorities to promote the strengthening of the capacities of EU agencies (Frontex, Europol, but also the European Asylum Agency - EUAA, formerly EASO) and to continue to flout the fundamental rights of individuals, both on its territory and in the regions targeted by its border externalisation policy. Since its creation, the network has defined the policy pursued by European authorities and their partners as a ‘war on migrants', given the belligerent hostility and the grim tally of deaths caused by freedom-destroying migration policies. The need to rethink collective imaginaries is therefore obvious to us. Defending freedom of movement allows us to break out of the cycle of increasingly repressive migration management policies, which can be observed in all countries where the network is active. This fight gives us the opportunity to shift the debate by refusing to align ourselves with the terms imposed by our political opponents. We reject any logic of sorting the people we could ‘welcome' and refuse to debate the criteria that would determine this sorting.

All over the world, some people enjoy the right to welcome, leave, come, settle or leave again, free from state, economic, colonial, racial or sexual domination. They experience freedom of movement in action.

Our commitment to freedom of movement and settlement for all is based on a fundamental observation: this freedom is twofold in nature. It remains an ideal to be achieved for some, but is already a concrete reality for others. This duality leads us to consider this freedom not as a utopia, but as a means and an achievable goal, because it already partially exists.

However, this freedom only has meaning and can only be persued if it is based on strict equality of treatment between foreign nationals and citizens. It therefore requires a determined collective struggle against all forms of discrimination and racism. The universality of the right to freedom of movement and settlement admits no compromise.

Call for a fair, dignified and anti-racist approach to migration governance in Europe

Camille — 2025-12-18T14:36:03Z

On International Migrants Day, Migreurop, along with more than 40 organisations from across Europe, signed a statement calling on Member States and European institutions to adopt a fair, dignified and anti-racist approach to migration governance in Europe.

Today, on International Migrants Day, we honour the countless people who move – across borders, cities, and continents – in search of safety, opportunity, family, and freedom. Migration is not an exception, problem,or emergency, nor should it be categorised as such. It is a fundamental and enduring part of what it means to be human. Historically, people have moved and continue to move for countless reasons – to study, to work, to care for loved ones, to escape violence or inequality, or simply to build a better life. Yet across Europe, this basic human reality continues to be distorted to justify racist and inhumane policies, as part of repressive systems of control.

We condemn any policy choice by European countries and institutions that has led to death, misery, and suffering inflicted on migrants in and around Europe. But today we also celebrate people who cross borders for various reasons – especially those who are racialised and marginalised, whose lives, work, and contributions sustain our societies, even as they are systematically excluded, criminalised, and dehumanised by the very institutions and communities that depend on their knowledge, care, and human capital.

Today, we acknowledge those who move through their journeys, with hope, resilience, and a sense of connection beyond borders. In these journeys, we see not a crisis, but a possibility; not a threat, but the beating heart of shared humanity, rooted in life, dignity, and belonging. Their presence is a testament to perseverance; it is also a call for justice – a reminder to Europe to finally honor and defend their rights as a fundamental step toward building a more just and equitable society for all.

Migration Governance as the New Face of Racism in Europe

In recent years, a dangerous political logic has deepened across Europe. Across a growing body of legislation – from the Pact on Migration and Asylum to the Schengen Borders Code reform, and now the proposed Deportation Regulation and the Facilitation Directive – migration, (particularly of racialised peoples from the Global South) is increasingly framed as a security threat to be controlled rather than a naturaland enduring aspect of human life. This securitised approach has accelerated alongside the rise of authoritarian forces within Europe, reinforcing policies that criminalise movement and undermine fundamental rights.

Across Europe, the same patterns are evident – large-scale interceptions, violent pushbacks, mass detention, and deportations across multiple European countries; the criminalisation of undocumented and irregularised people; intensified border controls and racial profiling at internal borders.

Migrant workers – many of them racialised – labour in agricultural fields under conditions that resemble modern-day servitude sustaining entire food systems while living with exploitation, unsafe housing, lack of access to healthcare and chronic precarity; house and workplace raids targeting migrants; and continuous vilification in media and public discourses.

All of this is reinforced by legal and policy infrastructures that do not simply ‘govern' migration but actively produce irregularity: restrictive visa regimes, employment rules that tie people to exploitative employers, endless bureaucratic delays, and pathways to residence so narrow that falling out of status becomes almost inevitable. In this system, irregularity and precarity are not accidents– they are the predictable outcome of policies designed to keep certain people vulnerable, deportable, and easily exploited.It is within this machinery that colonial and racialised hierarchies of mobility persist, determining who can move freely and who cannot; who has access to welfare and assistance; who is able to secure employment, housing, and education; and who is permitted to build a life within European societies.

These dynamics are not confined to asylum seekers or refugees. They shape the experiences of students, workers – including care workers – seasonal labourers, and families alike. In doing so, racialisation turns migration into a privilege for some and a source of precarity and dispossession for others.

But none of this is new. The racialisation and criminalisation of the movement of particular groups is rooted in centuries of colonial practice and labour exploitation. However, migrants and allies are not staying silent: across Europe, solidarity movements are growing, as communities continue to organise, resist, and build networks of care despite repression.

The Cost of Fortress Europe

Instead of investing into social systems, European governments channel billions of euros of public money into wars, border militarisation, surveillance technologies, detention camps, deportation machinery, and private contractors that profit from people's exclusion – while pointing the finger at migrants for the social and economic collapse their policies cause.

Reports show that securitisation policies do not provide safety; on the contrary, they promote death, fear, vulnerability, and instability. They force people to move regardless of their motives – into irregularity, exploitation, and danger. They divide communities, reinforce racialised hierarchies, further delegitimise the promise of the rule of law, and erode the right to live with dignity for everyone.

Reclaiming Migration: Our Vision for a Just and Caring Europe

Migration is not a problem to be solved by increased securitisation and criminalisation, but a human reality that demands robust systems of social care, meaningful institutional support, and a sustained political commitment to dismantling deep-rooted structural racism across the legal, social, and economic structures that shape people's lives.

As migrants and as Europeans, we call for a Europe that recognises human mobility as a social, cultural, and economic asset, and that dismantles the systems which criminalise and racialise movement. We demand policies rooted in anti-racism, care, equality, equity, and justice – policies that honour the dignity and rights of all.

Therefore, we envision a Europe that:

Ends the criminalisation of all migrants – regardless of status, pathway, or reason for migration, dismantles the systems that produce irregularity, precarity, and deportability, and delivers accountability for human rights violations and abuses.

Redirects public resources away from border militarisation and punitive migration governance, and toward strengthening social infrastructures such as affordable housing, universal healthcare, education, and community-based support systems.

Guarantees secure residence, fair and safe working conditions, and full and equal access to rights for all people who live in Europe, recognising mobility as a source of social, cultural, and economic vitality.

Ensures the meaningful and sustained participation of migrants and racialised communities in shaping the policies and decisions that affect their lives, including through democratic, accessible, and transparent mechanisms of consultation and governance.

Confronts and redresses Europe's colonial past and its enduring legacies, acknowledging how historical and ongoing racialised power structures shape global inequalities and patterns of movement.

Recognises human mobility as a shared global responsibility, grounded in the structural, economic, and geopolitical conditions – and the international policies and pressures – that compel millions to move, and expands the regular and safe opportunities for people to move.

Implements the standards set out in the UN Joint General Comments on xenophobia and the rights of migrant workers, ensuring that European laws, policies, and institutions actively prevent discrimination xenophobia and racial discrimination, and uphold the full human rights protections affirmed by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and United Nations Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW).

This International Migrants Day, we call on European institutions, Member States, and societies to reject the politics of fear and division, and to shift the narrative and policy direction from criminalisation to solidarity, and to reaffirm through these actions, the underlying values of Europe–respect for human rights and dignity.

Join us to take action in 2026!

As we work toward building a Europe grounded in justice and equality, we invite you to imagine with us: propose a bold idea for a collective action or campaign that challenges the current racialised and securitised migration policies and centres dignity, solidarity, and rights.

Send it to us –your vision matters: CLICK HERE!

#ReclaimMigration#AntiRacistEurope

Signatories

ActionAid International
Amnesty International
Border Violence Monitoring Network
EuroMed Rights
European Network Against Racism (ENAR)
Equinox Initiative for Racial Justice
ILGA-Europe
Legal Centre Lesvos
Médecins du Monde International Network
Platform for the International Cooperation on Undocumented
Migrants (PICUM)
Collective Aid (CA)
Quaker Council for European Affairs
Safe Passage International – Greece
Science, Integrity, Empowerment, Mobility, Renewable &
Educational Projects - SIEMPRE
Sea-Watch
International Rescue Committee
Een Andere Joodse Stem (Another Jewish Voice)
Greek Forum of Migrants
borderline-europe Human Rights without Borders e.V.
New Women Connectors
Stichting LOS, NL
SOS Humanity
International Community Dynamics CLG
ECCHR (European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights)
Here to Support
Centre for Peace Studies (Croatia)
Statewatch
Association for Integration and Migration
The Shelter Students Refuge
Kif Kif vzw
Seebrücke
Migreurop
International Planned Parenthood Federation - European
Network (IPPF EN)
Kisa-Action for Equality,Support,Antiracism
CompassCollective
MV Louise Michel Project
GRUPPO MELITEA
Refugees in Libya
WeMove Europe
La Cimade
Captain Support Network
FEANTSA (European Federation of National Organisations
Working with the Homeless)
Etudiants Musulmans de France
Revibra Europe