Acceleration and Intensification of Repressive Migration Reforms: A Timeline of European Migration Legislation (2023–2026)

Last update : 06/25/2026. To view the timeline in full-page mode, click here.

Analysis of the Timeline

2025–2026: An Unrelenting Wave of Rights-Violating Reforms

This timeline of European migration reforms documents all legislative instruments that have been adopted or are currently under negotiation within the European institutions following the European Pact on Migration and Asylum. The Pact was adopted on 14 May 2024 and entered into application on 12 June 2026. Consisting of nine regulations and one directive [1] (see the timeline – each regulation can be displayed or hidden), the Pact is intended to constitute a comprehensive overhaul of the EU’s legal framework on migration and asylum. It marked the beginning of a new wave of legislative reforms on immigration and asylum at the European level.

Since then, a series of major reforms has been adopted at breakneck speed. As early as spring 2025, three major new proposals were put forward: the Return Regulation (March 2025), the creation of a European list of "safe" countries of origin (April 2025), and the reform of the concept of "safe" third countries (May 2025). The latter two were adopted jointly less than a year later, in February 2026. The Return Regulation itself was adopted on Wednesday, 17 June 2026, following fast-tracked negotiations (Parliament’s position adopted in March 2026, trilogue negotiations concluded on 1 June 2026).

The first European list of "safe countries of origin" (see the "Asylum – Safe Countries of Origin" section of the timeline) includes Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, Kosovo, India, Morocco and Tunisia. It paves the way for mandatory accelerated asylum procedures for nationals of these countries, thereby weakening their procedural safeguards. On the same day, the expansion of the concept of "safe third country" (see the "Asylum – Safe Third Countries" section) was also endorsed. This concept is not new: previously, a connection between the individual and the third country (through nationality, transit or residence) was required. That connection is no longer necessary. A simple agreement or arrangement between Member States (or the EU) and third countries now suffices to deport an individual, including to countries that they has never set foot in. The notion of a "safe country" has thus become a tool enabling European states to evade their international obligations rather than ensuring effective protection.

The new Return Regulation (see the "Return" section) represents a significant tightening of the rules governing the detention and removal of foreign nationals. Detention becomes the norm through an expansion of both the grounds for detention and the categories of people concerned, including those deemed vulnerable. The maximum detention period is extended from 18 to 24 months, with the possibility of further extensions in cases involving threats to public order or national security. In addition, the Return Regulation authorises transfers to so-called return hubs located outside the EU and beyond its legal oversight, where people expelled from European territory may be forcibly sent under formal or informal agreements concluded between Member States or the EU and third countries [2].

This succession of reforms represents an unprecedented escalation of attacks on the rights of people on the move in the European Union’s history, effectively giving a green light to the most repressive ambitions of Member States. The timeline above illustrates how the reconfiguration of the European institutional landscape in recent years has enabled this fast brutalisation of EU migration policies.

2024: An Unprecedented Shift in Favour of the Far Right

The concepts underpinning these recent reforms are part of the long-standing trajectory of EU migration policies. "Safe" countries, accelerated procedures, the externalisation of asylum procedures and deportations: these ideas are not new, but have resurfaced cyclically for more than twenty years. As early as 2003, Tony Blair was already proposing the establishment of asylum processing centres outside the EU, an idea later revived, among others, by Viktor Orbán in 2015 in the form of "refugee camps outside the EU" [3].

Until recently, these proposals had been blocked or watered down by sufficiently strong political and social opposition. In 2016, the reform of the Common European Asylum System proposed by the Commission, followed by the reform of the Dublin III Regulation, failed to pass. Likewise, the reform of the Return Directive in 2018 remained stalled for several years, thanks to political resistance that preserved fundamental rights safeguards.

Today, that resistance has collapsed. This turning point is the result of a major political realignment brought about by the June 2024 European elections, which marked a clear shift to the right in the European Parliament. The European People’s Party (EPP) emerged as the largest political group with 188 seats, while the Patriots for Europe became the Parliament’s third-largest force with 85 seats. On migration issues, these two blocs converge around the same priorities: tightening access to international protection, further criminalising migration, and reasserting state sovereignty over obligations arising from international law. This consensus is also reflected within the European Commission, embodied by the Commissioner for Home Affairs, Magnus Brunner, who has notably advocated expanding Frontex’s powers and enhancing the interoperability of biometric databases, as provided for under the Pact. As a result, the space for human rights-based opposition within the EU institutions has been significantly reduced, enabling these reforms to be adopted with virtually no resistance.

Before 2024, mainstream political groups in the European Parliament refused to cooperate with far-right groups, whether on votes, resolutions or appointments. That longstanding political firewall has now collapsed, as illustrated by the accelerating pace of negotiations on EU migration legislation. The EPP no longer hesitates to form coalitions with far-right parties in order to secure the adoption of legislative texts. This was demonstrated by the vote on the Return Regulation in the LIBE Committee, where an unprecedented alliance between the EPP, PfE [4], ECR [5] and ESN [6] succeeded in adopting a text even more restrictive than the one initially proposed by the rapporteur, M. Azmani of the Renew group.

This shift did not happen overnight. It is the outcome of a thirty-year process of normalising narratives that associate migration with insecurity and crime. This had already led to previous "asylum packages", the predecessors of the Pact, in 2003 and 2013, which established surveillance and migration control systems such as Eurodac [7], as well as the creation of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex [8]. By placing these narratives at the centre of the political agenda—and now of the legislative agenda—European decision-makers have normalised the use of emergency as a justification for lawmaking. This has allowed major legislative reforms to be rushed through while sidestepping key democratic safeguards, including the requirement to conduct impact assessments.

2023–2026: Negotiations Under Pressure Driving the Expansion of Externalisation

While EU Member States have long struggled to reach agreement on key migration issues such as solidarity mechanisms and relocation quotas, one area of convergence has gradually emerged: externalisation. Whether by delegating migration control to third countries, processing asylum applications outside European territory, or making development aid conditional on cooperation on returns, Member States with otherwise divergent political traditions have found common ground. This broad consensus helps explain the speed with which the post-Pact legislation has been adopted (see the timeline). Externalisation has become the common thread running through the recent rotating Presidencies of the Council.

The Spanish Presidency (second half of 2023) set the objective of concluding the trilogue negotiations on the Pact before the end of the European Parliament’s term in June 2024 (see the "Pact: Overview" section). It was under this time pressure that an agreement was reached on 20 December 2023 (see: "Agreement between the European Parliament and the Council on Five Legislative Texts"). Clearly, this accelerated timetable did not allow for a thorough assessment of the impact of each regulation, particularly their externalisation components (as demonstrated by the timeline, no impact assessment was carried out, and no agreement was reached on the concepts of "safe countries", which were postponed until 2026).

The Danish Presidency (second half of 2025) pushed this logic even further. Denmark, one of the Member States most committed to developing so-called "innovative" solutions—having successively proposed processing asylum applications on a Danish island and negotiating an agreement with Rwanda in 2021 [9]—made it a priority to secure the Council’s position before the end of its Presidency on 31 December 2025. Denmark’s domestic political agenda, and its own ambitions regarding externalisation, thus directly shaped the accelerated pace of the reform of the Return Regulation and of the reforms to the concepts of "safe third country" and "safe country of origin", with far-reaching consequences for fundamental rights (see the "Return" and "Asylum" sections).

The Cypriot Presidency (first half of 2026) has continued along this trajectory, presenting itself as an "implementation Presidency". Its central objective has been to conclude the trilogue negotiations on the Return Regulation by promoting its most coercive provisions: extending detention periods, broadening the grounds for detention, and strengthening enforceable return decisions. Cyprus, which recorded the third-highest number of expulsions in the European Union during the third quarter of 2025, has openly embraced this approach.

Across all three Presidencies, a common pattern emerges: the strategic use of supposed "political urgency" to advance a European agenda centred on externalisation and the gradual erosion of the EU’s legal obligations.

Second Half of 2026: Legislative Developments to Watch

The European Union’s migration agenda does not end with the legislation already adopted. Several ongoing legislative processes deserve close attention, as they are likely to extend and deepen the trends outlined above.

The Facilitation Directive (see the "Facilitation" section), concerning the criminalisation of assistance to people on the move, is one of the most sensitive files currently under discussion. In its current form, it risks further undermining the work of organisations and individuals providing support to people in migration by broadening the range of situations that may be criminalised as facilitating irregular entry or stay.

The two policing regulations currently under negotiation (see the "Frontex" and "Europol 2026" sections) constitute another area requiring close scrutiny. They form part of a broader trend towards the further securitisation of borders and enhanced police cooperation on migration issues. This direction is already reflected in budgetary priorities, with spending on border control and returns expected to account for nearly 49% of the budget allocated to the European Union’s Justice and Home Affairs agencies.

In particular, the reform of the Frontex mandate (see the "Frontex" section), scheduled for 2026 and championed by Commissioner Magnus Brunner, aims to expand the powers and resources (human, financial and operational) of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. If this revision is adopted in the form advocated by the Commission, it will further strengthen the security-driven and externalised dimensions of European migration policy.

Across all these legislative files, the composition of parliamentary majorities will be decisive. The alliance between the EPP and far-right groups, first tested during negotiations on the Return Regulation, could be reconstituted, durably reshaping legislative balances within the European Parliament across the entire field of migration and security policy.

Texte written by Jeanne Olivet, May 25th, 2026.