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Press review July 2025

 Libya

The authorities of the Government of National Stability (GNS) in eastern Libya (Benghazi) have announced that they have deported 700 Sudanese migrants by land to Sudan. This flagrant violation of their rights exposes them to the conflict that has been ongoing in the country since 2023 and to serious risks to their physical integrity. At the same time, the authorities of the Government of National Accord (GNA), in power in the western part of the country (Tripoli), continue to intercept migrants at sea and return them to Libya [1]. A total of 113 people are believed to have been victims of such ’pull-backs’ in early July, while people on the move continue to suffer systematic violence in the country. A report by Médecins Sans Frontières, published on the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, warned in June 2025 of ’the scale, systematic nature and brutality of torture, abuse and violent practices reported by thousands of migrants’ on the central Mediterranean route.

Despite this situation, the European Union continues to engage in dialogue with the Libyan authorities, both those it officially recognises (the GNA in Tripoli) and those whose sovereignty it does not recognise (the GSN in Benghazi). A high-level delegation [2] visited Tripoli on 8 July, before heading to the east of the country, where it was expelled by Marshal Haftar, who is in power in Benghazi, following a diplomatic incident. While the content of the discussions held in Tripoli has not been officially disclosed, the composition of the delegation leaves no doubt as to their connection with migration issues, particularly in the context of renewed arrivals in the EU from Libya [3]. Furthermore, Commissioner Brunner, who is responsible for home affairs and migration, told Politico that it was ’urgent and necessary’ to resume talks with eastern Libya, beyond the exchanges that have already taken place ’at a technical level’. He expressed particular concern about Russia’s growing influence in the country and the risks of Libya ’instrumentalising’ migration, similarly to what the EU is claiming to be happening on its eastern borders [4].

 Mauritania

Mauritania is zealously continuing to toughen its migration policy, with numerous deportations, roundups and raids for people on the move (or those perceived as such [5]). These operations, which have been going on for several months (in public places, on roads, in shops, but also directly in homes), are the result of a partnership established with the EU in March 2024, in conjunction with support from Spain [6].

These deportations, whose racist and xenophobic nature has been strongly criticised by civil society, are creating situations of great precariousness and vulnerability on Mauritania’s eastern borders [7]. They also affect refugees recognised as such by the UNHCR, as well as people who have been living in Mauritania for several years and hold residence permits or work permits, particularly Senegalese nationals, despite the agreement concluded in June 2025 to ’remove all obstacles to the free movement of nationals’ of both countries [8].

 Germany

The German Interior Minister is considering opening direct talks with the Taliban regime in power in Afghanistan with a view to allowing the deportation of Afghans to their country of origin. With the exception of a flight organised in August 2024 (with the support of Qatar) to deport 28 Afghan nationals convicted of crimes in Germany [9], no deportations to Afghanistan had been carried out by Germany since the Taliban took power in 2021. However, a similar operation was carried out once again, thanks to Qatar’s intervention: 81 Afghan men ’subject to an expulsion order and who had already been convicted by the criminal justice system’ were deported on 18 July 2025 [10] – conveniently, on the day Germany hosted an interministerial summit on migration [11].

These statements raised concerns among the United Nations and the High-Commissariat for Refugees, who euphemistically pointed out that such deportations were not ’appropriate’ and that ’the conditions on the ground were not conducive’ to them, calling on states not to carry them out. The deportations carried out by Germany are in fact in total violation of the country’s international obligations, which – under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights – cannot expose persons under its jurisdiction to inhuman and degrading treatment. The UN has once again raised the alarm about the situation in the country [12], denouncing the mass deportations from Iran and Pakistan despite ’cases of torture, ill-treatment, arbitrary arrest and detention’ attributed to the Taliban authorities against Afghans returning to the country.

 Spain

The municipality of Torre Pacheco, in the region of Murcia, was marked by numerous racist attacks committed by far-right groups against foreigners between 9 and 13 July 2025. This violence was triggered by calls for hatred after a video, presented as proof that an elderly person had been attacked by a group of men of North African origin, went viral – before being subsequently denied [13]. Groups of far-right activists gathered on four consecutive nights, hooded and armed with sticks, to ’hunt down migrants’. One of their first victims was a 16-year-old Spanish boy, whose Moroccan origin led to him being subjected to racist abuse and beaten up before the police intervened.

This kind of exploitation of news items by the far right, seeking to serve an identity-based and xenophobic agenda, is nothing new: like other so-called ’moral panics’ reported in recent years in Europe, it is part of a well-established strategy of the European far right. It aims to capitalise on a situation by presenting a violent reaction as ’spontaneous’, ’local’ and ’popular’, when in fact it is orchestrated by networks of activists linked to political parties, who are often not residents of the locality in question. Behind these acts, these groups seek to legitimise and normalise the use of violence and persecution against foreigners, or those perceived as such.

 France

Both houses of the French Parliament have adopted a bill extending the length of detention in administrative detention centres (CRA), which will be increased to 210 days for foreign nationals who have been served with a deportation order and have been convicted of one of the offences listed in Article 1 of the law [14], or whose ’behaviour constitutes a particularly serious threat to public order’. Until now, only persons convicted of terrorist acts, activities or behaviour could, in exceptional cases and subject to judicial review, be deprived of their liberty for such a long period.

If this measure comes into force, it will only serve to increase both the suffering of those detained and the tensions within the CRA, where living conditions are often precarious, as highlighted by a dozen associations in a press releaseon July 2025. The objective pursued (to increase the number of effective deportations) is unlikely to be achieved. Associations defending the rights of foreigners have been repeating for years that locking people up more does not mean deporting more, as shown by the evolution of the average length of detention and the number of people deported between 2017 and 2024 (which increased by more than 2.5 times, while the number of deportations fell by more than 1.75 times). The vague legal definition of the concept of a ’particularly serious threat to public order’ is also a cause for concern, as it opens the door to widespread and arbitrary deprivation of liberty. The Constitutional Council has been referred to by two groups of MPs [15], who question the proportionality and necessity of the law, emphasising in particular that the offences and crimes covered by it cannot be considered to be of the same degree of seriousness or threat as terrorist crimes, on the basis of which a derogatory regime was exceptionally applicable. In accordance with Article 61 of the Constitution, the Council will have one month to rule on the constitutionality of the text and, if necessary, censor the disputed articles.

The association Utopia 56 has announcedthat it is filing a complaint for manslaughter and failure to provide assistance against a group of police officers, following revelations by Disclose about the circumstances surrounding the death of Jumaa al-Hassan. The Syrian national drowned on the night of 2 March 2024 in the Aa canal in Gravelines, shortly after a police operation to prevent a boat from leaving for the United Kingdom. The investigation, based on eyewitness accounts and a three-dimensional reconstruction of the events, appears to indicate that the police deliberately failed to assist Jumaa after spraying him with tear gas, which, according to witnesses, caused him to jump into the water in an attempt to reach the dinghy that was to take him to the United Kingdom. It was only when the boat became stuck in the mud a few dozen metres away that a rescue operation was launched around the dinghy, without any concern for Jumaa, who had disappeared under the water 20 minutes earlier. His body was discovered on the banks of the canal 16 days later by a passer-by. The investigation into this case was quickly handed over to a unit responsible for combating ’smuggling networks’, without questioning the responsibility of the police.

As the associations present on the ground keep repeating, ’police intervention increases the likelihood of death and even pushes people to take even greater risks to ensure their departure.’ Yet France persists in its security crackdown, encouraged by funding from the United Kingdom, which is keen to prevent any arrivals on its shores.

Following the Franco-British summit held on 10 July 2025 [16], the two countries announced the conclusion of a ’pilot agreement on cross-Channel migration’ aimed, for the first time, at allowing the return to France of people sent back from the United Kingdom after crossing in small boats. Although the text has not been made public, it has already been announced that it will be based on the ’one-for-one’ system put in place after the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement: for every person arriving by small boat in the United Kingdom and returned to France (considered a ’safe third country’ [17]), one person will be accepted into the United Kingdom through regular channels (family reunification or asylum application). The French and British authorities are currently expecting around 50 returns per week. Another new development is that 26 Frontex agents will be deployed on the coast, whereas until now the European agency’s support had been limited to aerial surveillance of the coast to report boats heading for the UK.

Those who are sent back from the UK and don’t have the right to stay in France will have few options once they’re back in France: apply for asylum or face deportation – and be held in a detention centre. If France, through a ’Dublin’ procedure, manages to prove that the applicant entered the EU through another Member State or has already lodged an asylum application there, a transfer procedure to that State may be initiated without examining the application on its merits. Far from providing a ’solution’ for exiled people seeking to reach the United Kingdom (21,117 as of 6 July 2025 [18], or an average of 782 per week), this system will encourage them to try to evade the authorities by dangerous routes and practices and will increase the risks involved in the crossing.

 Greece

On 10 July 2025, the Greek parliament approved a suspension of the right to asylum for people arriving by sea from North Africa [19], despite criticism from theCouncil of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations High Commissariat for Refugees (UNHCR): without the possibility of seeking asylum, people on the move affected by this suspension will be refused entry to Greek territory and will therefore be directly returned (in fact, pushed-back) to their country of departure, notably Libya, where they could be exposed to inhuman and degrading treatment. This decision, which the Prime Minister considers necessary in view of the ’urgency of the situation’ (described as an ’invasion’ by the Minister responsible for migration), follows an increase in the number of people arriving by sea from Libya in recent weeks. More than 200 people rescued at sea have already fallen victim to this suspension of the right to asylum, just a few days after it came into force [20].

Greece has thus chosen to disregard EU law, which obliges it to respect the most fundamental rights of migrants: the right to leave any country [21] – especially if it is unsafe for them [22] – and to seek protection from another state. While the Greek authorities claim to be ’fighting human trafficking’ and ’migrant smuggling’, their policy runs counter to these supposed objectives by allowing people on the move to be sent back to a country where their rights are at risk and from which they might eventually try to flee again.

During an informal meeting of the European Union’s Justice and Home Affairs Council, Greece presented a draft law on ’illegal migration’, described as ’the strictest ever submitted at EU level’. The law provides for a number of measures whose stated aim is to introduce ’disincentives’ to migration: return hubs outside the EU (Libya and Tunisia are mentioned as possible locations for these facilities), increased electronic surveillance of people in an irregular administrative situation, and imprisonment for illegal residence [23], etc. A few days earlier, the Greek Prime Minister had also announced in a speech to the Hellenic Parliament his intention to build a new administrative detention centre in Crete.

Considering the numerous violations of the rights of migrants deprived of their liberty in Greece [24], these umpteenth measures that undermine their rights will further weaken them and contribute to their marginalisation and precariousness in Greece.

 Italy

The Italian Constitutional Court has ruled on the constitutionality of the Piantedosi decree: the question had been raised by a Brindisi court after the Ocean Viking, a ship belonging to the NGO SOS Méditerranée, was detained (in accordance with the decree) in 2024 for carrying out ’an excessive number of rescue operations’ in the Mediterranean. While the Constitutional Court considered that the measure to immobilise the ship was neither unreasonable nor disproportionate and therefore did not invalidate the decree or the decisions taken in its application, it reaffirmed that it was subject to compliance with international law, in particular the SAR (Search and Rescue) Convention on the safeguarding of human life at sea. Thus, the Court considers that, where non-compliance with these provisions makes it possible to save lives or protect them from exposure to inhuman and degrading treatment, it will not be subject to sanctions, as the provisions of the decree are not binding in this case (see §26 of the judgment). This includes both protection against imminent danger (risks to life at sea) and the disembarkation of rescued persons in a place of safety (in accordance with the principle of non-refoulement, so as to guarantee the right to life and protection against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and collective expulsion).

The decree had been strongly criticised by civil society organisations, in particular civil rescue NGOs, which saw their activities threatened or hindered by its implementation [25]. In response to the court’s decision to uphold the decree, which it described as ’anti-NGO’, SOS Méditerranée expressed the hope that this decision ’will now lead the Italian administration and judges to apply the Piantedosi decree in accordance with maritime law’ – a hope that was quickly dashed. The NGO Sea Watch’s fast rescue boat, the Aurora, which had been blocked in Lampedusa since 22 July 2025 under the Piantedosi decree, was unable to assist a boat in distress just four and a half hours away on 28 July 2025. Although a Frontex vessel had approached the boat, it was ultimately a merchant ship that took charge of the rescue operation, during which two children drowned and one person went missing after the boat capsized [26].

The Italian NGO consortium Tavolo Asilo e Immigrazione (TAI) has submitted a report to the Italian Parliament about the Italian pre-expulsion detention centre (CPR) in Gjäder, Albania, claiming that this system poses a threat to democracy and the rule of law in Italy. TAI reports that 132 people have been transferred to the extraterritorial camp in Gjäder since April 2025 [27], without any written record or motive – often in the middle of the night, without warning or informing the detainees of their destination, and by force (handcuffing with cables). TAI also reports that access to healthcare and the exercise of the right to defence or appeal are impeded once in the camp.

The six visits and more than sixty interviews conducted by TAI have thus highlighted the numerous violations of rights that this externalised deportation camp entails, which contravenes many of the founding principles of a European Union that has nevertheless decided to allow its Member States to replicate and generalise such a model [28].

 Poland

Poland has introduced temporary [29] controls at its internal borders with Germany and Lithuania, following the example of other Schengen countries that have recently (re)introduced such controls (the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany). This measure appears to be a response to the restrictive stance taken by the German authorities, who have decided to refuse entry to any foreign nationals arriving at its borders, even if they are seeking protection. The Polish government had expressed its dissatisfaction with the measure, which Warsaw considered to place Poland ’under an unfair additional burden’. On the Lithuanian side, Poland justifies its decision by the risk that people on the move, “instrumentalised’ by Russia and Belarus, could cross the Lithuanian border outside authorised border posts and then enter Poland irregularly.

These decisions will further complicate the journey of migrants. Prevented from entering Germany, hunted down at the Polish borders, denied the right to apply for asylum [30], and sent back to Belarus, they will be exposed to inhuman and degrading treatment [31], and even risks to their physical integrity, forcing them to choose dangerous routes to escape the controls. On 22 July 2025, Polish soldiers used their weapons against a group of migrants who had entered Poland from Belarus outside the authorised border posts [32]. One of them was wounded in the thigh by a rubber bullet and taken to hospital [33]. The authorities justified these actions in a statement by citing the criminal nature of the border crossing, without giving any consideration to the (non) proportionality of such a response.

 United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, the government has announced to Parliamentthat it intends to use artificial intelligence (AI) to verify, through facial recognition, the age of people applying for asylum on its territory, considering this option to be ’the most cost-effective’. In plain language, when the age stated by an asylum seeker is disputed by the authorities, or when there is uncertainty about the person’s minority, officials will be authorised to use AI (trained on millions of images of people whose age is known) to obtain an estimate of their age based on their facial features.

Assessing the age of an asylum seeker is essential to their care, as minors are entitled to additional protection and guarantees, including appropriate accommodation. However, the standard method of age assessment currently used in the United Kingdom does not comply with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and does not respect the fundamental rights of minors. In the absence of ’sufficient evidence of minority’, the determination is made on the basis of appearance: it is sufficient for two Home Office officers to consider that the person is ’significantly over 18 years of age’ based on their physical appearance and behaviour for this assessment to be considered reliable by the administration [34]. Any error [35] in this process puts minors at risk of being treated as adults by the administration, in disregard of their rights and best interests. However, this is not the issue that the government wishes to tackle as a priority: in her speech to Parliament, the Minister for Border Security and Asylum, Angela Eagle, preferred to highlight cases of ’adults [...] falsely identified as children’. While this language fuels mistrust towards people on the move, the proposed measure remains worrying: what guarantees will there be for people subject to this use of AI? How can we ensure that AI will not reproduce human biases? What avenues of appeal will be available against a decision based on AI? How will personal data be processed by the authorities? This last point is particularly important, given the era of mass surveillance of foreigners that many European countries have entered into [36].

 Frontex

A joint investigation by the newspapers Le Monde, El País and Solomon [37] reveals the existence of a vast system of personal data sharing between the European Coast Guard Agency and border guards (Frontex) and the European Police Cooperation Agency (Europol), targeting activists and migrants. The investigation began with the case of Helena Maleno, a Spanish activist prosecuted in Morocco for human trafficking and ’facilitating illegal migration’ (acquitted in 2019). During her trial, the judge cited excerpts from three Frontex reports, which the agency had forwarded to Europol, which in turn had transferred them to the Spanish police in connection with a separate case, before the latter handed them over to the Moroccan authorities – outside of any legal procedure. These files contained a large amount of personal information that is not relevant to the case in question.

This example is symptomatic of a practice that is deeply rooted in the functioning of the two agencies, which have been linked since 2008 by a working arrangement governing their cooperation, largely based on Frontex sharing with Europol information collected in the course of its activities (Article 9). At the end of 2024, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) concluded that Frontex had ’unlawfully’, systematically and proactively transferred personal data (concerning more than 11,000 individuals and 450 NGOs between 2016 and 2021) from its ’debriefing interviews’ with migrants who had just disembarked – almost 18,000 conducted between 2016 and 2021 – which were then made available to the police authorities of the Member States. Although Frontex has no legal mandate for such proactive information gathering, it routinely labels anyone mentioned in one of these interviews as ’suspicious’ without further verification. In addition, Frontex’s mandate only allows such data transfers on a case-by-case basis – not systematically. Although Frontex claims to have ’learned clear lessons from this experience’ and to continue to ’adapt its internal practices accordingly’, the agency has not been subject to any sanctions other than the EDPS’ reprimand, which illustrates the wide latitude it enjoys in conducting its activities, its dangerousness and total impunity.

 EU draft multiannual financial framework for 2028-2034

On 16 July 2025, the European Commission published its proposal for a multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the period 2028-2034– a budget it describes as ’ambitious and dynamic’, with plans to increase it to €2 trillion, compared with €1.2 trillion for the current period (2021-2027). Expenditure on European migration policies totals €25 billion for 2021-2027: this budget is being significantly increased to €81 billion [38] (a 3.25-fold increase, while the total EU budget is only being increased by 1.67). The Frontex agency will see its multi-annual budget increase from €5.6 billion [39] to €11.9 billion (+112.5%), and nearly €34 billion will be allocated to border surveillance and border guard equipment, while spending on programmes related to asylum or the inclusion of migrants will be eliminated. The current project financing instruments (AMIF [40], IGFV [41], FSI [42]) are being merged, jeopardising transparency on the use (recipient countries, objectives, implementing partners, breakdown of funds, etc.) of the large amounts allocated. The NDICI-GE neighbourhood instrument renamed ’Global Europe’ (GE [43]), will be allocated €200 billion (+75%), with one of its main objectives being to enable ’comprehensive cooperation with partner countries, contributing to stability and addressing common challenges such as migration’.

The general thrust of this budget proposal is thus to continue the ultra-securitisation of the EU’s borders and to reinforce the implementation of restrictive migration and border policies, in line with the measures of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, which will come into force in June 2026. The increased budget for projects or ’partnerships’ outside the EU will undoubtedly encourage the wholesale externalisation of European security-oriented migration policies. The lack of transparency on spending, already a feature of the current MFF, is likely to increase as a result of the European Commission’s objectives of ’dynamism’, ’flexibility’ and ’simplification’ (fewer spending caps and targets, less compartmentalised budgets, vague earmarking, etc.) and at the request of Member States. International protection is largely overlooked and only mentioned in the context of the Pact and its restrictive measures (fast-track procedures, combating so-called ’abuses’), illustrating the EU’s pursuit of a fortress Europe chimera, with disregard for migrants’ rights, protection or integration.

 Zugspitze Summit

On 18 July 2025, Germany brought together a group of European ministers for a summit on migration, held at the Zugspitze, the country’s highest mountain. The Federal Minister of the Interior invited his French, Polish, Austrian, Danish and Czech counterparts to attend, ahead of an informal meeting of EU interior and justice ministers in Copenhagen on 22 July 2025. The final declarationissued by the six ministers indicates agreement on five main areas of common objectives. With regard to deportations, the ministers want to ’allow the creation of return centres in third countries [...] and improve Frontex’s mandate to help Member States return people to these centres in third countries’, but also that Frontex be ’mandated to carry out returns from third countries such as the Western Balkans’. They also demand that deportations to Afghanistan and Syria be made possible, despite the extremely dangerous situation in both countries. Mention is also made of a ’significant expansion’ of strategic partnerships with non-EU countries. Finally, the European Commission’s legislative proposals on the concepts of ’safe third countries’ and ’safe countries of origin’ are welcomed, and ministers call for these initiatives to be complemented by reforms of other aspects of EU asylum and migration law, such as the removal of the suspensive effect of appeals lodged after the rejection of an asylum application.

While these positions are not surprising, the formation of such a coalition, which promises harmful joint initiatives on asylum and migration and includes the Member State currently holding the rotating presidency of the EU Council (Denmark), will intensify the war on migrants that has been waged for several decades.