EU Updates - March/May 2026

Toward the imminent adoption of the “return” regulation

On March 26, 2026, the European Parliament confirmed in plenary session the negotiating mandate on the reform of the 2008 “Return” Directive (adopted by the LIBE Committee on March 9), paving the way for trilogue negotiations. With 389 votes in favor, 206 against, and 32 abstentions, and driven by an alliance between the right and the far right, the Parliament’s text further tightens the European Commission’s proposal, which already represented a significant set back for the rights of people on the move. As shown by Migreurop’s analysis, the text institutionalizes the detention of migrants with a period of administrative detention extended to 24 months (extendable in certain cases), the legalization of externalized migration management, and the removal of the automatic suspensive effect of appeals against deportations.

Negotiations took place, and a final compromise was adopted on June 1, 2026, following the final trilogue. A vote by the LIBE Committee [1] is scheduled for June 24, prior to a plenary vote for the official adoption of the text, expected in early July 2026.

Attacks on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR): European States Willing to Do Anything to Deport

Reform or Circumvent? Member States on the Offensive Against the European Court of Human Rights

For the past year, EU member states have repeatedly challenged the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). This is the second time in the Court’s history that such an offensive against the European judiciary has taken place.

In May 2025, nine member states signed an open letter calling for a review of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, specifically targeting Articles 3 (stating that no one may be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment) and 8 (which protects individuals’ private and family life [2]). These States claim that the ECHR is an obstacle to their immigration policies, insofar as Articles 3 and 8 prevent the deportation of convicted foreign nationals. They are calling for a more lenient interpretation that would allow them to implement a faster deportation policy, one that offers less protection for the rights of the individuals concerned due to reduced safeguards.

On December 10, 2025, 46 ministers of the Council of Europe also adopted a series of conclusions calling for “a rebalancing of fundamental rights and security imperatives " in the interpretation of the Convention, ahead of the Council of Europe summit on May 15, 2026, in Chisinau (see below).

Denmark is taking this bold new approach even further. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced a bill for summer 2026 providing for the automatic deportation of any foreign national sentenced to at least one year in prison. The Danish government itself acknowledges that this law goes beyond the scope of the ECHR but stands by it. It is a strategy of deliberate transgression: flouting individual rights, then amending national/European law to legalize what was previously illegal.

The Chisinau Declaration: A Barely Veiled Pressure on the European Court of Human Rights

On May 15, 2026, meeting in Moldova, the Council of Europe adopted a political declaration setting out its expectations regarding the European Court of Human Rights. The text is deeply contradictory: on the one hand, it proclaims commitment to the Convention and the Court, while on the other hand it urges the latter to “address the challenges” related to migration. Rather than questioning their own obsession with deportation, the signatory states have chosen to pressure European judges at the expense of the Convention’s safeguards. Paragraph 16 of the declaration thus warns that failure to take into account the expectations of the States Parties to the Court “could undermine public confidence in the Convention system.” This is a barely veiled threat, revealing the strategy of discrediting the Court that the States are prepared to employ if its case law does not become more flexible.

The declaration also incorporates language already present in the European Pact on Migration and Asylum, notably the terms “mass arrivals” and “the exploitation of migrants by a hostile state or actor” (§§ 34–40). These concepts pave the way for a further erosion of the rights of people on the move, potentially leading to the temporary suspension of the processing of asylum applications (a practice already employed by some European states, such as Greece and Poland).

Finally, the text praises “innovative solutions,” including return hubs (third countries transformed into deportation hubs, outsourced camps) and the externalization of the processing of asylum claims—two mechanisms that increasingly distance states from their obligations under the Convention.

Thus, states are increasingly resorting to authoritarian measures to push through their immigration reforms and view the judiciary as an obstacle to the implementation of measures that infringe upon fundamental rights. For example, the Italian government accuses “red” judges of interfering in the country’s political affairs [3].

Implementation of the European Pact on Asylum and Migration: Radical Changes at the EU’s Borders

The introduction of screening and the implementation of substandard asylum procedures

The European Pact on Asylum and Migration, which will take effect in Member States on June 12, 2026, brings about profound changes in border areas. The “screening” regulation and its associated procedure are unique to the Pact [4]. This screening involves a procedure for checking and sorting individuals who do not meet the conditions for entry into the EU, or who have been disembarked following a search and rescue operation, or who have requested international protection at a border crossing point.

The screening process includes: a health check, a vulnerability assessment, identification or identity verification, the collection of biometric data, a security check, and then referral to the appropriate procedure:

Screening at external borders:

• Individuals who have not filed an asylum application are considered not to have entered the territory, in order to facilitate their removal: the procedures set forth in the “Return” Directive are applied to them;

• Individuals seeking protection are categorized into those authorized to enter the territory to file an asylum application or a request for protection as minors (unaccompanied minors), and those subject to the “asylum at the border” procedure. Individuals are placed under the “asylum at the border” procedure if the recognition rate for international protection for their country of nationality or habitual residence is 20% or less (at the European level), or if they are suspected of posing a threat to public order. If the asylum application is denied, individuals are immediately referred to the “return at the border” procedure for removal.

• Individuals subject to relocation (solidarity mechanism for reception) are referred to the authorities of the relevant Member States

Individuals who have not already been "screened" at the external borders may be subject to screening within the territory, for instance if they are arrested at internal Schengen borders or on the territory of a EU member state.

The “asylum at the border” procedure combines two approaches: the identification and sorting process of the hotspot approach, which has been in place since 2015 with hotspots on Greek and Italian islands, and the legal fiction of “non-entry” into European territory, which was already applied at the French borders.

• The “hotspot” approach [5] aims to organize the sorting at EU borders between people accepted by the European Union (on-site or via relocation to another Member State) and those deemed “undesirable” and sent back directly from the border. While the screening process is underway, people seeking protection remain at the EU’s borders and are deprived of their liberty.

• The “fiction of non-entry” consists of maintaining individuals who are physically present on the territory in a status of “non-entry,” thereby creating a zone of legal uncertainty within which discretionary power is exercised outside the ordinary legal safeguards [6]. In practice, with the implementation of the Pact, individuals subject to the “asylum at the border” procedure will be physically present on the territory and at the disposal of the authorities for the entire duration of the accelerated review of their asylum application, but will be legally considered not to have entered the territory, which allows states to deport them more easily. Territorial continuity—the principle that the same legal rules apply throughout an entire territory—is thus suspended, paving the way for the application of lower standards. Currently, the “fiction of non-entry” rule is limited to 26 days in French "waiting zones" (zones d’attente); but under the Pact, it may be applicable at the borders of the Schengen Area for a period of up to 6 months [7].

Implementation Plans for the Pact: Member States Do Not Appear Ready

On May 8, 2026, the European Commission published a progress report on the implementation of the Pact at the national level. The picture painted is intended to be “reassuring” for European and national institutions: five states have reportedly already adopted the bulk of their legislation, 11 others are in the process of doing so, and 15 are said to have reception capacities deemed “adequate.” The Commission also emphasizes “preventing leaks,” with screening tests conducted by Frontex, the European Asylum Support Office (EUAA), and Europol in Lampedusa and Sicily, as well as a “toolkit” provided to Member States. However, this assessment hides another reality:

• With regard to France, the government’s intention [8] is to subject the majority of people arriving at the external borders to “asylum procedures at the border.” The Ministry of the Interior has even announced a provision allowing the scope of border procedures to be extended to groups other than those defined by the Convention. To date, we do not know which additional groups are involved. Nevertheless, the current capacity in holding areas and Administrative Detention Centers (CRA) in France is insufficient to detain all individuals subject to border procedures. The Minister of the Interior announced during his Senate hearing on April 29, 2026, that by the end of 2026, France will have built new detention facilities specifically designed for the border asylum procedure, based on the model of the Cergy-Pontoise center [9]. The plan for implementing the Pact includes “alternatives to detention,” notably through the adoption of a provision for a house arrest order. This would apply to asylum applications at the border, and individuals would be housed in “accommodation centers” with “adequate capacity,” with no further information provided regarding the status of these facilities.

• In the case of Spain, the government stated in its Pact Implementation Plan published in late 2024 that no detention centers specifically intended for border procedures would be created. To meet the capacity requirements set by the EU, Spain plans to use the CATE [10], the CIE [11], and reception centers, stating that: “There will be no centers dedicated exclusively to border procedures.” If this guideline is followed, then border procedures will be carried out in spaces “on the mainland,” as the plan does not mention the need to change the status of these spaces. However, these statements date from late 2024, but the Spanish plan may have changed, as the Canary Islands government says it fears the archipelago will become “a large detention center””. It should be noted that, with less than a month to go before the Pact takes effect, the Canary Islands government has still not been included in the discussions, according to Octavio Caraballo (Deputy Advisor to the Presidency of the Canary Islands Government), who states: “We know nothing; we haven’t even been informed about matters within our jurisdiction, such as those concerning minors.”

• In Italy, border procedures will not be limited to the existing border detention facilities, as Italy does not have sufficient infrastructure to place all individuals subject to border procedure “at the disposal of the authorities”. Consequently, this country will use alternatives to detention such as house arrest with a restricted perimeter around the home, or reporting to reception centers several times a day. If individuals do not accept these terms, they could lose their material reception conditions.

At this stage, we have little information about other European countries. However, the logic of control and the permanent “availability” of migrants appears to be the common denominator across all planned procedures. Nevertheless, the concrete details of how these procedures will be implemented (facilities and management of detention centers) remain largely unknown. This lack of transparency is partly due to the considerable delay on the part of most Member States in transposing the Pact into national law.

Externalization: A Reshaping of Relations Between the EU and “Third” Countries

For the past six months, one priority has consistently dominated the agenda of member states: ensuring that deportations are carried out. Deporting someone requires that the country of origin agree to “take back” its nationals, which entails issuing a consular laissez-passer. When this document is missing, the procedure is halted. It is from this impasse that, since the 2000s, an increasingly explicit political response has emerged: making relations with third countries contingent on their level of cooperation regarding readmission.

We observe that the European Union is shifting from a logic of reward, where cooperative countries benefit from advantages (granting of visas, preferential access to its market, and development aid), to a logic of sanction, where non-cooperative countries lose existing benefits/agreements. This approach is taking shape in three distinct types of instruments, either already adopted or currently under negotiation:

• The first is commercial. On April 28, 2026, the European Parliament adopted the reform of the Generalized System of Preferences with 459 votes in favor and 127 against. This mechanism, which since 1971 has allowed countries in the Global South to export to the EU at reduced tariffs, includes a “readmission conditionality”: a country deemed uncooperative in the readmission of its nationals may have its tariff benefits revoked. The link between cooperation on deportations and access to the European market is now explicit. Cristina Guarda (Greens, Italy) denounced a mechanism which she describes as “neo-colonial,” arguing that Europe is subordinating its development aid to migration imperatives at the expense of its values.

• The second lever is budgetary. In the negotiations on the 2028–2034 multiannual financial framework, the Commission is proposing €81 billion for home affairs—three times more than in the previous period—including €34 billion specifically allocated to strengthening external borders. Beyond the amount, it is the logic of allocation that is significant: funding for third countries would be conditional not on respect for human rights, but on the level of cooperation on readmission.

• The third tool is visa policy. The Commission’s roadmap calls for stricter oversight of visa waiver programs and the introduction of new restrictive measures: suspension or reduction of visas granted to nationals of “non-cooperative” countries, increased costs, and prioritization of procedures for individuals with “high added value.”

Underlying these measures is a fundamental trend: negative migration conditionality, which is evident in all these changes—whether already adopted or still to come—that will significantly influence diplomatic relations with non-EU countries, extending far beyond migration issues.

Europol and Frontex Under Construction: Toward an Increasingly Security-Focused Europe

Little is known about the new reforms to the mandates of Frontex and Europol, other than their timeline.

For Europol, the Commission’s proposal is scheduled for June 2026. Magnus Brunner, the European Commissioner for Home Affairs and Migration, addressed the LIBE Committee on March 19, 2026. He wants to strengthen Europol’s data-sharing capabilities with other European agencies and the private sector. He aims to make this agency a “truly operational” player, to fill information gaps by making data sharing the default option, to win what he calls the “technological arms race,” and to strengthen cooperation with non-EU states. To achieve this, he aims to double Europol’s budget to 3 billion. During this hearing before the parliamentary committee, Fabrice Leggeri (PfE, France) expressed a desire for Europol to be less constrained by “administrative burdens and excessive regulations” and voiced concern that the European Data Protection Supervisor might “block cooperation” between agencies. Sophie Wilmès (Renew, Belgium) would like Europol to make greater use of AI “because criminals are already using it.” We learn from the Greens that an impact assessment will normally be published alongside the proposal for the new regulation.

As for Frontex, the reform of its mandate is scheduled for September 2026. Given that the European agency has continued to expand since its creation, the next mandate is unlikely to be an exception. Of the 81 billion euros that the 2028–2034 multiannual financial framework allocates to migration, border management, and internal security, nearly 12 billion is earmarked for Frontex. This is a considerable sum, confirming the European agency’s status as a central pillar of European security policies. This reform is expected to make Frontex increasingly indispensable for carrying out deportations, currently from EU member states, but likely soon also between third countries, which would be a new development. Thus, the agency continues to expand its influence over migration management, well beyond European borders.