

REVUE DE PRESSE

May/June
2026

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Africa

Egypt/EU

- EuroNews, [“EU pays Egypt billions to manage migration — Cairo says it is not enough”](#), 21 May 2026

Faced with the reception crisis currently affecting Egypt, Cairo is pressing the EU to increase its funding for 'migration management'. The regime considers the €200 million allocation currently available to the country for the period 2024–2027 to be 'insufficient'.

As a key partner of the EU for almost 30 years in the externalisation of borders – a cornerstone of European migration policy – Egypt wields considerable negotiating leverage. It would therefore come as no surprise if European funding were indeed increased, at a historic juncture when restrictions on mobility have become an absolute priority for the EU. This is despite systematic violations of migrants' rights in the country: migrants in Egypt are arbitrarily detained in inhuman and degrading conditions, and forced returns continue to rise¹. In March 2026, independent experts appointed by the UN Human Rights Council also warned of an intensification of deportations and violations of fundamental rights targeting migrants on Egyptian territory, in particular Sudanese and Syrian nationals².

Libya

- France24, [“‘The Angel of Death’: former Libyan prison director to appear before the ICC”](#), 19 May 2026

From 19 to 21 May, Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri, a Libyan member of the Special Deterrence Forces militia and a senior official at Mitiga Prison in Tripoli, where he is alleged to have directly committed, ordered and facilitated multiple crimes between 2014 and 2020 (war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, rape, murder and other acts of persecution). His victims are alleged to have been targeted on the basis of their gender, ethnic origin, sexual orientation and migration status. El Hishri is the first suspect to appear before the ICC for atrocities committed in Libya against migrant persons, as part of the investigation conducted by the Court since 2011 under a UN mandate³.

After decades of impunity, the opening of these hearings represents a significant step forward for the victims of the Libyan detention system, which has been fuelled and supported by Europe through its border externalisation policies. Cooperation between the EU and its Member States (notably Italy) with Libya is based on three pillars: technical support and assistance provided to the 'Libyan Department for Combating Illegal Immigration' (DCIM) – which manages the camps and prisons where migrants suffer serious human rights violations; training and equipping the Libyan coastguard to intercept people at sea and push them back to Libya; and the conclusion of agreements with local Libyan authorities and armed groups to strengthen border controls in the south of the country⁴. By continuing and strengthening its relations with Libya on migration matters, the EU is making itself complicit in the crimes currently under investigation by the ICC, as well as in the impunity that many of their perpetrators continue to enjoy⁵. The case of Najim Isama Almasri clearly illustrates this long-standing complicity. A former head of the Libyan judicial police and an accomplice of El Hishri in the running of Mitiga, he too is the subject of an international arrest warrant issued by the ICC. When

¹ See the EuroMed Rights factsheet on this subject, [‘Safe on paper, dangerous in reality: Egypt and the EU’s return policy’](#), June 2025

² See OHCHR, [“Egypt: UN experts raise alarm over violations against refugees and migrants”](#), 6 March 2026

³ 14 people, including E Hishri, are currently the subject of international arrest warrants in connection with this investigation. Some of them have died, whilst others are on the run.

⁴ See, in particular, Amnesty International, [“Libya: European governments are complicit in human rights violations against refugees and migrants”](#), 12 December 2017

⁵ For further information, see the press release from Refugees in Libya, [“Civil society statement: Detention crimes in Libya finally before the ICC: Judges to decide whether El Hishri case moves to trial”](#), 11 May 2026

he was on Italian territory in early 2025, Rome sent him back to Libya on a state flight, without handing him over to the Court⁶⁷.

- InfoMigrants, [*“‘I’m scared, I don’t leave my house anymore’: in Libya, Black people are going into hiding, terrified by the ‘hunt for migrants’ raging across the country’*](#), 5 June 2026

Since early June, Africans of sub-Saharan origin in Libya have been the target of a crackdown on migrants carried out by hostile individuals, the police and local militias. Many are hiding and no longer dare to leave their homes for fear of being attacked. This wave of violence follows anti-immigration protests outside the offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Tripoli, sparked by false information circulated on social media about the existence of a fictitious refugee resettlement programme in Libya. The demonstrators were demanding that the UNHCR leave Libya and that refugee support services cease their activities. The UNHCR expressed concern over the demonstrators’ hate speech and stated that it was working in cooperation with the Libyan authorities to find solutions for those who have fled conflict.

However, as part of this escalation of violence, these same authorities have carried out mass round-ups in neighbourhoods where migrants live. It should also be noted that round-ups and arbitrary arrests of migrants by the Libyan authorities have long been documented in Libya. Those affected are detained in inhumane conditions and subjected to torture. Incidents of physical, psychological and sexual violence, as well as the abandonment of people in the desert, have also been extensively documented⁸. The UNHCR, whose mandate is to protect refugees in Libya, appears in reality to be serving as a ‘humanitarian fig leaf’ to enable European states to continue their cooperation with a failed state where rights are systematically flouted⁹.

Morocco

- InfoMigrants, [*“‘They treat you like cattle’: migrants arrested in Morocco on their way to Melilla recount their ordeal’*](#), 8 May 2026

In late April, seven Mauritanian nationals attempted to cross the only land border between Morocco and the Spanish-controlled enclave of Melilla. They were arrested by the police and subjected to degrading treatment (including beatings and the theft of their personal belongings), before being pushed back to the Moroccan-Algerian border.

This kind of violence is a daily reality for people attempting to reach the European enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, located on the African continent. The border between Moroccan territory and these enclaves is heavily militarised: over the years, high barriers have been erected and a dense network of radar, thermal and infrared cameras has been deployed along the entire border, with the aim of preventing anyone from reaching the European territory. Forced returns are systematic and are often accompanied by physical violence and theft,

⁶ This refusal to cooperate with the Court has led to two complaints being lodged against Italy with the European Court of Human Rights. See, on this subject, InfoMigrants, [*“Italy facing two complaints with the ECHR for releasing the Libyan migrant torturer Osama Almasri Najim”*](#), 1 June 2026

⁷ Almasri was recently sentenced by a court in Tripoli to 7 years and 4 months’ imprisonment, whilst still being the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the ICC. Libya, which is not a signatory to the Rome Statute (the founding treaty of the ICC), is not obliged to hand him over to the Court. See in this regard II Post, [*“General Almasri has been sentenced in Libya to 7 years and 4 months for acts of violence against migrants”*](#), 21 June 2026.

⁸ See, on this subject, the information on Libya on Migreurop, [*“The Maghreb states and the European Union are guilty of systematic violations of international law and crimes against humanity”*](#), 7 April 2026

⁹ See also Refugees in Libya, [*“Book of Shame. How UNHCR Fails to Protect Refugees in Libya, Tunisia, and Niger”*](#), 2025

perpetrated by both Moroccan and Spanish forces, whose collaboration on migration issues dates back to 1992 (agreement on the movement of persons, transit and the readmission of foreigners who have entered illegally). This cooperation has since been consolidated through a series of externalisation agreements (between Spain and Morocco, but also between the EU and Morocco), which have turned this country into a veritable ‘blockade zone’ for migration. The systematic human rights violations in Ceuta and Melilla are emblematic of the process of building a closed-off Europe, and continue with complete impunity¹⁰.

Rwanda/United Kingdom

- *BBC, [‘UK wins court case over collapsed Rwanda asylum deal’](#), 1 June 2026*

The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) has rejected Rwanda’s claim for compensation against the United Kingdom, following the annulment of the migration arrangement concluded between the two states in 2022. The aim of this informal agreement was to deport to Rwanda foreign nationals who had arrived on British soil ‘irregularly’ and whose applications for protection had been declared inadmissible. The UK Supreme Court had ruled that this arrangement was unlawful on the grounds that Rwanda could not be considered a safe country for refugees. In 2024, under the Starmer government, the agreement was finally cancelled and payments suspended. Rwanda then initiated arbitration proceedings in January 2026, claiming £50 million in compensation from the United Kingdom.

This brings to a close a legal dispute that clearly illustrates the commercial logic inherent in border externalisation, which reduces asylum seekers to a bargaining chip, enabling, on the one hand, European countries to rid themselves of people deemed ‘undesirable’, and, on the other, enabling non-European authoritarian regimes to secure financial inflows and achieve diplomatic rehabilitation as legitimate partners of European countries¹¹.

Member States of the European Union

Austria

- *InfoMigrants, [‘Austria limits refugee family reunification under new quota system’](#), 21 May 2026*

The Austrian Parliament has passed a new law introducing annual caps on family reunification, the level of which has not yet been set. This law follows a measure suspending family reunification procedures adopted in 2025, justified on the grounds of an alleged ‘overburdening’ of social services, and adopted by unjustifiably invoking the ‘emergency clause’ provided for in Article 72 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union¹².

With the introduction of this quota system, Austria is flouting its obligations regarding reception and protection: the law will result in the separation of families, in breach of the right to family life protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as the case law of the Court of Justice of the

¹⁰ See on this subject Migreurop, [“CEUTA Factsheet”](#), Isaline Roverato, 2024

¹¹ See also Migreurop, [“UK–Rwanda Agreement: Outsourcing Asylum to Africa, a Massive Deterrent in Europe”](#), 20 June 2022

¹² See on this subject InfoMigrants, [“Austria: family reunification suspended for a further six months”](#), 12 December 2025

European Union and the European Court of Human Rights, which have established that quotas applied to family reunification are unlawful in the absence of an individual assessment of each situation¹³.

Cyprus

- CyprusMail, [‘EU earmarks €800m for Cyprus to tackle immigration’](#), 8 June 2026

Cyprus will receive 800 million euros from the EU for the period 2028–2034, earmarked for ‘migration management’, representing a 70 per cent increase on the 480 million allocated for the period 2021–2027.

To date, EU funding has been used to build camps, to facilitate forced returns (Cyprus has recorded an unprecedented number of deportations of migrants in recent years), or to step up operations to identify people without the right to remain. At the end of May, three migrant people jumped from a balcony in Larnaca to escape the intensifying raids across the country. One of them died¹⁴.

Cyprus has repeatedly been accused of and found guilty of violating the rights of migrants, including refoulement¹⁵. Yet the southern part of the island will continue to benefit from the EU’s support and cooperation in its migration policies that infringe upon the rights and lives of migrants.

Greece

- Al Jazeera, [‘Greece reopens Syrian and Afghan asylum cases, hoping for returns’](#), 1 June 2026

Since February, Greece has reopened all asylum cases likely to be rejected. As part of this process, the cases of Syrian and Afghan nationals – particularly men – are being subject to almost systematic re-examination, with rejection rates rising sharply. This review appears to reflect a broader political desire to rid the country of Muslim migrants or those from predominantly Muslim countries by deporting them to regimes where serious human rights violations have been documented. The Minister for Migration and Asylum, Athanasios Plevris, has openly embraced this racist shift during a recent parliamentary hearing, stating that Greece prefers to welcome non-Muslim migrant workers.

Greece’s strategy is part of a wider European climate of growing racism and Islamophobia. Several European countries, led by Germany, are now considering the forced return of Afghan and Syrian nationals, despite the extremely dangerous situation in their countries of origin. The European Union itself hosted a Taliban delegation in Brussels on 23 June, to negotiate the deportations of Afghans¹⁶, and has renewed its cooperation agreement with Syria – ending the partial suspension in place since 2011 – which reflects a desire to speed up the forced returns of Syrian refugees residing throughout Europe¹⁷.

¹³ See in particular Amnesty International Austria, [‘Nationalrat adopts quota system for family reunification: Amnesty warns of human rights violations’](#), 19 May 2026

¹⁴ See in particular Cyprus Mail, [“Migrant dies following balcony jump during immigration raid”](#), 27 May 2026

¹⁵ See on this subject Cyprus Mail, [‘UNHCR expresses concern over alleged pushback of Syrian refugees’](#), 19 March 2025 and InfoMigrants, [‘Cyprus condemned by the ECHR for pushing back two Syrians at sea’](#), 9 October 2024

¹⁶ See below

¹⁷ See, on this subject, The New Arab, [‘Eyeing migrant returns, EU moves to bolster Syria ties’](#), 12 May 2026

Italy/Albania

- *La Repubblica*, [“Palazzo Chigi tries again: ‘Migrants picked up at sea to be held in centres in Albania’”](#), 11 May 2026

The Italian government is reportedly working on a new decree under the Italy–Albania Memorandum of Understanding (2023). The aim is said to be to revert to the original plan to outsource the fast-track processing of asylum applications to the camps in Shëngjin and Gjadër – under Italian jurisdiction. Those affected are migrants intercepted at sea by the Italian authorities, who come from so-called ‘safe’ countries and are considered ‘non-vulnerable’. According to the government, this change would be made possible by the European Pact on Migration and Asylum, which came into force on 12 June 2026.

The initial project had so far been held up by several court rulings. The court in Rome has repeatedly refused to authorise detention in the camps in Albania, ruling that the countries of origin of the people concerned, such as Bangladesh and Egypt, could not be considered ‘safe’ under European law¹⁸. To prevent these camps from becoming unused, Italy converted them in 2025 into Italian detention and deportation centres (CPRs)¹⁹. The entry into force of the Pact could, however, remove these obstacles. The Pact does indeed allow a country to be classified as partially ‘safe’ and facilitates the use of accelerated procedures for nationals of countries with a low asylum recognition rate (< 20 per cent). Together with the new common European list of ‘safe countries of origin’, these measures provide Italy with a more solid legal basis for reactivating the Albanian centres²⁰.

However, doubts remain, particularly regarding Italy’s ability to detain asylum seekers undergoing standard procedures on territory outside the EU – an issue referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which is expected to rule in the coming months²¹.

Sweden

- *InfoMigrants*, [‘Sweden: Parliament passes law obliging public authorities to report undocumented migrants’](#), 16 June 2026

On Monday 15 June, the Swedish Parliament passed two bills aimed at stepping up the deportation of migrants. The first measure, known as the ‘snitch law’, obliges six public authorities (employment, pensions, tax, debt, social insurance and the prison service) to report to the police any undocumented migrants with whom their staff come into contact. The second, known as the ‘good conduct’ law, provides for the deportation of foreign nationals residing in Sweden who do not lead an ‘honest life’.

These measures establish a state apparatus of control and coercion in Sweden, which will lead to racial profiling, discrimination based on appearance and serious infringements of migrants’ rights. The ‘snitch law’ risks preventing migrant people from accessing social rights; they may forgo essential services – including going to hospital or school – for fear of being denounced. By systematically using government departments and public services as tools for surveillance, it foreshadows the ‘return’ regulation – adopted on 17 June by the European Parliament – which authorises raids in public places and private homes.

¹⁸ See also [“Rome court does not uphold the detention of migrants in Albania”](#), 18 October 2024

¹⁹ See SkyTG24, [‘How migrant centres in Albania work’](#), 9 June 2025

²⁰ See Fanpage, [‘Why, under the new EU regulation, Meloni can reopen the centres in Albania’](#), 10 December 2025

²¹ See also Italian Coalition for Freedom and Civil Rights (CILD), [“The Italy-Albania Protocol before the Court of Justice of the EU”](#), 10 December 2025

The 'good conduct' law, does not specify the criteria for defining what would constitute 'bad conduct'. Its discretionary nature exposes migrants to the risk of having their residence permits refused or revoked on the basis of behaviour that is neither illegal nor punishable for Swedish citizens. This amounts to the deliberate creation of legal uncertainty and the imposition of conditions on rights, which is dissuasive and contrary to the rule of law. These measures will foster fear and self-censorship amongst migrants.

European countries outside the European Union

United Kingdom

- France24, [‘Violent anti-immigration protests in Belfast following an attack attributed to a refugee’](#), 9 June 2026
- France24, [“Mass rally against racism in Belfast following anti-immigrant riots”](#), 13 June 2026

On 9 June, anti-immigrant demonstrations took place in Belfast (Northern Ireland) in the wake of a knife attack attributed to a Sudanese national, footage of which was shared on social media. Neo-fascist groups set fire to cars and homes, most of which belonged to migrant people. A few days later, a large anti-racist demonstration was organised to condemn this wave of racist violence.

This incident illustrates a well-known pattern in several European countries and beyond: an offence or crime committed by a foreign national is exploited to target entire communities of migrants and to legitimise violent attacks and racially motivated intimidation against them. This dynamic is part of a context of a sharp rise in racism and the far right in the United Kingdom – visible both on social media and in public spaces (murals inciting racial hatred, anti-migrant rallies, etc.)²² – which threatens the lives and safety of migrant people and non-white people.

- InfoMigrants, [‘In the UK, the government wants to expand the sponsored refugee scheme’](#), 30 June 2026

On 30 June, the UK Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood, [announced](#) the introduction of a refugee sponsorship scheme, which will come into force in autumn 2027. In practice, universities, businesses and other organisations will now be able to sponsor a person recognised as a refugee under Article 1 of the [1951 Geneva Convention](#), enabling them to settle legally in the UK. The organisations responsible for this sponsorship will be in charge of providing accommodation, facilitating integration and assisting with the selected individuals' entry into the labour market. The number of potential beneficiaries has not yet been specified, and applications will remain subject to strict government scrutiny.

This announcement comes against a backdrop of a general tightening of UK asylum policy. Sponsorship schemes are, in fact, frequently used by governments to project an image of selective generosity towards 'genuine refugees' (Mahmood uses the term '*genuine* refugees'), whilst diverting attention from deterrence policies that remain unchanged, or that are strengthened. Sponsorship schemes thus become instruments of a policy of selection, enabling states to set quotas for people entering their territory and to select certain categories of refugees based on their level of qualifications or their religion (church-sponsored schemes spring

²² See, in particular, the International Federation for Human Rights, [‘Northern Ireland: racist violence and intimidation must stop’](#), 11 June 2026

to mind)²³. Furthermore, the state shrinks its responsibilities regarding protection and asylum by transferring a legal obligation to the private sector. Beyond the individual benefits that selected people may enjoy, this scheme, which is part of a highly repressive UK policy towards migrants, risks distorting the spirit of the right to asylum, which could then be reduced to ‘a neoliberal, privatised immigration scheme, reserved solely for highly skilled and educated migrants, or for certain ethnic or religious groups’²⁴.

United Kingdom/France

- *Le Monde*, [“Migration: a first step towards the Europeanisation of the management of Channel crossings”](#), 23 June

The ‘One in, one out’ agreement (2025) between France and the United Kingdom will not be renewed after October 2026. It will be replaced by a [European Commission action plan](#) for the Channel migration route, drawn up in partnership with the United Kingdom and published on June 16.

The ‘One in, one out’ agreement currently stipulates that, for every asylum seeker the United Kingdom undertakes to admit through ‘legal channels’, France agrees in return to readmit to its territory one person who has arrived in the United Kingdom so-called irregularly²⁵. The new action plan sets out a repressive approach centred on three pillars: strengthening diplomatic cooperation with countries of origin and transit to facilitate deportations; the ‘fight against people-smugglers’ (which raises fears of increased criminalisation of migrants and solidarity organisations²⁶); and increasing the resources allocated to law enforcement and border control. Unsurprisingly, the text refers to the need to curb ‘illegal’ migration in order to deter people from undertaking dangerous journeys. This is a rhetorical ploy that obscures the fact that it is precisely the sealing off of borders that drives many people to continue undertaking these dangerous journeys.

Switzerland

- *Euractiv*, [‘Swiss reject divisive anti-immigration proposal’](#), 14 June 2026

On 14 June, 54 per cent of Swiss voters rejected the anti-immigration initiative ‘No to a Switzerland with 10 million!’. This initiative was put forward by the far-right SVP party and identified asylum seekers as the cause of the population growth that, according to SVP, is jeopardising the country’s ‘sustainability’. The text called for the permanent resident population to be kept below the ten-million mark by 2050, through repressive migration measures that contravened the country’s obligations regarding reception and protection. Once the population reached 9.5 million, asylum seekers granted temporary leave would no longer have any prospect of remaining in the country. Should the population exceed 10 million, international agreements accused of encouraging population growth would have to be renegotiated or even withdrawn. The application of texts such as the Global Compact for Migration, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the European Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons would be threatened²⁷.

²³ See on this subject Nikolas Feith Tan, [‘Community Sponsorship of Refugees and Local Governance’](#), in *Theorising Local Migration Law and Governance*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2022, pp. 252–271

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

²⁵ See on this subject the short documentary by MSF Frontlines, [‘One in, one out: thousands of lives at risk’](#), 21 May 2026

²⁶ On this point, see PICUM, [‘Migrant smuggling: why we need a paradigm shift’](#), 18 July 2022

²⁷ See on this subject Amnesty International, [‘The “No Switzerland at 10 million” initiative: a frontal attack on the protection of human rights’](#), 7 May 2026

The initiative failed thanks to strong opposition from employers' organisations and trade unions, which feared severe repercussions for employment and growth. Although many of the arguments in favour of a 'no' vote were economic in nature, the rejection of the initiative remains a significant victory and a setback for the far right's vision of society. A vision that would have exposed migrants to a real risk of being turned back at the borders and of asylum procedures being suspended, and which would have led – through the possibility of renouncing international human rights agreements – to a general weakening of these protections for everyone, not just for migrants.

European Union

Chisinau Declaration

- Euractiv, [‘European countries urge rethink of human rights on migration’](#), 15 May 2026

On 15 May 2026, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a [declaration](#) in Chisinau (Moldova) proposing a restrictive interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in order to facilitate the deportation of migrants who have not been granted the right of residence or who have committed serious offences. The declaration proposes a reinterpretation of Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life) to ‘rebalance’ the individual rights of migrants against ‘the public interest and public security’. It also proposes narrowing the scope of Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment), so that insufficient access to healthcare or precarious socio-economic conditions in the country of deportation cannot constitute inhuman or degrading treatment that would prevent forced return. It should be noted, however, that Article 3 admits of no exceptions.

The Council of Europe has thus acted on the [declaration](#) issued in December 2025 by 27 member states calling for a more restrictive interpretation of the ECHR with regard to forced returns. Whilst the Chisinau Declaration remains non-binding in legal terms, it constitutes a worrying political development which will contribute – alongside recent European legislation (‘safe’ countries of origin, ‘safe’ third countries, the ‘Return’ Regulation) - to entrench in the collective imagination the need to systematise dangerous deportations, in the name of so-called security imperatives. It also constitutes political interference in the interpretation of the ECHR, illustrating a European trend towards challenging the legitimacy of the judiciary²⁸, which has been accused by several right-wing and far-right governments of favouring progressive positions on migration.

Entry into force of the Migration and Asylum Pact

- Mediapart, [‘Migration and Asylum Pact: a day of shame for the European Union’](#), 12 June 2026

On 12 June, the European Pact on Migration and Asylum came into force. It constitutes a comprehensive reform of European policy in this area, introducing far-reaching changes at the EU's borders. It establishes new screening procedures for anyone arriving at the EU's external borders. Following this screening, some people may be subject to accelerated border asylum procedures, leading to deportation if their application is rejected. Throughout all these stages, people are deprived of their liberty, likely in isolated locations that are difficult for lawyers, doctors, journalists and civil society organisations to access. They are also kept in a legal ‘fiction of non-entry’: whilst physically present on European soil, they are legally considered not to have

²⁸ See on this subject Joël Andriantsimbazovina, [‘Political pressure on the European Court of Human Rights’](#), Le Club des Juristes, 12 June 2025

entered. This enables states to deport them more easily, paving the way for lower standards of fundamental rights.

Deprivation of liberty is therefore becoming the norm, and access to asylum – as well as to an effective remedy – is drastically restricted. Indeed, more people will be subject to accelerated procedures, on the assumption that they do not require protection: those from countries where the asylum recognition rate in the EU is below 20 per cent, those from so-called ‘safe’ countries of origin, and those suspected of posing a ‘threat to public order’, a vague and undefined concept. Furthermore, if individuals subject to a deportation order appeal against that decision, their appeal will not have suspensive effect, and the Pact authorises deportation even before a final decision has been taken.

In short, this Pact institutionalises, at a European level, the detention, registration, screening and expulsion of migrants at Europe’s borders.

Final adoption of the ‘return’ regulation

- RFI, [‘Migration: the European Parliament adopts reform providing for “return hubs”](#)’, 17 June 2026
- Le Monde, [“‘Send them back!’ chant far-right MEPs in the European Parliament”](#), 17 June 2026

On 17 June, the European Parliament gave final approval to the ‘return’ regulation, amidst applause and racist chants from right-wing and far-right MEPs in the chamber, who shouted “*Send them back!*”. The text provides for a massive detention system (lasting up to two years, with the possibility of indefinite extension in the event of a threat to public security), the conversion of third countries into ‘return hubs’, to which migrants may be deported even if they have no connection to those countries²⁹, as well as ‘investigative’ measures authorising raids on homes and in public spaces, the seizure of electronic devices and the obligation to provide biometric data to the authorities.

The proposed measures cross a red line by establishing a regime of widespread surveillance within the EU: migrants without the right to reside will be subjected to a veritable manhunt and deported to countries known to be unsafe (European governments are currently considering deportations to Rwanda, Uganda, Libya, Egypt...³⁰). This regulation institutionalises the violation of fundamental rights and international law: it will lead to breaches of the principle of non-refoulement, flout the right to private and family life, and expose migrant people to inhuman and degrading treatment³¹.

A Taliban delegation in Brussels

- InfoMigrants, [‘Unprecedented meeting between the EU and Taliban officials to discuss the return of Afghans to their country of origin’](#), 24 June 2026
- Euractiv, [“The Taliban use their visit to Brussels to request consular access in Europe”](#), 23 June 2026

On 23 June, members of the European Commission met with a Taliban delegation to continue negotiations on the forced return of Afghan nationals without the right to reside in the EU. In exchange for their cooperation with these deportations, the Taliban requested the restoration of consular services for Afghans across Europe.

²⁹ A coalition of five Member States has already begun negotiations with third countries with a view to establishing *return hubs*. See Euractiv, [“EU return hubs to be revealed by autumn, says Dutch minister”](#), 5 June 2026

³⁰ See Human Rights Watch, [‘Dangerous EU Momentum Towards Offshore Deportation Centres’](#), 26 June 2026

³¹ For further reading, see in particular Migreurop, [‘Adoption of the EU “Return” Regulation: the death knell for international law’](#), 26 March 2026

Once again, the EU's anti-immigration obsession is leading to the normalisation of relations with a repressive regime, with the aim of deporting people at any cost³². As the restoration of consular services is a fundamental condition set by the Taliban, the end result of these negotiations risks being a de facto legitimisation of the Afghan regime, which has established gender apartheid³³ and is responsible for the systematic violation of human rights in Afghanistan³⁴. By normalising its relations with the Taliban, the European Union is eroding its own standards on fundamental rights, pushing the boundaries of what is considered 'acceptable' ever further. If these negotiations are successful, the Afghan nationals concerned risk being deported to face torture and death.

³² Agreements with Libya or Turkey are further examples.

³³ For further information, see Human Rights Watch, '[Gender Apartheid as an International Crime: Taliban Oppression in Afghanistan Triggers](#) Campaign', 2 September 2025

³⁴ See also Amnesty International, '[Afghanistan: the human rights situation in 2025](#)', 2026